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This study purports to examine an analogous affirmation of uncertainty in the vernacular writings of Meister Eckhart (1260-
1328/9) and Derrida, in contrast to a negative depiction of uncertainty in the early plays of Harold Pinter.
In the introductory chapter, a preliminary review of all three figures' critical backgrounds takes place as I delineate the
various interpretations which have been made of Eckhart, Derrida and Pinter.
The first real stage of the argument begins in Chapter Two. Section one examines the various similarities and differences
between Derrida's diffdrance and Eckhart's Godhead. After considering their respective contexts (that of thirteenth century
scholasticism and French structuralism) and the essentially generative role of nothingness in both vocabularies, the section examines
how Eckhart and Derrida call the notion of 'presence' into question for different reasons - 'God' can never be grasped because he is
ineffably infinite, whereas the text can never be mastered because of an infinite oscillation between finite parameters of play.
Section two examines The Homecoming in precisely these terms, showing how critics have disagreed over the play in much
the same way affirmative and negative theologians have disagreed over God - and ultimately proposing that the text of the play
eludes all interpretations, positive and negative. This section also considers how uncertainty is negatively treated in the play - as a
means of strategically dominating and humiliating other.
The first section of Chapter Three examines Eckhart and Demda's positive treatment of errancy, how both writers see the
destination as (respectively) spiritually deadening and illusory. This section examines how both writers advocate a centreless thought
(Eckhart's pathless way) along with an analogous abandonment of motivations and justifications. It also considers the analogous
difficulties which face both 'wandering thinkfcrs', who profess to abandon the destination but at the same time still want to keep to
one way rather than another.
Section two examines a correspondingly negative depiction of wandering in The Caretaker, delineating how Mick uses
unmotivated and groundless behaviour to bully and deceive the homeless tramp of the play. In the second half of section two, a
'semiotic' reading of The Caretaker is proposed which equates 'wandering' with vulnerability, rather than any notion of liberation or
spiritual freedom.
Chapter Four examines the association of certainty and representation with violence in Eckhart and Derrida. Although the
early Derrida is seen as initially skeptical towards a possible non-violent relationship with the Other, an analogous 'openness'
towards the mystery of God/the Other is finally perceived in both writers. Eckhart and Doerrida, it is shown, see the uncertainty of
God/the Other as something which must be preserved, not dispelled.
In contrast to this fundamentally positive understanding of the uncertainty of otherness in Eckhart and Derrida, section two
undertakes an examination of the Other in Pinter as radically evil. Through a neoplatonic reading of this section examines how
Pinter's darker version of the Absurd employs the theological language of ineffability and unfathomable motives to more sinister
effect. Groundless love becomes groundless malice.
Chapter Five ends with the uncertainty of the secret. Derrida's long-abiding objection that Meister Eckhart - and negative
theology in general - is the logocentric keeper of a secret, is finally dealt with. Each of the points Derrida raises against Eckhart are
systematically dealt with. This section attempts to show how the version of Eckhart Derrida deconstructs is undermined by the
existence of another, more unorthodox Eckhart whose deconstruclive implications Derrida has simply not allowed for.
The second section examines briefly whether Pinter, like Derrida's Eckhart, is the keeper of a secret - and what role secrets
play in The Birthday Party and The Dumb Waiter. It also considers the possibility that there are secrets in Pinter which ultimately
have no meaning.
In the conclusion, I summarise my findings and re-iterate my final point: that the dangers and menace of Pinter's drama
remains a sobering corrective to Eckhart and Derrida's joyful affirmation of the uncertain.
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Certainty is the region of death, uncertainty the valley of life.
- Edmond Jabes, The Book ofYukei
To sum up, briefly, the essential aim of this thesis: the study of an analogous
affirmation of uncertainty in Meister Eckhart and Derrida, in contrast to a profoundly
negative portrayal of uncertainty in the early works of Harold Pinter. The study of
two attitudes: one which extols uncertainty in all its forms (namelessness,
unpredictability, whylessness, waylessness, secrecy) as essentially life-giving and
positive, in contrast to a view which sees uncertainty in a more menacing, sinister
context. The namelessness of both Eckhart's God of love and Derrida's endlessly
proliferating differance is also the namelessness of Goldberg and McCann's
mysterious, violent organisation. The 'pathless way' Meister Eckhart exhorts us to
embark upon and the joyous errancy of the Derridean text is also the anguished
homelessness of Pinter's caretaker. The unknowability of the Eckhartian Godhead
beyond God and the uncontrollability of Derrida's text, an epistemological
uncertainty celebrated rather than resented, provides in The Homecoming nothing
more than a basis for endless mind games and ruthless power-struggles.
A secondary aim of this thesis will be to examine and compare not simply the
attitudes towards uncertainty in all three writers, but also the type of uncertainty they
deal with. Both Meister Eckhart and Derrida consider God/the text to be resistant to
all totalization, but certainly not for the same reasons. The divine ineffability of
Eckhart's God is not to be simplistically equated with the semantic instability of
Derrida's text, for reasons which are examined in Chapter One. I also hope to show
how these two types of uncertainty - one concerning infinite hermeneutical
possibility, the other infinite undecidability between a. finite number of alternatives -
both make themselves manifest in Pinter's plays. My contention is that whereas
Pinter's early plays (The Dumb Waiter, The Birthday Party) with their emphasis on a
nameless, mysterious organisation, make use of a more theological uncertainty
1 cit. in Mark C.Taylor's ErRing: A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1986)pl76
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(uncertainty as an infinitely speculative secret), later plays such as The Caretaker and
The Homecoming make use of a more terrestrial, undecidable version of uncertainty -
a "determinate oscillation between possibilities" as Derrida says in Limited Inc.2 In
the early plays, we ask: "Who do Goldberg and McCann work for? Why do they
want Stanley?" In The Caretaker and The Homecoming, the questions become: "Is
Ruth a tart or a tease? Is Aston's smile genuine or malicious?"
In a sense, this could also be seen as a study of the uncertain in negative
theology, deconstruction and the British theatre of the Absurd, even though there will
be a reluctance to use such terms in this thesis. Like most generic labels, words such
as 'absurd', 'deconstructive' and 'negative theology' take on a semantic life of their
own as soon as they appear on a page, pulling the assertions they accompany in
unwanted directions. If I have chosen to keep with the subjects' proper names, it is
partly out of a desire for accuracy, and partly out of a conviction that St Thomas does
not provide us with the only way of understanding negative theology, anymore than
Jonathan Culler gave us the last word on Derrida, or Esslin the definitive Pinter.
Something residual in all three writers necessarily exceeds these largely institutional
appropriations of their work.
This thesis must demonstrate, therefore, that Meister Eckhart was to St
Thomas and medieval Scholasticism, what Derrida is to German phenomenology and
"3
French structuralism. By re-emphasising how "no-one can really say what God is"' in
the face of Thomist scholasticism, Eckhart re-located uncertainty in the heart of the
Scholastic project - just as, by re-emphasising the uncontrollable play within the text
(even texts written by structuralists), Derrida re-introduced a disruptive uncertainty
into the foundations of both structuralism and phenomenology. This possibility that
the Christian tradition contained (and contains) within itself the potential to
deconstruct and liberate itself from a reifying onto-theology has been advocated by a
number of figures4, not least of all Derrida himself:
2 Limited Inc., trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP, 1988)
pl46
3 James M.Clark, Meister Eckhart (London: Nelson & Sons, 1957) pl58 - taken from the sermon
Homo quidam fecit
4 Kevin Hart insists that "Eckhart's definition of God deconstructs Aquinas' definition." (Trespass of
the Sign [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989] p257). John D. Caputo also writes of
Eckhart's "powerful deconstructive effort...to undo the ontotheological God" (The Mystical Element in
Heidegger's Thought [New York: Fordham University Press, 1978] pxvi). Most recently, Thomas A.
Carlson has compared Derrida and Maurice Blanchot to Marguerite Porete and Meister Eckhart in
4
...the point would seem to be to liberate theology from what has been grafted
onto it, to free it from its metaphysical super-ego...And thus, from the
perspective of faith, deconstruction can at least be a very useful technique when
Aristotelianism or Thomism are to be criticised...5
Which does not mean, of course, that Derrida excludes Meister Eckhart from his
critique of metaphysics, or feels that 'negative theology' is synonymous with
'deconstruction' - as we shall see in Chapter Five.
Umberto Eco, in the closing pages of his doctoral dissertation of Aquinas'
aesthetics, was probably one of the first to see some affinity between Structuralism
and Scholasticism: "Structuralism can find not a little of its ancestry in the Scholastic
forma mentis".6 Although hesitant in painting St Thomas as an "early kind of
Structuralist" (217), Eco does highlight the similarities between the two
systematizing approaches: the claim to be "an interdisciplinary discourse", the
proposal of a "universal logic", the claim to reduce all the human sciences to "a
single master science" (in Saussure's case, linguistics), an analogous interest in
"binary divisions" and a method of thinking "synchronically" (217). Both Eckhart
and Derrida , in their own respective ways, defeat these attempts as a system by re¬
introducing a radical uncertainty into the subjects of the scholastic/structuralist
project. By re-emphasizing God as unknowably divine and the text as an
unmasterable cluster of forces, they deconstruct the "will to a system" (to use
Nietzsche's phrase) they found themselves opposed to.7
their language concerning "an impossible death and an unknowable divine" ( see Christianity and
Literature 47:2 [1998] pi69).
5 Derrida is speaking in the interview "Derrida in America: An Interview with Jacques Derrida" in
Critical Exchange 17 (1985) pl2 - cit. in Kevin Hart's essay "Jacques Derrida : The God Effect"
from Philip Blond (ed) Post-Secular Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1998) p262
6 Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas (trans. Hugh Bredin, London: Radius, 1988) p216
7 Nietzsche writes in Twilight of the Idols: "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a
system is a lack of integrity." (trans. A. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin ,1995) p36. One of
the deliberate, unforgivable Haws of this thesis will be to intentionally ignore more recent, complex
readings of Aquinas and use him as a kind of 'straw man' for medieval scholasticism in general. The
word 'Thomist' will therefore be employed in a very narrow sense, as one who sees negative theology
merely as a corrective of positive theology. Although Wolfson presented an Aquinas who still
interpreted "certain divine attributes eminentially" (Harry A. Wolfson, Studies in the History and
Philosophy ofReligion [Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977] vol 2 p523) and as
"analogies" (p524), this orthodox understanding of St Thomas the Systematizer has been eroded by a
number of critics - starting with Josef Pieper {The Silence ofSt Thomas, 1957) and Sertillanges , who
not only stresses the apophatic in Aquinas' writings, but goes so far as to suggest the agnostic. David
Burrell has done a great deal to dispel the image of St Thomas the Scholastic, painting an Aquinas
who "retreat(s) into the chaste mysticism of silence" (David Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical
Language [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973] pl35), an Aquinas who whether one can know
anything about God at all. For Burrell, Aquinas invokes the res/modus distinction ('x in God is
5
In a very different fashion, Pinter re-introduced a new sense of uncertainty
into British drama just when the Fifties' wave of British realism was beginning to
gather momentum. Pinter's speech took on the gritty, working-class idiom of
Osborne's Jimmy Porter and Wesker's Beatie whilst simultaneously calling that
language into question. The result was an uncompromising, 'kitchen-sink' naturalism
filled with bizarre occurrences and strange silences - a new kind of play which had all
the trappings of a work by Osborne or Simpson but none of the content. If Look Back
in Anger or A Taste ofHoney had shocked audiences, Pinter's early work
disconcerted them. People who had been scandalised by the angry young diatribes of
Kenneth Haigh's Jimmy Porter were at least certain of what they had been shocked
by. The first reactions to The Birthday Party and The Caretaker - confusion, hilarity,
uncomprehending anger - reflected the profound sense of uncertainty which Pinter
had injected into British drama. An uncertainty which, for all the laughter at the
Hammersmith, nurtured a darker, more disturbing element beneath it.
This thesis, therefore, proposes to examine these two attitudes towards
uncertainty - the joyful and the woeful - and the kinds of uncertainty which provoke
them. The first half of Chapter Two will examine the critique of presence
exemplified by both Eckhart's Godhead and Derrida's differance, and examine the
analogous descriptions which both writers provide about them. In the second half, the
text of The Homecoming is used to show how Pinter critics have argued over the play
in much the same way 'affirmative' and 'negative' critics have discussed the
knowability of God (Esslin and Wardle insisting everything the characters say is true,
Almansi and Henderson indignant that everything they say is a lie) - and how the
contradictions and ambiguities in Pinter's play ultimately render the text elusive to
all unproblematic interpretations, negative and positive. I also examine the various
attitudes of the characters towards uncertainty within the play itself, to show how
there are two kinds of character-type in Pinter: those who flee uncertainty, and those
who ruthlessly exploit it.
unimaginably x' )and yet "his practice contradicts it" (139). Burrell finds passages in Aquinas where
the apophatic seems to gain the upper hand - such as this moment in the commentary on Boethius:
"...when we come to the end of our knowledge, we acknowledge God as the unknown, because the
mind has made the most progress when it realizes that God lies beyond anything that it can
comprehend." (Burrell, 142 - cit. from In Libro Boethii de Trinitcitis expositio , Book 1:2, ad 1)
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Chapter Three considers uncertainty through the motif of 'wandering'. It
examines how both Eckhart and Derrida advocate actions 'without why', an
analogous distrust of motivations and destinations which is found in both writers.
The loss of centre - which for Eckhart translates as the abandonment of the concept
of God - is seen as a liberating gesture, not a lamenting one. Such a positive, life-
affirming view of wandering and aimlessness is presented in stark contrast to the
anguished tramp in The Caretaker, whose vagrancy never means anything other than
vulnerability. Through a 'semiotic' reading of The Caretaker, seeing Davies as the
wandering text, we see how the very absence of textual origins - seen by Derrida as
leading to joyous errancy - only ever results for Davies in desperation and terror, as
he is ruthlessly interpreted and re-interpreted by those around him. To wander is not
always an expression of freedom.
Chapter Four considers the possibility of 'certainty' as violence. It examines
the attitude towards names, violence and the Mystery of the Other in all three writers.
Beginning with a common understanding of eponymy as violent in Eckhart and
Derrida, Chapter Four locates in both writers an analogous openness towards the
Other, an openness which consists in a refusal to name, conceptualise or anticipate
the Other in anyway at all, a simple acknowledgement of the Other's radical
incommensurability. This positive , affirming version of the Other is contrasted with
the darker version found in The Birthday Party. Pinter's play about a man who is
gradually subjugated, crushed and absorbed into a mysterious organization is
compared with the Neoplatonic assimilation of the Eckhartian soul as it progresses
through the various stages of its journey towards silent union with the ineffable One.
The ineffability of Goldberg and McCann's mystery, however, is not loving but
malicious, a nameless entity which seeks through its agents to inflict harm upon
others, inexplicably and unconditionally. In this sense, I try to show how Pinter - like
Kafka and Ionesco - represents a darker strain of the tradition of the Absurd, one
which constitutes a sinister re-working of the various vocabularies of negative
theology and Neoplatonism.
In the final chapter, which examines uncertainty understood as 'secrecy',
Derrida's long-abiding position on Meister Eckhart and negative theology in general
is finally considered. Derrida's insistence on Eckhart as ultimately being, for all his
deconstructive characteristics, the keeper of a secret, is met with an objection: that
7
Derrida's interpretation of Eckhart as ultimately returning God to onto-theology,
although relatively valid, fails to take into account the wilder, less orthodox moments
of an other Eckhart, one who cannot simply be re-inscribed within a scholastic, onto-
theological tradition. In the second section of Chapter Five, I examine whether
Pinter, like Eckhart, is the keeper of a secret. I also consider the role of the secret in
The Dumb Waiter, and suggest that what secrets there are in Pinter's plays are almost
always malicious - hidden desires to kill, maim or humiliate. The secret, which in
Eckhart's sermons is usually the secret of God's holy Word, bringing love and
spiritual renewal, only brings death to Gus in The Dumb Waiter.
Before beginning with the real kem of the argument in Chapter Two, we shall
briefly review the critical background to all three writers. It is a review of all the
various Eckharts, Derridas and Pinters which have influenced this study, a review
which cannot claim to be comprehensive, but which does give an idea of the
extraordinary possibilities which any of the studied texts allows for.
1.1 Which Eckhart?
Inevitably, any brief survey of Eckhart criticism cannot hope to address the
startling diversity of readings which the Dominican master has provoked. The most
this section can do is to provide a general outline of the critical background, dwelling
for a moment on some of the more significant studies of relevance to this thesis,
whilst at the same time mentioning some of the more ideologically-motivated
appropriations of Eckhart's work which have been made over the years. For a more
detailed and chronological account of the development of Eckhart criticism, see
Chapter 1 of Oliver Davies' 1991 work, beginning with Franz von Baader - allegedly
the father ofmodern Eckhart studies - and also Giorgio Penzo's 1997 study Invito al
Pensiero di Eckhart, which places particular emphasis on Nicholas of Cusa's role in
Q
the re-discovery of Eckhart's works (pp83-109). Probably the most comprehensive
and illuminating study of Eckhart's reception in German thought remains
8 Oliver Davies, Meister Eckhart: Mystical Theologian (London: SPCK, 1991); Giorgio Penzo, Invito
al Pensiero di Eckhart (Milan: Bompiani, 1997).
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Degenhardt's 1967 work Studien Zum Wandel des Eckhartbildes, with particularly
strong chapters on Schopenhauer and the Nazification of Eckhart.9
Regarding the impossibility of arriving at a single, exclusive interpretation of
Eckhart, Etienne Gilson has perhaps best summed up the hermeneutical dilemmas
facing any would-be interpreter of the Meister:
The difficult lies not in finding a good interpretation of Meister Eckhart, but
rather in making a choice between so many coherent interpretations, founded on
irreproachable texts [sur des textes irrecusables] and yet different between them
sometimes to the point of complete contradiction...the problem is that after
having constructed one interpretation, one realises one could have elaborated
another, completely different and yet based on texts no less authentic than the
preceding one [non moins authentiques que la precedente - own trans.]10
Any perusal of even the most nominal Eckhart bibliography will confirm this -
Catholic Eckharts, Protestant Eckharts, Nazi Eckharts, Marxist Eckharts,
Zen/Hindu/Mahayana Eckharts, heretical Eckharts, muddled/mediocre Eckharts,
Eckharts who had nothing to do with the Protestant Reformation and Eckharts who
were single-handedly responsible for it. Although a diverse critical reception is a
common fate for practically every widely-read thinker, Eckhart's own critical legacy
has attracted an unusually diverse following (from Nazi intellectuals such as Alfred
Rosenberg to Zen scholars such as D.T.Suzuki) for a number of reasons: the absence
of any definitive edition of Eckhart's sermons and treatises until at least 1936
(Pfeiffer's 1857 edition, although of undeniable importance, also contained a great
deal of wrongly-attributed material); the alleged differences between the Latin and
the German works, differences which for some (Koch, for example") are merely a
question of tone, whilst for others distinguish (as McGinn puts it) the "vibrant and
i ^
creative vernacular preacher" from the "dry and uninteresting scholastic writer" ; the
marginality of Eckhart as posthumously-convicted heretic, which has drawn from
sympathetic parties a number of 'anti-clerical' or overtly 'unorthodox'
9
Ingeborg Degenhardt, Studien zum Wandel des Eckhartbildes (Leiden, 1967)
10 taken from Gilson's preface to Vladmir Lossky's Theologie Negative chez Maitre Eckhart (Paris,
1973)p9
1 In Koch's oft-cited essay "Zur Analogielehre Meister Eckharts" (Kurt Ruh (ed), Altdeutsche und
Altniederlandische Mystik [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964] ) insists upon the
"closed unity" of Eckhart's thought, as opposed to an "unclear syncretism, whose heterogeneous
elements are violently and inorganically combined [gewaltsam und unorganisch verbindet]" p277
12 Bernard McGinn, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1986) vol 2,
pi - not McGinn's viewpoint. Alois Haas talks of the "distancing objectification" of the language of
the Latin works, in contrast to the German works' "directness of engaged and intentional
language"(taken from "Schools of Late Medieval Mysticism" in Bernard McGinn(ed), Christian
Spirituality [London: Routledge & Kegan, 1987] pi47).
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interpretations; and finally, Eckhart's own highly original language and striking use
of imagery, an adventurous style which for many critics has resulted in a number of
straightforward contradictions.13
The existence of such a wide diversity of readings does prompt an impulse
towards the other extreme - namely, an instinctive closure towards any
'contemporary' interpretation and an insistence that Eckhart can only be understood
within his own immediate context. C.F.Kelley's 1977 study, Meister Eckhart on
Divine Knowledge, is one such example. After boldly stating how his book
"supersedes all former interpretations of Eckhart's teaching" (partly as a result of "an
ignorance of Eckhart's Latin writings" and partly by too many scholars being
"limited by an education in modern philosophy"14) Kelley goes on to extol an
Eckhart "wholly traditional in the truest sense" (xiv). The perfectly valid desire to
ground one's reading of Eckhart in his original tradition becomes, for Kelley, the
desire to return Eckhart to such a tradition, safe from the clutches of "modern
philosophy" (a phrase used repeatedly throughout the book). A much more moderate
and reasoned plea for context comes from Turner's excellent book The Darkness of
God (1995):
What is the contemporary reader going to make of Eckhart's radical doctrines of
detachment and of the nothingness of the self if they are ripped up from their
roots in Neoplatonic apophaticism , except some 'mere' metaphors, no doubt
satisfyingly redolent of Buddhism?11'
Which all rather depends on whether one feels a proliferation of interpretations to
be a good thing or a bad one. Although there is much truth in Turner's remark,
two points need to be made: first of all, there is nothing "contemporary" about
Eastern readings of Eckhart - Schopenhauer was equating the Meister with
Buddha as early as 185916,and Rudolf Otto's comparative study of Eckhart and
Sankara (West-Ostliche Mystik) dates back to 1926. Secondly, the notion that one
should forever read a text in the light of its original context (in this case, forever
13 Oliver Davies sums this up best: "[Eckhart] tells us that our union with God is not love but
knowledge (Sermon W 72), not knowledge but love (Sermon W 77). Speaking also of the birth of God
in the soul, he tells us that it is both intellect (Sermon 23) and not intellect (Sermon W 72), that it is to
be identified with grace in one sermon (Sermon W 68) and not in another (Sermon W 41)."In Oliver
Davies, Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings, (London: Penguin, 1994) pxxxiv
14 C. F. Kelley, Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge (New Haven :Yale University Press, 1977)
pxii-xiii
15
Denys Turner, The Darkness ofGod (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp266-7
16 See Ingeborg Degenhardt, Studien zum Wandel des Eckhartbildes (Leiden: Brill,1967) pl58
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read Eckhart in the light of Proclus and Dionysius) would surely be alien to the
medieval mind, and certainly to Eckhart's own occasionally wild hermeneutics -
consider his highly original interpretations of "Mary and Martha" and the "Casting
out of the Money Lenders". 7
If Kelley's insistence on a "wholly traditional" Eckhart appears simplistic,
this is partly due to the debate over what kind of 'traditional' context Eckhart
should be considered in - as a straightforward Scholastic in the Thomist tradition
(Otto Karrer, Denifle, et al) or through the influence of Maimonides, Proclus and
Dionysius as a thinker with a much more Neoplatonic frame ofmind (Lossky,
Schiirmann, Turner). Davies is convinced that Eckhart "needs fundamentally to be
considered within the context of the German Dominican school which fashioned
1 o
him". Which would mean understanding Eckhart in the light of such writers as
Dietrich von Freiburg and, of course, Albert the Great. The German Dominicans'
unusually Augustinian emphasis on self-knowledge (on the divine intellect within
us) would play down the Thomist, and ultimately Aristotelian elements in
Eckhart, a move few neo-Thomist scholars would agree with.
Given the internal strife in Eckhart scholarship over a number of issues - the
question of Eckhart's (un)orthodoxy, the historical circumstances surrounding his
trial, his exact relationship to the Thomist tradition, the (dis)parity between his
Latin and German works, the alleged incompatibility between his two metaphors
of the birth of the Son in the ground of the soul and the breakthrough
(.Durchbruch) to the Godhead, not to mention the precise extent of God's
ineffability in Eckhart - it comes as no surprise that less theologically-orientated
readings encounter a similar range of diversity. Although lying in diametrically
opposite directions, politically-motivated appropriations of Eckhart by both
Marxist (Bloch, Ley) and Nazi critics (Rosenberg) do share one thing in common:
a de-transcendentalising of Eckhartian motifs, a perceived desire to emphasize the
divine in man at the expense of the divine in God as a liberating gesture. In Ernst
Bloch, Eckhart's insistence on the unity of God and the soul becomes a
subversive, emancipatory gesture which ultimately sees "the treasure in Heaven
17
Davies, Meister Eckhart, p 155
18
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[as] the property ofman" {die Schdtze im Himmel als Eigentum der Mensch ).19
Thus for Bloch, Eckhart supplies not just an "aspiring subject" but also a "blown-
open, descending heavenly kingdom" (gesprengter, niedersteigender Himmel)}0
9 1
In the middle of his work DerMythus des XX.Jahrhunderts (1930) , Alfred
Rosenberg dedicated the central chapters to Meister Eckhart, a figure he saw as
the Nordic apostle of a new, Germanic Christianity, one which would "overcome
Syrian dogma and awake the God in our own breast" (219). Although
Rosenberg's reading shares with both Bloch and Ley an Eckhart set against
institutionalised religion and an emphasis on the divinity in man, Rosenberg's
scholarship is distinctly inferior. Painting Eckhart as the last champion of manly,
Aryan values in an otherwise Semitic Christian faith, Rosenberg laments the
petering out of the Meister's vigorous sense of the divine into the effeminate
sentimentality of Angelus Silesius. It is a reading in many ways reminiscent of
Baumler's Nietzsche, wishful to the point of absurdity. Using Buttner's edition of
the sermons, Rosenberg manages to invent an Eckhart where "race and self, blood
and soul lie in close connection with one another" (Rasse und Ich, Blut und Seele
stehen im engen Zusammenhang, 258), an Eckhart whose message is not for those
of mixed race, but rather for those "of the same or related blood" {des gleichen
oder verwandten Blutes, 258).
The profusion of Eastern readings of Eckhart (Otto, Schomerus, Suzuki,
Ueda) do seem to reflect a tremendous desire to see Eckhart as some form of
proto-Buddhist in the West. Whether this proposition is viable is another question,
although such 'eastern' perspectives have opened up the critical debate in an
interesting way {pace Turner). Rudolf Otto's Mysticism East and West (first
published in English in 1932) constitutes one of the first major confrontations of
Eckhart with an eastern thinker - in Otto's case, the ninth century Indian sage
22Sankara. Otto sees "an almost identical metaphysic" in the two figures, linking
the Sanskrit terms 'maya' and 'adavaita' with Eckhartian 'multiplicity' and 'non-
19 Ernst Bloch, Atheismus im Christentum - found in his Gesamtausga.be (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1968) vol 14 p95
20
ibid, p287
21 Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des XX. Jahrhunderts ( Munich, 1930)
22 RudolfOtto, Mysticism: East and West, trans. Bertha L. Bracey and Richenda C. Payne (London:
Collier Books, 1932) p4
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duality'. Probably one of the clearest (and fairest) considerations of the 'eastern'
Eckhart by an Eckhart scholar can be found in the final pages of Schtirmann's
1978 work24; Schtirmann lists eight alleged similarities between Zen Buddhism
and Eckhart's thought, proposed by Suzuki in his Mysticism: Christian and
Buddhist, and then goes on to evaluate the validity of each one. Amongst others,
Suzuki associates Eckhartian isticheit with Buddhist tathata or 'is-ness',
gelazenheit with 'emptiness' or sunyata, Lao-Tzu's Tao with Eckhart's Godhead
and the divine spark in the soul with Zen satori. Despite Suzuki's confident claim
that Eckhart's thought is "singularly Mahayanistic"25, somewhat cautiously
Schiirmann concedes a substantial resemblance only on the last point.
Another genre of Eckhart-interpretations which might be said to have
developed over the past fifty years could be called 'Heideggerian' readings of
Eckhart. Kate Oltmanns' 1935 study attempts to read Eckhart in the light of Being
and Time. Oltmanns, herself a student on Heidegger's 1919 lecture course on
medieval mysticism, presents Eckhart's "dialectical relationship" of the soul to God.
God is understood as "freedom", a freedom which the soul simultaneously must be
and cannot be, which has rather bleak consequences for the unhappy Dasein which
seeks to escape the facticity of its thrownness - Eckhart "wishes only to show us that
96
we have to love Being as it is"." Two later studies of Heidegger and Eckhart
(Schiirmann, 1972, and Caputo, 1978) choose rather to emphasise the resemblance
between the later Heidegger and Eckhart. Schiirmann sees the Eckhartian soul as the
ground/clearing where "the One conflicts with the multiple"27, a "three-fold play of
God, man and the world" (114) which prefigures the four-fold Heideggerian Geviert.
Hence, he sees the Eckhartian openness to God in the same light as Heidegger's
"openness towards the favours of the Mystery", the new ground where we can
glimpse the concealing-unconcealing nature of Being.
John D. Caputo, at least in his 1978 work The Mystical Element in Heidegger's
Thought, follows a similar line, seeing the ground of the soul as a "clearing" where
23
ibid, p4
24 Reiner Schumann, Meister Eckhart ( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978) pp221-6
25 cit. in Schurmann, 222
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God may "take place".28 For Caputo, the common ground between Heidegger and
Eckhart lies in "a distrust of the Idols ofmetaphysics and their openness to the
Mystery"(xxiii). Significantly, Caputo also sees in Eckhart "a powerful
deconstructive effort...to undo the onto-theological God" (xvi), although it is only in
his later book Radical Hermeneutics (1987) that he talks about Eckhart in relation to
contemporary hermeneutics as "one of the great masters of disruption"29, a
description which places his Eckhart very close to the reading of the Meister
presented in this thesis. Caputo is also one of the few people to have written
exclusively about Derrida and Meister Eckhart. In "Mysticism and Transgression"
(1989) he admits that Eckhart was ultimately 'logocentric', but cites Eckhart's prayer
"I pray God to rid me of God" as a "prayer against closure".30 He also draws attention
to a common predilection in both thinkers for playing with words - noting how
throughout his sermons, Eckhart puns on ave (as in 'ave Maria') and ane we
('pathless'), adeler ('eagle') and edeler ('nobleman'). The extent to which Meister
Eckhart's thought is logocentric - and thereby still belongs to a metaphysics of
presence - shall be examined in the final chapter.
1.2 Which Derrida?
If one were naive enough to ask for some empirical 'proof of the disseminative
possibilities of texts, the reception of Derrida's own works would be sufficient to
show how no author can ever control the responses of their readers. Like Eckhart, the
versions of Derrida which have appeared since his introduction to the English-
speaking world are disconcertingly at odds with one another: De Man's story-teller,
Norris' rigorous thinker, Altizer's Kabbalist, Gasche's System-builder, Rorty's
playful exposer of hidden logoi, Habermas' mystic...Derrida's texts have undergone a
somewhat ironic dissemination of their own, one which seems to show no signs of
ending.
28 John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1978) pi07
29 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) p4
30 John D. Caputo, "Mysticism and Transgression: Meister Eckhart and Derrida" in Hugh J. Silverman
(ed), Derrida and Deconstruction (London: Routledge and Kegan,1989) p33
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Critical disagreement with Derrida, apart from often failing to distinguish his
work from a much more generic understanding of 'deconstruction', manifests itself in
two ways: firstly, in a basic disagreement with what Derrida is 'perceived' to be
saying (that 'no context can absolutely determine a meaning', that 'there is nothing
outside the text', that 'all interpretations are misinterpretations'); secondly, in a
conviction that Derrida's writings either advocate or unwittingly result in an
intellectual/moral irresponsibility. Although the second objection often follows on
from the first, there are critics who, whilst sympathetic to the general drift of
Derrida's thought, nevertheless retain a certain unease towards the moral and
political ambivalence of deconstruction.31 The problematic biographies of Heidegger
and de Man, in this respect, have not helped the status of deconstruction.
Although objections to Derrida vary in tone and motive, most do seem to
involve a charge of 'mystification' or 'incoherence'. Habermas, in a reading based
more on Culler than Derrida32, sees a theorist who "promotes a mystification of
palpable sociable pathologies" (181), who remains "close to Jewish mysticism" (182)
and who ultimately represents the "mysticism of the New Paganism" (184). Although
Habermas' refusal to see Derrida in any other context than that of Heidegger33
facilitates this charge of 'mysticism', Habermas is actually indebted to Susan
Handelmann for her earlier placement of Derrida in the Jewish tradition of rabbinical
hermeneutics. It is precisely this perceived belief of Derrida in the "absolute
31 For an excellent review of this scene, see Michael Fischer's "Deconstruction and the Redemption of
Difference" (in Wendell Harris(ed), Beyond Poststructuralism: The Speculations of Theory and The
Experience ofReading [ Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Press, 1996] pp259-277). Fischer, who
feels the political activists' "dismissal of deconstruction has been too sweeping" (259), maintains
deconstruction can still supply "a much needed perspective on [social] action " (275), even though
with apolitical critics it can "license indecisiveness" (274). For a passionately (and amusingly) Marxist
response to the perceived irresponsibility/impotency of Derrida's thought, see Terry Eagleton's
famous "Marxism and Deconstruction" (Contemporary Literature [Fall 1981] 477-488). Eagleton,
although willing to admit that "Derrida's dismantling might be richly resourceful" (486), ultimately
sees its use as discouraging any notion of political critique ("What could be less deconstructed than the
facts?" 486). Deconstruction, by proposing "a problematic which tends to see meaning itself as
terroristic" (480), derails all useful political theory by robbing it of its truth claim. In a world without
facts, Eagleton argues, how will anyone protest about anything?
32
Jiirgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse ofModernity (Boston: MIT Press 1987). In the
footnotes of Limited Inc, Derrida accuses Habermas of not having read a single word of his texts, and
of having used instead Johnathan Culler's On Deconstruction. See Jeffrey Nealon's "The Discipline of
Deconstruction" in PMLA 107 (1992) pi275-6
33Habermas calls Derrida at various points an "authentic disciple" of Heidegger (161), an "orthodox
Heideggerian" (165) and arrives at the conclusion that "Derrida's attempt to go beyond Heidegger
does not escape at aporetic structure of a truth-occurrence eviscerated of all truth-as-validity" (167)
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readability of the text"(166) which angers Habermas, who sees in it the kern of
Derrida's levelling of the distinction between philosophical and literary texts.
Anglo-American objections to Derrida's works (from figures such as Abrams,
Ellis and Searle) invoke a similar vocabulary of 'common sense' in their opposition
to what they feel to be Derrida's 'nonsense'. John Searle, in a debate which has been
ongoing with Derrida for almost twenty years, paints a Derrida who is "ignoran(t) of
the history of the philosophy of language" (one wonders whether Wittgenstein, who
claimed to read so little philosophy, would have agreed with the spirit of this
rebuttal). Searle insists that "any use of any concept is always relative to a
Background [a context]", and this "renders a certain context-free account of meaning
and intentionality impossible".34 Searle invokes his theories of the "Background" and
the "Network" to refute Derrida's proposal that no context can ever absolutely
determine a meaning , ironically castigating Derrida for not reading Austin in the
context ofWittgenstein (and thereby insisting that Derrida participates in the
discussion on his terms, not Derrida's). John Ellis' wonderfully readable book
Against Deconstruction (1989) also fails to enter into any genuine spirit of dialogue
with Derrida, whom he accuses of 'mysticism'(8), self-contradiction(13), of a
complete incomprehension of Saussure (22) and, ultimately, of a "contribution to the
debate on language and meaning" which is neither "substantial", "coherent" nor
"revolutionary" (66).35
Ironically, the very 'mysticism' Habermas, Ellis et al deride Derrida for is
extolled, by 'death-of-God' theologians such as Thomas Altizer and Mark C.Taylor,
as a central element of his thought. Although Altizer identifies a Derrida who "has
unveiled his own ground in Lurianic Kabbalism"36, Altizer's interpretation is by no
means a 'religious' appropriation of Derrida, but is rather concerned with a "de-
mythologising" figure, one who affirms the death of God "with a certain laughter and
a certain dance" (150). The Kabbalistic proliferation of meanings, so unacceptable to
Ellis and Searle, is celebrated as an affirmation "that the end of history has occurred"
(168). For Taylor, Derrida's overturning of binary oppositions offer "a revolutionary
34 taken from John Searle's essay "Literary Theory and its Discontents" in Wendell Harris' Beyond
Poststructuralism, pi07
35 John Ellis, Against Deconstruction (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989)
36 taken from "History as Apocalypse" in Thomas J. Altizer (ed), Deconstruction and Theology (New
York: Crossroad, 1982) pi48
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reading of writing that reveals scripture anew". In this sense, deconstruction is "the
hermeneutic of the death ofGod" (6), a gesture which liberates the Book from its
Author, the text from its context, to result in "an unending play of surfaces"(16).
With their emphasis on infinite interpretations and indeterminate meanings,
such readings of Derrida - both hostile and sympathetic - have in turn provoked their
own school of Derrida readings, which we shall call the 'rigorous' school for want of
a better term. Its main exponents (Culler, Norris, Gasche) insist on the coherence and
consistency of Derrida's writings, often with a clarity of style and argument very
different from Derrida's own distinctive language, and present a 'serious'
philosopher working in a philosophical tradition of Kant, Hegel and Husserl. Gasche,
automatically against any reading of Derrida which would advocate "licentious free
play"38, takes it upon himself to carefully and impressively systematize Derrida's
thought, turning differance into "the system or chain beyond Being of the various
infrastructures or undecidables".39 What is most interesting about Gasche's
understanding of Derrida and deconstruction is that he sees it not so much as
'mystifying' but explicating, an "attempt to 'account for a heterogeneous variety...of
discursive inequalities...that continue to haunt even the successful development of
philosophical arguments".40 In contrast to critics such as Caputo, who sees Derrida as
a "hermeneutical trouble-maker"41, Gasche's Derrida sorts out and explains the
"inconsistencies" in philosophical systems and their expositions.
To some extent, Norris follows the same line. He presents a Derrida who "has
distanced his own thinking from a generalized 'post-modern' or post-structuralist
discourse".42 Norris insists that Habermas has misread Derrida as "reduc(ing) all
texts to an undifferentiated 'freeplay' of signification", thus dissolving all
"disciplinary borderlines" to turn philosophy into "one kind of writing amongst
others, with no special claim to validity or truth".43 This would be only a "very partial
reading" of Derrida, ignoring his "philosophical seriousness" and basing itself on a
37 Mark C. Taylor, ErRing: A Postmodern A/Theology,p 13
38
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handful of well-known moments from the Derridean oeuvre ("Limited Inc. abc", the
last paragraph of "Structure, Sign and Play", the 'Envois' section from La Carte
Postale...).44 The idea that Derrida is (in Norris' words) "in the mainstream tradition
from Kant to Husserl and Frege"45 is also shared by Culler - as Jeffrey Nealon points
out, it is probably Culler's version of Derrida which has been disseminated the most
in American campuses.
Rorty provides one of the most interesting objections to this exclusively
philosophical re-appropriation of Derrida. He makes a distinction between the 'early'
Derrida (Margins ofPhilosophy, Writing and Difference, OfGrammatology) - a
serious philosopher who "wants to find words which express the conditions of
possibility of all previous theory"46,and his later work (Glas, The Post Card) which
"simply drops theory...in favour of fantasising about those predecessors, playing with
them" 47 The serious theorist gradually becomes the playful underminer of other
people's theories. Rorty thinks Gasche, Culler et al take Derrida too seriously,
attributing to him a quasi-transcendental status he doesn't deserve , paying him
"logocentric compliments" when he is, in fact, one of "the enemies of
logocentrism".48 For Rorty, Derrida is not so much a 'theorist' , but simply one who
shows the pointlessness of all theorizing in a new and original way.
'Eastern' interpretations of Derrida are numerous (Coward, Loy, Yeh) and
arouse less controversy than those of Eckhart, if only because Derrida himself has
made several references to Eastern languages as a possible model for the 'Other' in
his thought. In an essay on "Deconstruction and Taoism", Hong Chu Fu notes a
number of superficial similarities with the thought of Lao-Tzu, comparisons which
turn out to be "largely negative"49, even though they are not without significance.
Hong Chu Fu sees the major difference to be one of transcendence - whereas Derrida
"displays rigorous reasoning ...to analyze closely various problems", Taoists are more
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Coward, in his analysis of Derrida and Indian philosophy, is more assertive.
Comparing Sankara's evasions on Brahman with Derrida's 'neither this nor that'
depiction of differance, Coward arrives at a negated "Brahman" which "is
functionally not much different" from Derrida's differance.50 Throughout his
writings, Coward adopts a reading of Derrida which is intensely ethical -
deconstruction is, we are told at one point, "a means for spiritual realization" which
"infuse(s) us with a divine demand for moral action"51, and in a later book, we learn
that "the consideration of human relationships [is] the goal of Derrida's philosophy
of language". In comparing Derrida with possible Eastern counterparts, David Loy
probably goes furthest of all, claiming that deconstruction is "from a Buddhist point
of view, logocentric". Loy compares Derrida with the second-century Buddhist sage
Nagarjuna, whose 'sunyata' "parallels the Poststructuralist radicalization of
structuralist claims about language" (233). Loy believes that, unlike deconstruction,
Nagarjuna's 'sunyata' was not a theory - deconstruction is logocentric "because it
seeks liberation through and in language" (239). Our way of solving the problem,
says Loy, turns out to be what maintains the problem (248).
Finally, one of the more relevant appraisals of Derrida to be considered -
relevant, that is, to the concerns of this thesis - lies in the writings of Kevin Hart.
Like Mark C.Taylor, Hart sees deconstruction as "a new way of reading texts".54
Unlike Taylor, he does not consider deconstruction to be a priori "atheistic", "non-
theological" or "counter-theological".55 Working with what is probably a Christian
agenda, Hart's aim in his 1989 study (as well as his most recent essay this year) is to
retrieve deconstruction from "contexts that were at the least secular and at the most
determinedly atheistic".56 Deconstruction is seen as a useful tool, one which might
help work towards the development of a "non-metaphysical theology" 7 by liberating
faith from its metaphysical shackles. In God Without Being (Dieu Sans L'Etre) Jean-
Luc Marion performs a similar re-appropriation of Nietzsche and Heidegger - a
50 Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (eds), Derrida and Negative Theology (Albany: SUNY Press,
1992) p204
51 ibid, p216, 222
52 Harold Coward, Derrida and Indian Philosophy (New York, 1990) pi 3
53 David Loy's "The Deconstruction of Buddhism" in Coward(ed), Derrida and Negative Theology,
p227
34 Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, p 19
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56 Kevin Hart's essay "The God Effect" in Philip Blond (ed), Post-secular Philosophy, p260
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Nietzsche who would "affirm new gods" and whose Gotzendammerung is "a
liberation of the divine"58, a Heidegger for whom "to cross out^€£^ does not mean
God disappears as a concept", but simply demonstrates "that His unthinkableness
saturates our thought"(46). Whether such Christian responses to/appropriations of
postmodernity can ever successfully abandon the onto-theo-logic without
compromising the essence of their thinking, remains another question.
1.3 Which Pinter?
As in the case of Meister Eckhart and Derrida, any attempt to comprehensively
address the proliferating diversity of 'Pinter-crit' within two thousand words is
doomed to reductive precis and oversimplified paraphrase. Since those fateful first
reviews of The Birthday Party in May 1958, the wealth of writing on Pinter has
mushroomed to Shakespearean proportions. Not simply books on Pinter but books on
books on Pinter - most notably Susan Hollis Merritt's Pinter in Play (1990), by far
the most exhaustive and dedicated study of Pinter criticism, of what have now
become quasi-theological debates over Pinter's scriptures.59 As our study of the
Pinter plays involved in this thesis - The Homecoming, The Caretaker, The Birthday
Party and The Dumb Waiter - will all include a review of each play's critical
background, the main aim of this section is simply to outline the key areas in the
general debate over Pinter's contribution, whilst referring the reader both to Merritt
and to specific parts of this thesis for further elaboration.
The debate, inevitably, begins with Esslin. Although by no means the first
person to write about Pinter, Esslin's early placing of the playwright in his Theatre of
the Absurd (1961) - thereby directly inserting Pinter into a tradition of the Absurd
alongside Beckett and Ionesco - remains a significant gesture in any history of Pinter
criticism. It supplied the kind of position which critical debates so often need; a
central critical view, at first radical, which slowly becomes orthodox and then
obsolete, espoused by an influential figure whom critics either rally around or
77
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violently disagree with. In The Peopled Wound60, Esslin reiterates his general
position, which is by no means a simplistic painting of Pinter the Absurdist. He is
keen to stress a certain duality in Pinter, "the most extreme naturalism of surface
description" along with the simultaneous evocation of a more surreal "dreamlike,
poetic feeling" (229). Although not averse to introducing psychoanalytical motifs
into his readings (see my section on The Homecoming, 2.2.1) not to mention an
insistence on the biographical importance of certain elements of Pinter's plays, Esslin
sees Pinter's "integrity as a poet" (227) as an important element in any reading - an
understanding that Pinter's vision "is essentially a lyrical vision" (233).
Critics such as Hinchliffe and Fricker follow this initial demarcation to a
large extent, seeing Pinter largely in the light of European Absurdism and
existentialism. Hinchliffe considers Pinter to be "the English representative of the
Absurd stage"61 , seeing plays such as The Dwarfs as coming "very close to the
problems of Roquentin in Nausea" (28). Ultimately, we are dealing with a playwright
whose language "is employed to make us constantly aware of the essential loneliness
of the human condition" (164). Such existential concerns, however, should not blind
us to the peculiarly East End flavour of Pinter's speech - a fortuitous meeting which
successfully "combine(s) the European Absurd with native wit" (165). Once again,
Pinter the Absurdist blurs with Pinter the Naturalist, perpetuating a debate which has
lasted a good deal longer than the critical currency of such terms.
In response to such an 'Absurdist' labelling of Pinter, many critics (John Lahr,
John Russell Taylor, Katherine J. Worth) have sought to re-emphasize the earthier,
'real-life' elements in Pinter's work, placing him in a much more British 'kitchen-
sink' tradition (a la Osborne, Simpson and Delaney). Thus John Russell Taylor,
whilst acknowledging Pinter's "air ofmystery and uncertainty" , is also equally
interested in "an almost uncannily accurate reproduction of everyday speech", one
which leads Taylor to the assertion that Pinter is "the stage's most ruthless and
uncompromising naturalist" (357). Such an emphasis on presenting characters 'as
they are and without stilts' inevitably leads to Chekhovian comparisons. " Dukore ,
60 Martin Esslin, The Peopled Wound (London: Methuen 1970)
61 taken from the preface to Arnold Hinchliffe, Harold Pinter ( Boston : Twayne Publishers, 1967)
62 John Russell Taylor, Anger and After(London: Methuen, 1962) p225
63
see John Lahr's "Pinter and Chekhov: The Bond of Naturalism" in Arthur Ganz (ed), Pinter: A
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in particular, sees Chekhov's aversion towards 'statement' and insistence upon the
artist as "impartial witness" (142) as indicative of Pinter, whose "dialogue conforms
to this naturalistic tradition ...of social verisimilitude"64. For Dukore, Pinter simply
depicts - despite such "surface naturalism", there lies beneath no definable,
paraphrasable meaning (4).
As language plays such a central part per se in Pinter's plays, it is not
surprising that a number of studies have devoted themselves to exclusively linguistic
analyses of Pinter's texts. Austin Quigley's The Pinter Problem (1975) is probably
the most important, adopting as it does an unequivocally Wittgensteinian approach.
Just as Wittgenstein saw his attempts to resolve philosophy's problems as "showing
the fly the way out of the fly-bottle", so Quigley sees the only way of overcoming the
"impasse in Pinter criticism" is to "clarify the ways in which a Pinter play works".65
Quigley sees "proliferation" but not "progression" in Pinter studies, a lack of
development which occurs because critics are "unable to build upon accurate
perceptions" (22). With this, Quigley has in his sights the "reference theory of
meaning" which "dominates our criticism...decades after its inadequacy has been
convincingly demonstrated"(27). Andrew Kennedy, although arriving at radically
different conclusions, also sees Pinter's use of language as "the principal interest in
each play"66, one which reaches "a level of mimesis" untouched even by Eliot or
Beckett (167).
Female centred-studies of Pinter are by no means as numerous as they should
be, given the number of female critics writing on his plays. Michelene Wandor's
disappointing Look Back in Gender provides nothing more than a standard
paraphrase of Pinter's plays, whose main motif is - unsurprisingly - "an obscene
authority controlling the values by which people live".67 Of much more interest is
Elizabeth Sakellaridou's Pinter's Female Portraits (1988), which sees as its main
concern "Pinter's problematic treatment of female characters". Working with a
distinctly Freudian/Jungian vocabulary, she sees even in Pinter's later work " a
strange lingering fondness ...for closed male circles which lock out any female
64 Bernard Dukore, Harold Pinter (London: Macmillan 1988) pi42-3
65 Austin Quigley, The Pinter Problem (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975) pxviii
66 Andrew Kennedy, Six Dramatists in Search ofa Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 1975) pi65
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presence".68 Which is not to say that Pinter's attitude towards his female characters
has stagnated over the years - on the contrary, the "initial biased sexist attitudes" of
the earlier works "eventually crystallizes into a gentler, totally androgynous vision"
(11).
Such political /ethical possibilities in Pinter - not just the later , more
politically conscious plays such as Mountain Language but also the earlier works
dealt with in this thesis - have not always received the maximum attention, partly
because of Pinter's own understandable attempts to distance his work from any
perceivable 'message' or 'statement'. Ruby Cohn and Penelope Prentice provide two
examples, separated by almost thirty years, of a very early and a very recent attempt
to re-emphasise the ethical in Pinter. Cohn's famous 1962 essay adopts what is
essentially a humanistic reading of Pinter, a playwright whose intention (and here
Cohn cites John Wain's words ) "is to assert the importance of humanity in the teeth
of whatever is currently trying to annihilate that importance".69 For Cohn, each of
Pinter's plays depicts "the virtual annihilation of an individual" (Gus, Stanley,
Davies) - Pinter's rage is directed against a faceless, anonymous System, which
crushes and absorbs the individual into its whole. Prentice's 1994 study, on the other
hand, whilst sharing with Cohn a Pinter who exhibits "a powerful concern with
justice"70, adopts a rather different route to the ethical in Pinter. Invoking the fractal
geometry of chaos theory to "illuminate(s) how the organic structure in Pinter's work
weds the ethic to the aesthetic" (5), Prentice constructs a Pinter who has "levelled
easy distinctions between victim and villains" (3). Dissolving not just the
victim/villain distinction but also the public/private ("his work consistently
dramatizes how private acts have public consequences" 366), Pinter's drama with its
portrayal of dominant/subservient conflicts asks us to reconsider our traditional
notions of love and justice, and suggests "the need to return Eros to our ethic in order
to reconnect the self with the whole" (365). Both Sakellaridou and Prentice's
discussion of The Birthday Party are examined in section 4.2.2.
68 Elizabeth Sakellaridou, Pinter's Female Portraits (London: Macmillan 1988) p7-8
69
Ruby Cohn , "The World of Harold Pinter" in Arthur Ganz (ed), Pinter: A collection ofcritical
essays, p79
70
Penelope Prentice, The Pinter Ethic: The Erotic Aesthetic (London: Garland, 1994 ) pxviii
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In The Postmodern Turn, Ihab Hassan lists Pinter among a tentative canon of
fifty-nine 'postmodern' authors.71 Pinter's radical explorations of language obviously
open his work up to postmodern and Poststructuralist interpretations, good and bad.
Rodney Simard's consideration of Pinter in his 1984 work Postmodern Drama,
however, is neither striking nor original: beginning with the promise of a Pinter who
purveys "a distinctly postmodern dramatic aesthetic"7 , we learn that this lies in "a
new form of existential realism" (xi), springing from "a synthesis of the realistic
mode with Absurdist techniques" (25), a point which has been repeatedly made since
Esslin and Taylor. Simard is keen to place Pinter and Albee "among the first
generation of postmoderns", essentially because they depict the problems of language
- hardly a qualifier for 'postmodern' - and because both playwrights see "the
[postmodern] dramatist's function is to expose the interior self' (34). One wonders
whether 'dismantle' might not be a more postmodern choice of verb.
"Meaning begins in the words...continues in your head and ends nowhere,"
-7 "7
writes Pinter. "There is no end to meaning". ~ There has certainly been no end to the
meanings Pinter's critics have ascribed to Pinter's plays - one could go on categorising
such interpretations, listing them in all their diversity (Wardle's socio-biological
reading, Braunmuller's interest in memory, Morrison's study of the anecdote in Pinter,
Davison's placing of the playwright in the British music hall tradition, not to mention
Almansi and Henderson's classic study of Pinter the Liar...). For now, however, it has
simply sufficed to show the breadth and scope of Pinter-criticism, before going on to
examine some of the plays themselves.
Why Pinter?
At this point, one may ask the question: why has Pinter been chosen, as opposed
to any other playwright - Beckett, Celan, Eliot? That Derrida and Eckhart are to be
considered together is understandable enough, given Derrida's considerable interest in
Eckhart over the years. But why has Pinter (a writer who has little interest in the
medieval, who has never read Eckhart and whose works in this study were written well
71 Ihab Hassan, The Postmodern Turn (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987) p84
72
Rodney Simard, Postmodern Drama (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984) px
"taken from a letter to Peter Wood, May 1958 - cit. in Michael Scott(ed), Pinter: The Birthday
Party, The Caretaker and The Homecoming (London: Macmillan Casebook Series, 1986) p80.
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before Derrida and 'deconstruction' had reached any level of fame) been chosen for
examination alongside a medieval mystic and a French Post-structuralist?
First of all, it is the author's conviction that no dramatist - not even Beckett -
makes greater use of uncertainty in all its forms, be it the 'mystery-thriller' (two
strangers arriving at a bedsit in a seaside town) or the 'unresolvable-dilemma'
(characters displaying conflicting modes of behaviour). Pinter's characters deal with,
exploit and suffer from uncertainty - either those who desperately seek to grasp 'what's
going on' (Max and Joey in The Homecoming, Davies in The Caretaker, Meg in The
Birthday Party) or those who have understood the unstable play of signs around them
and ruthlessly exploit it (Ruth, Lenny, Mick, Goldberg and McCann). Insofar as we are
looking at how uncertainty is understood in Eckhart and Derrida, Pinter's plays offer us
valuable insights.
Secondly, the notorious ambiguities inherent in Pinter's dialogue, their often
eerie feel and even eerier silences, all serve to illustrate Derrida's idea of the
undecidable, Godelesque play between opposite points of meaning (Is Ruth's farewell
to Teddy in The Homecoming mocking or sincere? Is Aston's hospitality towards
Davies at the start of The Caretaker genuine or a sinister, disarming ploy?), a theme we
shall be examining in closer detail in the following chapters. In a sense, the language of
Pinter's plays shows, more than any other playwright, deconstruction 'in action' - the
semantic shifts in meaning every time a remark is repeated, the polysemic multiplicity
which beleaguers every attempt to say 'what we really mean', the unwanted/unexpected
interpretation of irony and cliche - lending strange, new meanings to familiar phrases,
the impossibility of repetition...Pinter's dialogue radically makes us think about
meaning and how we produce it, indeed, if we can ever re-produce it. As such, it is
difficult to think of a more appropriate playwright for a study of deconstruction.
Finally, the plays featured in this study all concern three main themes which we
will be examining in Eckhart and Derrida - whylessness (the absence of motives and
goals), the concept of wandering and the power of the secret. In all of Pinter's plays,
characters perform actions with no obvious reason behind them: Max's aggression
towards Ruth, Mick's spontaneous abuse of Davies, Goldberg's abduction of Stanley,
the murder of Gus.. .all of these instances offer a sinister version of Eckhart's "Man
Without Why", as we shall see in Chapter Three. For our meditations on the idea of
wandering in Eckhart and Derrida, no play offers us a clearer basis for our
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investigations than The Caretaker. Pinter's wandering tramp quickly becomes, in our
study, a metaphor for the Derridean wandering text, forever subject to endless
reappropriations, forever wandering from one context to another. And finally, as this
study concludes with an examination of the secret in negative theology and
deconstruction (Is Eckhart's God really nothing more than a forever deferred secret? Is
there a secret to Derrida's differance?), plays such as The Birthday Party and The
Dumb Waiter, with their air ofmystery, their concealed information and hermeneutic
puzzles, offer an interesting perspective on the 'secret' in Eckhart and Derrida - and the
secret, possibly, that there is no secret.
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Chapter Two: Uncertainty
and the Critique of
Presence
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2.1 Negative Theology, Deconstruction and the Unpresentable:
Analogies and Parallels.
This section has one clear, overriding purpose in mind: to examine in both
Eckhart and Derrida an analogous distrust towards the language of certainty , and
an equally analogous affirmation of uncertainty. As we are dealing with texts that
lie almost seven centuries apart, the word "analogous" has to be stressed: it does
not mean 'equivalent', 'interchangeable' or 'the same', words which would make a
preposterous claim upon texts which have been produced by radically different
scenarios. This does not mean to say that the various analogies drawn between
negative theology and deconstruction in this chapter might not, given further
research, develop into genealogies, a possibility which - however tempting - would
lie outside the scope of this project. For simplicity's sake, attention must be focused
and restricted upon comparisons between the texts themselves.
Readers already familiar with Derrida will not be surprised at seeing a
contemporary French theorist examined in such close relation to a fourteenth
century Dominican master. As early as 1964, Derrida - within the pages of Revue
de metaphysique et de morale - already displays a revealing knowledge of "Maitre
Eckhart" and his vernacular sermons, not to mention the telling awareness of a
possible resemblance to the language of deconstruction.1 This awareness becomes
more expressed in the 1968 lecture "La 'differance'", where Derrida relates how
"the detours, locutions and syntax [les detours, les periodes, la syntaxe] in which I
will often have to take recourse will resemble those of negative theology,
occasionally even to the point of being indistinguishable [parfois a s'y meprendre]
from negative theology".2 It is this relationship between deconstruction and
'The essay concerned was "Violence et metaphysique: Essai sur la pensee d'Emmanuel Levinas" -
found in Jacques Derrida, L'Ecriture et la Difference (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967) ppll7-228,
translated by Alan Bass (Writing and Difference [London: Routledge & Kegan, 1978]).
2
Jacques Derrida, Marges de la Philosophie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972) - translation by
Alan Bass (Margins ofPhilosophy [Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982] ) p6,6. Page numbers of French /
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negative theology - a current in medieval thought beginning with the sixth century
Pseudo Dionysius and culminating in Eckhart - which has drawn so much recent
attention, particularly from theologians such as Mark C.Taylor (ErRing,
a
Deconstructing Theology) and Kevin Hart (The Trespass of the Sign).
In order to avoid wild, transhistorical claims about the relationship between
Derrida's and Eckhart's various texts, a brief look at what kind of certainty they
were calling into question is essential. Once we have understood the difference of
their respective frameworks, then we can begin to talk about the parallels.
2.1.1 Contexts: The Theologian and the Theorist.
One of Eckhart's favourite quotations is taken from Augustine's De Trinitate:
"What one says of God is not true, and what one does not say of Him is true".4 It
provides an idea of God as pure Otherness, the elusive signified, the permanent
ontological inverse of everything we think and say. Eckhart's insistence on the
ineffability of God is typically expressed in His namelessness:
God has many names in scripture. But I say that if someone perceives something
in God and gives it a name, then that is not God. God is above names and
nature...There is no name we can design for God.
Man nennet ouch got in der schrift mit vil namen. Ich spriche: swer iht bekennet
in gote und im deheinen namen anekleibet, daz enist got niht. Got ist iiber
namen und iiber nature...Wir enmiigen keinen namen vinden, den wir gote
miigen geben.5
Such passages place Eckhart directly in opposition to a tradition of affirmative or
cataphatic theology which insisted (in John Scotus Eriugena's words) that God
could be "reasonably signified causally from things of which it is the cause".6
Affirmative theology believed one could speak meaningfully and truthfully about
German editions will be given in bold.
3
Mark C. Taylor, ErRing: A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986) and
Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
4James Clark (ed), Meister Eckhart (London: Nelson & Sons, 1957) pi59
5Ohver Davies, Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994) pi29. German
text used is Josef Quint, Meister Eckhart: Werke (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1936ff) 2:533-4 -
taken from Sermon 53, Misit dominus manum suum
6A.Hyman & J.Walsh(eds), Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co., 1973)
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God. Aquinas, in his Summa Theologiae, maintains with some reservations that
divine names "signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of
God, although they fall short of representing Him".
Negative or apophatic theology, in its most orthodox form, was seen as a
complement to this: God could not be understood through what was, but only
through what was not. If God really is, as Eckhart says, paraphrasing Avicenna ,"a
o
being to whom nothing is or can be similar" , then knowledge of God can never be
linguistically mediated, as God is radically incommensurable (in the most
Kierkegaardian sense of the word - "the absence of a unit of measure in terms of
which two entities can both be measured exactly").9 Eckhart's deity - as opposed to
the knowable, comprehensible God of Christian orthodoxy - is a God of infinite
mystery, one who recedes before all our propositions: it is not difficult to see in
this, as a number of commentators already have, a limited but nevertheless
prescient critique of presence - what Tracey calls, in reference to the apophatic
tradition, "characteristically postmodern suspicions of all modem language of
presence and self'.10 Negative theology calls into question a certain confidence in
language about God, hence assertions such as Kevin Hart's: "My position is not
that deconstruction is a form of negative theology, but that negative theology is a
form of deconstruction".11 Of course, a point must be made here which will be
repeated again and again: negative theology, in its critique of presence, did not see
anything problematic about language in itself, but only language which tried to
represent the ineffable. The idea that all language is inherently unstable, that there
is a kind of restless play at work within even the most unambiguous assertions, is a
belief peculiar to Derrida: far from embarking upon any investigation of language
p 141
7taken from Part One, Question XIII of the Summa - found in Hyman & Walsh, Philosophy in the
Middle Ages p491
8Clark, Meister Eckhart, pi79 - taken from Avicenna's Metaphysicae , Lib ix, ch 1
9Alistair Hannay's note to Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling , trans. Alistair Hannay
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985) pl52
10David Tracey, "Literary Theory and the Return of Forms for Naming and Thinking God in
Theology" Journal ofReligion 74 :3 (1994) p313
"Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pi 86
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in general, Eckhart only becomes suspicious about the adequacy of words when
they are used to talk about God.
In addition to challenging the confidence of affirmative theology, Eckhart
also proposed an element of uncertainty through his own hermeneutics by
suggesting that a biblical text may well have a progressively infinite number of
meanings:
...there is none so wise that when he tries to fathom it, he will not find it deeper
yet and discover more in it. Whatever we may hear, and whatever anyone can tell
us, contains another hidden sense.
...vtind es ist auch niemant so weyss, der sy griinden woll, erfynde sy tieffer
vnnd fynde mer darinn. Alles, das wir hie horen mogen, vnnd alles, das man vns
gesagen mag, das hat alles eynen anderen, verborgenen synn darinn.12
For Eckhart even the most learned man will never get to the bottom of the
scriptures; something will always elude him. It is a situation analogous to the
defining of God, who - like Eckhart's idea of scriptural interpretation - is without
end, Ab-grund.This is in contrast to the general attitude towards biblical exegesis
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which acknowledged the manifold meanings
inherent in scripture, but insisted on a finite number of them, in most cases three or
four. Scholastics such as Alexander of Hales, St Bonaventure and Aquinas
followed either Hugh of St Victor's insistence on the historical, allegorical and
1 ^
tropological (moral) possibilities of a verse , or Bede's addition to these of an
"anagogical understanding".14 Perhaps, of all Eckhart's near contemporaries, only
St Bonaventure comes closest to suggesting that the divine page may well possess
an infinite depth - in his Breviloquium, he writes how "under the shell of the
obvious literal meaning are hidden mystical and profound understandings". For this
reason, the scriptures have "manifold meaning so that [they] may win over every
mind".15 And yet "manifold" may still not mean "infinite" here.
12 M. O'C. Walshe, Meister Eckhart.German Sermons and Treatises (London: Watkins, 1979) vol 2,
p250 - Sermon 51, Quint 2:467
13from Hugh of St Victor's De Sacramentis, I.Prol.iv, found in A.J.Minnis & A.B. Scott, Medieval
Literary Theory and Criticism Circa 1100- 1375 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988) p222
14ibid, p234
13Breviloquium , Prol., 4-6, taken from Minnis & Scott, Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism p234
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Like Mallarme's poem and the Socratic dialogue in Dissemination, the Holy
Scriptures for Eckhart "definitively escape any exhaustive treatment" (se derobent
definitivement a toute exhaustion)16, not "because of a certain fold"(un certain pli)
within the text, but because the Holy Scriptures are so profound (literally "deeper")
that the finite mind can never quite master the ineffably divine intention which lies
behind them, forever regressing. It is a difference we shall return to shortly.
If Eckhart insists upon the ineffable God in the face of affirmative theology,
then Derrida insists upon the ungovernable text in the face of literary structuralism.
This insistence is best examined in one of Derrida's earliest essays, "Force and
signification", which first appeared within the pages of Critique in 1963. The title
of the essay - a play on the title of the work it deals with, Jean Rousset's 1962 study
of Corneille, Forme et Signification - effectively sums up many of Derrida's basic
disagreements with structuralism, described as "a relaxation, if not a lapse, of the
attention given to force" {une detente, sinon une lapsus, dans Vattention a la force
17
). Throughout the essay, Rousset's own brand of structuralism, the confidence
with which he produces his structural analyses of Le Cid and Polyeucte ("with
18such a mastery one wonders whether the credit is due Corneille or Rousset") , is
portrayed as a consistent forgetting of a certain energy within the text, a lamentable
obliviousness towards the play which is always already at work within Corneille.
Therefore, Derrida's objections to Rousset (whose Forme et Signification, it
does not take long to realise, ultimately serve Derrida as a springboard toward the
chief tenets of structuralism in general) are three in number and interrelated.
Firstly, the concept of the structure initially implemented as an aid towards
analysis, "becomes in fact and despite his theoretical intention the critic's sole
preoccupation"(15). The text, sacrificed for the sake of structure, simply becomes
an excuse to talk about the structure - leading Derrida to speak of Rousset's efforts
as an "ultrastructuralism"(16). Derrida is keen to emphasise this - one almost
expects to encounter the word 'fetishism' - as it brings him to his second objection:
16taken from Peggy Kamuf (ed), A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds (Exeter: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1991) pl73 - Jacques Derrida, La Dissemination ( Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972) pl83
l7Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference,p4, 11
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so captivating is the attention given to structure, one "risks being interested in the
figure itself to the detriment of the play going on within it metaphorically [cm
detriment du jeu qui s'y joue par metaphoreY.19 In other words, Rousset becomes
so interested in forme, he forgets about force. In this sense, structuralism can
almost be seen as a minimal desire for certainty, the desire for a structure which
might eliminate - or at least contain - the chaotic play within a text. "Structuralism
above all insists upon preserving the coherence and completion of each totality at
its own level"(26). For Derrida (third objection), this is the very thing which cannot
be done. The desire to preserve a totality, to speak meaningfully and above all
consistently about the 'autonomy' of a work, would be to "attempt to forget
difference" (vouloir oublir la differance )20, to forget uncertainty, to forget the
dynamic nature of textuality and pretend that things stand still within a text.
Although Derrida's essay is a specific response to a specific text, "Force
and Signification " is by no means simply a critique of a contemporary work on
Corneille. Derrida clearly has other things in mind - Rousset's version of literary
structuralism was simply the nearest logocentrism at hand. In Rousset's obsession
with form lies the reason "why literary criticism is structuralist in every age, in its
essence and destiny".21 It is an obsession, to paraphrase Derrida, which either
denies or forgets that the play of meaning always overflows signification - an
obsession hardly exclusive to Rousset.
2.1.2. Differance and the Godhead: "indistinguishable" terminologies?
The most important thing we learn from Derrida's essay on Rousset is that
the text is never present. No matter how coherent and meticulous a structure is
created to explain the text, the interpretation of the text will always be rendered
incomplete by "the impossibility of its ever being present, of its ever being
18
Writing and Difference, pi9
19ibid pi6, L'Ecriture 29




summarised by some absolute simultaneity or instantaneousness". " Having briefly
examined the different historical contexts in which Derrida and Eckhart are
writing, we shall now go on to consider the oft-cited similarities in the terms used
by both negative theologians and deconstructionists, by comparing the language
used to describe the concepts - or rather non-concepts - of "differance" and "the
Godhead".
In his essay on Edmond Jabes, Derrida writes: "It is thus simultaneously
true that things come into existence and lose their existence by being named".23 In
a sense, negative theology's opposition towards the naming of God was a
recognition of this very fact: firstly, there was a danger that in speaking about God,
one would actually create one's own God - that is, by naming something one
actually brings into existence something which has nothing to do with the
Unnamable. Secondly, by attempting to apply a name to God substantially, one
might actually be committing an act of blasphemy - by attempting to finitize the
infinite, to approach the unapproachable. One might even say that negative
theology exhibited a fear of presence, a desire that God should never acquire it
fully - after all, as Derrida says in Dissemination: "if ...an undeferred logos were
possible, it would not seduce anyone" (si... im logos non differe etait possible, il ne
seduirait pas ).24And yet, the New Testament God was a God of love, of nearness
and intimacy, the God one could call "abba" (lit."Daddy"): there had to be some
kind of knowledge.
Eckhart's response to this was to replicate a Gnostic gesture made a
millennium earlier: that is, to produce two Gods, a God one could speak of, and a
God one could not, called the Godhead (Gottheit). True faith consisted in a
"breakthrough" (Durchbruch), bypassing the intelligible, comprehensible God in
order to reach the Godhead, the God with no name. John Caputo, in his
22ibid,pl4
23
Writing and Difference, p70
24Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: Athlon, 1987 ) p71, La Dissemination 80
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comparative study of Eckhart and the later Heidegger, writes how "the deepest
ground and essence of ...God Himself... lies in a nameless region from which all
properties and attributes (Eigenschaften) are excluded".25 Whereas Eckhart's God
is very much what post-structuralists call the "onto-theo-logical" God, the
comprehensible, accessible deity of Christian orthodoxy, loving, kind, just,
Eckhart's Godhead is an attempt to talk about the mystical space which lies behind,
beyond this God, which enables God to be. Nevertheless, given the fact that
Eckhart's Godhead is a nameless, quality-less space, Eckhart does say a surprising
amount about it; the Godhead is invariably described as an "abyss" (Abgrunt), a
"desert", the "divine dark" and a "nothingness":
"Paul rose from the ground and with open eyes he saw nothing." I cannot see
what is One. He saw nothing, that is to say, God. God is nothingness, and yet
God is a something. What is something is also nothing. What God is, He is
totally. Therefore the illuminated Dionysius, wherever he writes about God,
says: he is super-being, he is super-life, he is super-light. He does not attribute to
him any of these [qualities], but he intimates through them that he is an -1 do not
know what - that lies far beyond them. If you visualize anything or if anything
enters your mind, that is not God; indeed , he is neither this nor that. Whoever
says that God is here or there, do not trust him. The light that is God shines in
the darkness. God is a true light. To see it one must be blind and one must divest
God of everything that there is. A master says: to speak of God in any simile is
to speak of Him in an impure mode. But whoever speaks of God through
nothingness speaks of him to the point.
"Paulus stuont ufvon der erden, undmit offenen ougen ensach er niht." Ich
enmac niht gesehen, daz ein ist. Er sach niht, daz was got. Got ist ein niht, und
got ist ein iht. Swaz iht ist, daz ist ouch niht. Swaz got ist, daz ist er alzemale. Da
von sprichet der liehte Dionysius , wa er von gote schribet, da sprichet er: er ist
iiber wesen, er ist iiber leben, er ist iiber lieht; er engibet im noch diz noch daz,
und er meinet, daz er si neizwaz, daz gar verre dar iiber si. Der iht sihet oder
vellet iht in din bekennen, daz enist got niht; da von niht, wan er noch diz noch
daz enist. Swer sprichet, daz got hie oder da si, dem engloubet niht. Daz lieht,
daz got ist, daz liuhtet in der vinsternisse. Got ist ein war lieht; swer daz sehen
sol, der muoz blint sin und muoz got al abenemen von ihte. Ein meister
sprichet: swer von gote redet bi deheiner glichnisse, der redet unluterliche von
im. Der aber bi nihte von gote redet, der redet eigenliche von im.26
Although there are a number of points to be drawn from this passage, our principal
aim is to show how Derrida can say that the "detours, locutions and syntax" of
25 John D.Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (New York: Fordham University
Press 1978) pi23
26 Reiner Schiirmann, Meister Eckhart (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978) pl25, Quint 3:
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differance are similar to Eckhart's passages on the Godhead, "even to the point of
being indistinguishable from negative theology".27
The 'resemblance' between the passages on differance in Derrida's essay
and the descriptions of the Godhead in Eckhart's vernacular sermons manifests
itself in seven ways. Firstly (and most importantly), they are both nameless and
unnamable, albeit for different reasons. Eckhart's Godhead is "free of all names" as
there is no noise one could make, no characters one could write, which would
adequately convey its ineffability. In the paragraph immediately preceding the
passage quoted above, Eckhart gives four reasons why the soul might not name
God, of which the third is of particular interest to us: "The third reason is that it
does not have enough time to name him. It cannot turn away long enough from
love". Eckhart almost says here that one cannot love and name at the same time -
that in order to name something, one must turn away from it. To name, therefore, is
to indicate an absence. If one wishes to know God, the last thing one should do is
name Him.
Derrida is quite keen to point out that if differance is unnamable, it is "not
because our language has not yet found or received this name...outside the finite
system of our own".29 Although one might be tempted here to think of the Hebrew
unnamable name, Lossky's nomen innominabile, Derrida is actually referring to
Heidegger. Differance is unnamable because "there is no name for it at all...not
even that of differance". Having distanced himself from Heideggerian nostalgia
with the remark that differance is "Older than Being itself, Derrida goes on in the
next paragraph to repeat the dissociative operation, this time with regard to
negative theology. The unnamable "is not an ineffable Being which no name could
approach" but rather "the play which makes possible nominal effects" (le jeu qui
31
fait q'il y a des ejfets nominaux).
223-4 - taken from Sermon 71, Surrexit autem Saulus de terra
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Another resemblance between the Godhead and differance is that both are
literally unthinkable: they are terms which, both authors insist, can never acquire
presence. Eckhart's God cannot be thought because, following Dionysius, He is
hyperousia, beyond being: "If you visualize anything or if anything enters your
mind, that is not God".32 Eckhart's Godhead cannot be thought because he is a
being (ov) which has no relation (can have no relation) to actuality. In other words,
it is His incommensurability which renders him unthinkable. However, the 'a' in
differance "cannot be exposed" because "differance is ...what makes possible the
presentation of the being-present".33 Since differance is a kind of play, not an
unknowable being, there is no presence to try and think, and therefore its
unthinkability, although superficially identical to Eckhart's, is of a radically
different kind: "One cannot think the trace - and therefore differance - on the basis
of the present, or of the presence of the present".34
This common ground of "namelessness" and "unthinkability" with regard to
differance and the Godhead , however differently constituted, does lead us onto a
string of similar points, most of which repeat the same basic point again but which
are worthwhile mentioning, as they elucidate this point from a variety of different,
interesting perspectives. Firstly, both the Godhead and differance are neither
sensible nor intelligible - one can neither touch nor conceive them. Derrida's
famous insistence that differance "is literally neither a word nor a concept"35echoes
that oft-repeated Eckhartian tenet that God "is neither this nor that, and yet He is a
something", a characteristically Dionysian pronouncement. The second
resemblance lies in the fact that the movement of differance "eludes both vision
and hearing" and ultimately works within "an order which no longer belongs to
sensibility ...But neither...to intelligibility". Neither the sensible nor the
intelligible can capture the movement of differance, just as "that which has being,
32










time or place does not reach God". This idea manifests itself in another
resemblance: that of sitelessness. "Whoever says that God is here or there, do not
o o
trust him". As the Godhead is the inverse of the present, it has no latitude or
longitude, it cannot be anchored to a city or a name. Similarly, "the trace is not a
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presence but the simulacrum of a presence...itproperly has no site". The
immediate consequence of this (fourth resemblance) is that both differance and the
Godhead cannot be expounded upon directly, through what they are, but indirectly,
through what they are not. Harvey makes much of this in an excellent chapter of
her Derrida and the Economy ofDifferance, where she quite literally lists 26 things
that deconstruction is not, ranging from "a) metaphysics" through "m) 'un coup des
Des', as per Mallarme" to "z) the celebration of a Wake, as per Joyce".40 "I can
speak of this graphic difference only through a very indirect discourse on
writing".41 In a sense, Derrida's lecture on "La differance" is an attempt to say what
cannot be said - in the open pages Derrida quickly demonstrates himself to be
articulately aware of this problem. Even lectures on differance fall prey to
differance, which explains why Derrida consistently refuses to provide any clear,
concise definition of what differance 'means', choosing to abandon the direct
approach of naming and defining for the oblique way, the way of inference,
allusion, negation. Interestingly enough, in an article written years after his famous
lecture on differance, Derrida confesses to this predilection towards 'obliqueness':
Instead of tackling the question or the problem head on, directly,
straightforwardly, which would doubtless be impossible, inappropriate or
illegitimate, should we proceed obliquely? I have often done so, even to the
42
point of demanding obliqueness by name...
In this use of the word oblique, one almost senses the anticipation of a certain
curve, the apprehension of a certain shift, the suspicion that one should never name
the destinations one wishes to arrive at. Eckhart puts it similarly: "...to speak of
37Clark, Meister Eckhart, p205 - from the sermon Quasi Stella matutina
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God through any simile is to speak of Him in an impure mode. But whoever speaks
of God through nothingness speaks of him to the point".43 Through this
comparison with Derrida's own 'method', one can perhaps better understand
Eckhart's own attempt to speak of God as an infinite nothingness rather than a
finite something. Aware of the problematic nature of naming God in order to talk
about what He is, Eckhart's approach is necessarily oblique: one must negate God's
attributes, not define them, in order to truly understand what they are.
Nothingness.
The final similarity between the vocabularies of Eckhart and Derrida
consists in a positive appropriation of nothingness - a word which both differance
and the Godhead are referred to as ; nothingness no longer conceived as the
absence of presence, but as the absence which enables presence to present itself.
The experiencing of nothing - as Heidegger says -" the vastness of ...which gives
every being the warrant to be".44 This final similarity differs from the ones we have
considered up to now, inasmuch as it constitutes a resemblance which may not be
completely superficial. What I now propose to do is examine, in turn, exactly how
both writers present their ideas of nothingness through differance and the Godhead,
and whether the similarities in terminology ultimately betray any deeper and more
substantial affinities.
To understand Eckhart's concept of the Godhead as a 'productive' nothingness,
one must first understand the Godhead's relation to God. The image Eckhart
supplies us with is that of a "desert" (einoede), the very symbol of aridity. For
Caputo, the Godhead is to be contrasted with God in these very terms: God as
fecundity/fountain /word, in opposition to the Godhead as sterility /desert/silence.45
And yet, despite such negative imagery, the Godhead is a positive creative force,
the "source" and groundless ground of God. Again, Schiirmann writes: "The desert
43
Schiirmann, Meister Eckhart, pi25
'"Postscript to What Is Metaphysics ? - found in David Krell (ed), Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger
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is full of seed, but they do not sprout there." (115) The potentia of the Godhead
does not become actualitas within the silent stillness of the Godhead but outside
it. "The Godhead is silence; but in the 'birth' of the Son the Father speaks His
word".46 The Godhead is anterior to God, just as silence is anterior to language. It
is the nothingness of the Godhead which enables entities to come into being.
The silence of the Godhead is that from which all language springs, just as the
nameless region beyond God is the source of all names. This is why Schiirmann
interprets the Godhead as "a quest for the origin of God and the origin of his
attributes".47 Caputo describes the process in a chapter on Heidegger:
God is a process of welling up from concealment into self-revelation- first
into the Son and the Holy Ghost, then into the creation itself. God emerges
from the darkness of the Godhead...the abyss (Abgrund )...into the light
of day, into 'God' and 'creatures'. 48
Caputo's Heideggerian language is unmistakable , although the passage Caputo
refers to in his concept of ebullition is actually a passage taken from the latin
works:
Life means a certain overflow by which a thing, welling up within itself,
first completely floods itself, each part of itself interpenetrating every
other, before it pours itself out and spills over into something external.49
The Godhead, it would seem, is no longer still but subject to a 'welling up within
itself - hence the term "ebullition", ex-bullitio, which literally means a 'boiling
over'. This suggests a dynamic principle within the Godhead, an unseen , one might
almost say oscillating motion which ultimately wells up out of the abyss to spill
into language in the form of "God" and of "creatures". The terms are not entirely
dissimilar from Heidegger's advance (hervorkommen) and withdrawal (sich
entziehen) of Being50: the idea of a dynamic nothingness, prior to all divinity, is an
45
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utterly mystical idea - as Nicolas Berdyaev says, speaking of Eckhart and Boehme,
it constitutes "the deepest and most secret idea of German mysticism".51
Like the Godhead, differance is nameless and yet the 'source' of all names,
the nothingness "which makes possible nominal effects".52 Differance constitutes a
nothingness inasmuch that it is not an ens separatissimus, a concept or an entity
one can refer to independently of what it does. It is a non-entity which enables
entities to be, a nothingness which "differs from itself, defers itself, and writes
itself as differance",53 The idea of differance as an errant, intangible yet
nevertheless generative "movement", one which works forever within a kind of
non-space - the fold in a piece of paper, the hinge in a door - is best illustrated
with a passage from Dissemination, in an analysis of Mallarme's poem "Mimique".
Derrida, insisting that the narrator of "Mimique" "imitates nothing", and that there
"is nothing prior to the writing of his gestures"54, begins to speak of the poem as a
profusion of gestures emanating from rien, from le rien, itself a word which, with
every repetition, gradually acquires a peculiar resonance of its own:
...this operation is not a unified entity but the manifold play of a scene that,
illustrating nothing - neither word nor deed - beyond itself, illustrates nothing.
Nothing but the many faceted multiplicity of a lustre which itself is nothing
beyond its own fragmented light. Nothing but the idea which is nothing. The
ideality of the idea is here for Mallarme the still metaphysical name that is still
necessary in order to mark nonbeing, the nonreal, the nonpresent. This mark
points, alludes without breaking the glass, to the beyond of Beingness, toward
the epekeina tes ousias ...It is a dramatisation which illustrates nothing , which
illustrates the nothing , lights up a space, re-marks a spacing as a nothing, a
blank: white as a yet unwritten page, blank as a difference between two lines.
L'operation...n'est pourtant pas une unite mais lejeu multiple d'une scene qui,
n'illustrant rien hors d'elle-meme, parole ou acte, n'illustre rien. Rien que la
Heidegger's manifesting and withdrawing Being would ultimately lead us back to the Neoplatonic
tradition - namely , Plotinus: "Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lacking nothing, the One is perfect
and, in our metaphor, has overflowed and its exuberance has produced the new..." Ennead , V.2.1, cit.
in Gerard Watson , Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion ofGod (Dublin: Columba Press,
1994) p73
51Kaufmann, Walter, Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre ( New York: Meridian Books, 1956)
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multiplicityfacettee du lustre qui n'est rien, lui-meme, hors de sa lumiere
fragmentee. Rien que I'idee qui n'est rien. L'idealite de I'idee est ici, pour
Mallarme, le nom, encore metaphysique, encore necessaire pour marquer le
non-etant, le non-reel ou le non-present; cette marque indique ,fait allusion
sans briser la glace vers Vau-deld de 'etantite, vers V epekeina tes ousias...Mise
en scene qui n'illustre rien , qui illustre le rien , eclair lespace, re-marque
I'espacement comme rien, comme blanc: blanc comme line page pas encore
ecrite ou comme difference entre les traits. 55
Before going on to examine this evocative and difficult passage, let us consider for
comparison an instance from Eckhart's own sermon on nothingness, based on the
verse from Acts 9:8 "Saul rose from the ground, opened his eyes and saw nothing"
(Surrexit autem Saulus de terra apertisque oculis nihil videbat):
When the mind penetrates into the One, entering in pure dereliction of itself, it
finds God as in a nothingness. A man had a dream, a daydream: it seemed to him
that he was big with nothingness as a woman is with a child. In this nothingness
God was born. He was the fruit of nothingness. God was born in nothingness.
This is why it says: "He rose from the ground and with open eyes he saw
nothing."
Swenne diu sele kumet in ein und si da inne tritet in ein luter verworfenheit ir
selber, da vindet si got als in einem nihte. Ez duhte einen menschen als in einem
troume - ez was ein wachender troum -, wie ez swanger wiirde von nihte als ein
vrouwe mit einem kinde, und in dem nihte wart got geborn; der was diu vruht
des nihtes. Got wart geborn in dem nihte. Da von sprichet er: "er stuont ufvon
der erden, und mit offenen ougen sach er niht".
In both extracts, a certain generative process is being examined. In the first
passage, it is how a pen produces - or 'unveils' - a text, and how a text produces a
reading of a text, that is being considered. In the second passage from Eckhart the
question is theological but the "movement", as Derrida calls it, is essentially the
same: the birth of Christ in the soul, the re-production of God in the world. In both
passages, nothingness precedes the generative act, instigates it, brings the
generated into being. In both passages the "movement" described is one - to use
Derrida's own words - of aletheia as opposed to adequatio, an unveiling as
opposed to an imitation. The comparison is by no means stretched: intentionally or
no, the terms and images Derrida uses in the passage , a passage which deals with
singularly literary preoccupations, have a peculiarly Neoplatonic ring about them,
55A Derrida Reader , pi 82, La Dissemination 236
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employing phrases which readers of Eckhart will already be familiar with:
nothingness, multiplicity, fragmented light (in Eckhart the funklein or divine spark
in the soul), the notion of the idea as the "still metaphysical name" and, above all,
the phrase epekeina tes ousias, the 'beyond' of Being where Plato situated his Good
and the Neoplatonists their God. When Derrida refers to Levinas' use of this phrase
in "Violence and Metaphysics"57, it is used to support Derrida's own admiring but
ultimately suspicious critique of Levinas' phenomenology - his suspicion, in the
end, that Levinas' "face of the infinitely Other" is just another Yahweh, another
"passageway to essentiality"58, dressed up in Heideggerian language. In other
words, Derrida sees epekeina tes ousias as another name for God.
If one were to suggest that the movement of Derrida's discourse runs along
the same series ofNeoplatonic grooves as Eckhart's - the nothingness and essential
non-presence of the text spilling over into a blossoming plurality of significations
in much the same way Eckhart's Godhead overflows (ebullitio) into the ground of
the soul - then one would have to look no further than the first essay in Writing and
Difference for an example of such a hypothesis. Eckhart writes: "God overflows
into all creatures, and yet he remains untouched by all ."(Got vliuzet in alle
creaturen, und blibet er doch unberiieret von in alien).59 In Derrida we read: "If the
play of meaning can overflow signification...this overflow is the moment of the
attempt-to-write" (si le jeu du sens peut deborder la signification...ce debord est le
moment du vouloir ecrire).60 Of course, we must tread carefully here. In
considering the translator's fortuitous choice of a common word in English, there is
a danger of falling prey to what Wittgenstein called "the bewitchment of our
intelligence by language" - that is, assuming the translated word 'overflow' to mean
the same thing in both sentences, whereas the original words (deborder and
vliuzen) may well have radically different meanings. Nevertheless, in both
quotations a certain excess, a certain outpouring is indicated. It is in both cases an
^Schurmann, Meister Eckhart pl26, Quint 3: 224-5 - from Sermon 71, Surrexit autem Saulus de terra
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overflowing which does not seek to equate (ad-equatio) itself with anything, but
which nevertheless proceeds from a nothingness. And it is in Derrida's and
Eckhart's ultimately different conceptions of the word 'nothingness' that our
principal distinction lies.
We already know that differance is not a being (ov) and "does not exist".61
In a passage from Dissemination, quoted by Gasche at the beginning of his own
work on what he calls Derrida's "System beyond being", Derrida offers an
important analogy towards the understanding of the role of differance and its
relation to nothingness:
The breakthrough towards radical otherness...always takes, within philosophy ,
the form of an a posteriority or an empiricism. But this is an effect of the
specular nature of philosophical reflection , philosophy being incapable of
inscribing (comprehending) what is outside it otherwise than through the
appropriating assimulation of a negative image of it, and dissemination is written
on the back - the tain - of that mirror. 62
Differance is that which allows identities to produce differences - and differences
to produce identities - ad infinitum, endlessly disseminating a trace without origins,
without ever taking part in the process. The tain of a mirror, Gasche tells us, "is the
silver lining, the lustreless back of the mirror...without which no reflection and no
specular and speculative activity would be possible, but which at the same time has
no place and no part in reflection's scintillating play".63 Differance is this tain - a
movement which generates without participating, engenders without appearing.
Derrida's cryptic mark which "alludes without breaking the glass, toward the
epekeina tes ousias" now becomes clear: writing only ever alludes to, but never
trespasses into the non-space beyond being, to the non-space behind the mirror.
"God is a word" says Eckhart, "an unspoken word".64 Whereas in Eckhart the
nothingness beyond God is a realm of infinite possibility, one which chooses to
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about...in Derrida, the nothingness of differance operates indirectly through the
play of absences, an ancillary yet essential element in the generation of phenomena.
One may finally ask: what has this discussion of nothingness to do with our
study of the uncertain in the texts of Eckhart and Derrida? The answer is simple:
nothingness instigates uncertainty, nothingness makes uncertainty possible. There
is nothing behind the sign , nothing which could ever precede the sign, nothing
which would ever wholly determine how the sign should repeat itself, what signs it
should provoke in response. It is the nothingness outside the text, beneath the text,
which renders the text uncertain, which means that the text can never be safely
anchored to a historical event, a biographical intention, a subconscious desire.
Analogously, for Eckhart, it is the nothingness of the Godhead which makes
God uncertain, which means why "No-one can really say what God is".65 Eckhart's
God is like no other thing: He does not constitute a knowable entity whose actions
one could predict and explain. There is nothing one can say about God which
might determine His actions.
The aim in this section, therefore, has been to show how both concepts of the
Godhead and differance are analogous manifestations of the uncertain, in response
to the language of certainty used, for example, by affirmative theology and
structuralism. By showing how both Eckhart and Derrida employ a different, more
positive concept of nothingness, one which does not negate but generates, we move
one step closer to our central tenet: that both writers, in their own ways, not only
perform a critique of presence but also affirm and approve of the uncertainty which
arises as a result of their efforts.
Objections.
The question of whether Eckhart's negative theology really does
correspond to Derrida's appraisal of it - that is, whether the Godhead really is, in
the end, just another superessentiality - will be examined in more depth in the final
foClark, Meister Eckhart, p!58, taken from the sermon Homo quidam fecit
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chapter. All that is necessary for now is to note a) Derrida's objection to Eckhart's
uncertainty as, ultimately, a transcendental version of a deferred certainty and b)
the possibility of this judgment being based on one particular, 'orthodox' version of
Eckhart, in ignorance of another.
While explaining to his "Japanese Friend" the necessity of having to "put
aside all the traditional philosophical concepts, while reaffirming the necessity of
returning to them", Derrida mentions how "this has been called, precipitously, a
type of negative theology (this was neither true nor false but I shall not enter into
the debate here)".66 Derrida's attempts to disassociate himself from the God-
saturated language of negative theology are interesting, partly because of what they
tell us about Derrida's own ideas of Dionysius and Eckhart, and partly because of
what they tell us about Derrida. Perhaps the most concentrated and explicit attempt
to create some kind of distance between himself and the apophatic tradition occurs
in Margins ofPhilosophy.
So much so that the detours, locutions and syntax in which I will often have to
take recourse will resemble those of negative theology, occasionally even to the
point of being indistinguishable from negative theology. Already we have had to
delineate that differance is not, does not exist, is not a present-being (on ) in any
form; and we will be led to delineate also everything that it is not, that is,
everything ; and consequently that it has neither existence nor essence. It derives
from no category of being, whether present or absent. And yet those aspects of
differance which are thereby delineated are not theological, not even in the
order of the most negative of negative theologies, which are always concerned
with disengaging a superessentiality beyond the finite categories of essence and
existence, that is, of presence, and always hastening to recall that God is refused
the predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior,
inconceivable and ineffable mode of being. Such a development is not in
question here, and this will be confirmed progressively. Differance is not only
irreducible to any ontological or theological - ontotheological - reappropriation,
but as the very opening of the space in which ontotheology - philosophy -
produces its system and its history , it includes ontotheology, inscribing it and
exceeding it without return.
Si bien que les detours, les periodes, la syntaxe auxquels je devrais souvent
recourir, ressembleront, parfois a s'y meprendre, a ceux de la theologie
negative. Deja il afallu marquer que la differance n'est pas , n'existe pas, n'est
pas un etant-present (on ), quel q'il soit: et nous serons amenes a marquer aussi
66"Letter to a Japanese Friend" - taken from Peggy Kamuf (ed), A Derrida Reader (Exeter: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1991) p273
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tout ce qu 'elle n'est pas, c'est-a-dire tout: etpar consequent qu'elle n'a ni
existence ni essence. Elle ne releve d'aucune categorie de I'etant, qu'il soit
present ou absent. Et pourtant ce qui se marque ainsi de la differance n'est pas
theologique, pas meme de I'ordre le plus negatifde la theologie plus negative,
celle-ci s'etant toujours affairee a degager, comme on sait, une supra-
essentialite par-dela les categories finies de I'essence et de I'existence, c'est-a-
dire de la presence, et s'empressant toujours de rappeler que si le predicat de
I'existence est refuse a Dieu, c'est pour lui reconnoitre un mode d'etre superieur,
inconcevable, ineffable. II ne s'agit pas ici d'un tel mouvement et cela devrait se
confirmer progressivement. La differance est non seulement irreductible a toute
reappropriation ontologique ou theologique - onto-theologique - mais, ouvrant
meme I'espace dans lequel Vonto-theologie - la philosophic - produit son
67
systeme et son histoire, elle la comprend, I'inscrit et I'excede sans retour.
For Derrida, negative theology - "even the most negative of negative theologies" -
is still a theology of presence. Its critique of presence is ultimately always
teleological, in that it always sees such a critique as a means to an end - it
dismantles theological presence on one level, only to reaffirm it on another. Its
concern is not to challenge the notion of a 'superessentiality', but merely to remove
it from the "finite" language of theologians and scholastics. To repeat the point
more clearly in terms of our own project: Derrida's version of negative theology
only affirms the immediate uncertainty of God, an uncertainty which arises from
our own finite knowledge - or rather ignorance - of His hidden, unknowable
essence. Therefore, as Derrida sees it, the God of the negative theologians is not
fundamentally uncertain, but simply a hidden, elevated certainty rendered
indeterminate through the act of mystification. Negative theology, as Schrodinger
might have said, simply puts God back in the black box.
Derrida has already made this point in a similar passage in his essay "Violence
and Metaphysics", with two minor differences. Firstly, whereas the above-cited
passage is probably referring to Pseudo-Dionysius (the word 'superessentiality' 's
most immediate echo is the Areopagite's hyperousia, 'beyond being'), Derrida's
objection to negative theology in "Violence and Metaphysics" invokes two of
Eckhart's sermons, Nolite timere eos and Quasi stella matutina, as representative of
the negative stance. Secondly, the objection to Eckhart in the passage from
61
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"Violence" seems slightly more guarded, as if the author were vaguely aware of the
possibility of another Eckhart, to whom such objections might not be applicable:
"...When I said that God was not a Being but above Being, I did not thereby
contest his Being, but on the contrary attributed to him a more elevated Being."
(Quasi Stella ).This negative theology is still a theology and, in its literality at
least, it is concerned with liberating and acknowledging the ineffable
transcendence of an infinite existent...
"Quandj'ai dit que Dieu n'etait pas un etre et etait au-dessus de I'etre, je ne lui
ai pas par la conteste letre, au contraire le lui ai attribue un etre plus eleve"
(Quasi Stella matutina)" Cette theologie negative est encore une theologie et,
dans sa lettre du moins , il s'agit pour elle de liberer et de reconnoitre la
transcendance ineffable d'un etant infini...68
Literality? Does this mean that Eckhart's words , understood 'less' literally, might
actually escape Derrida's dismissal of negative theology as just another
transcendental signified? That a figurative interpretation of Eckhart's words might
not necessarily constitute the disengagement of a familiar 'superessentiality' from
finite logic and language?
Hart has already pointed out that Derrida's version of negative theology
"assumes the Thomist reading of Pseudo-Dionysius and the Hegelian reading of
Eckhart".69 Readings which understood negative theology as simply a corrective
"part of a dialectic with positive theology". This is, after all, how Aquinas makes
use of Dionysius in his discussion on the names of God (see his Summa
Theologiae, Question XIII, Second Article).70 Hart sees Derrida as having
understood Dionysius' hyperousia, following Rolt's translation, as 'above being',
rather than in Levinas' terms - "otherwise than being".71 A similar case might be
made for Eckhart and his reversal of Aquinas' "God is Being" (deus est suum esse)
- "Being is God" (esse est deus). Eckhart, far from trying to correct affirmative
theology, might well be seen as departing from it altogether.The via negativa in
Eckhart - instead of returning once more to a deferred "superessentiality", the God
68Writing and Difference pi46, L'Ecriture 217
69
Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, pi 93
70Hyman & Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages p490
71
Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, p202
48
of affirmative theology, on a sublated, aufgehoben level - veers off on its own into
the unfathomable Godhead, to wander where it will, blissfully errant.
2.1.3 Summary: The Affirmation of Uncertainty.
Having examined the respective contexts of negative theology and
deconstruction, the alleged 'common ground' of their terminology, their parallel
conceptions of nothingness and ,of course, Derrida's own objections to the label of
'negative theologian', it would be difficult to maintain that both writers are
concerned with the same kind of 'uncertainty'. Both Eckhart's God and Derrida's
text - an analogy we have already developed at some length - are elusive,
ungovernable, resistant to explanation, but for different reasons. Eckhart's
uncertainty stems from a finite incapacity to embrace an infinite store of
significations; in other words, an uncertainty deriving from an absence of
knowledge. The incertitude of Derrida's text, however, has a different 'source': "If
polysemy is infinite, if it cannot be mastered as such, this is not because a finite
reading or a finite writing remains incapable of exhausting a superabundance of
meaning".72 Rather, one cannot speak with certainty about the text because of the
play going on within its finite parameters, a play which always exceeds whatever
structure one tries to impose upon the text, in order to have the final word on what
the text is trying to say. This absence of certainty is clearly not a question of
knowledge - even if one knew all the variables and all the constants, one could still
not predict their play. This distinction between the uncertainties of Eckhart and
Derrida is rendered most eloquently by Clive Hart: "As with some questions of
modern physical theory, it is not that we could know but don't; it is rather that the
information, the certainty, that we are seeking does not exist".73
12Dissemination , p253, 285
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The dissimilarity in these two versions of uncertainty, however, is not so
great as to deny a powerful similarity in their consequences: an antipathy towards
claims of certainty, an affirmation of errancy, a reluctance to name and classify
and, above all, not just a refusal by both Derrida and Eckhart to lament their
respective states of uncertainty, but the declaration that this is the ideal state in
which to be:
If you wish to know God in a divine manner, then your knowing must become a
pure unknowing...
Now you could say: but sir, what is there left for my reason to do if it stands
entirely bare and wholly inactive? Is this the best way, if I raise my mind to an
unknowing knowing, which cannot ever exist?...Should I stand in complete
darkness?
Yes indeed! You are never better placed than when you are in complete
darkness and unknowing.74
Uncertainty, by no means the regrettable anxiety described by Descartes, is seen
here as a necessary prelude to a 'knowledge' of God. Uncertainty means to dispense
with certainties, to empty oneself of preconceptions, to create a 'clearing' in oneself
in which God can become manifest. Eckhart goes on to call this darkness "potential
receptivity"75, which does give a clear indicator of what Eckhart feels uncertainty
to be: an opening up towards God, who himself is "free and untrammeled in all his
actions" and does everything "gladly and gratuitously".76 For Eckhart, certainty
would be the death of spontaneity, the curtailing of God's energy.
Derrida's own affirmation of uncertainty begins with a call to abandon the
desire for certainty, a desire which "dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin
which escapes play and the order of the sign" (reve de dechiffrer une verite ou une
' 7*7
origine echappant au jeu et a I'ordre du signe ) - a phrase which, as we have
seen, evokes Rousset just as much as Rousseau. Such a desire to escape the
instability of language and find out what the sign originally meant will always see
play as an obstacle, an impediment, as something problematic. Derrida does not see
why one should seek the "lost or impossible presence of the absent origin" - the
74Obver Davies, Meister Eckhart, p224 - from the sermon Et cumfactus esset Jesus
75 ibid, p224
76Clark, Meister Eckhart, p 128
50
play which lovers of certainty find so problematic should be celebrated, not
resented, in one "Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play
of the world".78 There seems to be something liberating about uncertainty for
Derrida - a shaking off of nostalgia and guilt, a refusal to recognise nothingness as
an absence or lack . Just as Eckhart calls on the believer to abandon his
conceptions of God, his desire to name or define Him, similarly Derrida exhorts
the interpreter to abandon his truths, his goals, his desire to control the text and
surrender himself to "the seminal adventure of the trace".79
Derrida, in this well-known passage from the end of "Structure, Sign and
Play" never states explicitly why we should affirm uncertainty rather than work
towards its banishment; the word-choice he employs to describe the two
"interpretations of interpretation" - the "saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty,
Rousseauistic" path, as opposed to Nietzsche's "joyous", "active" affirmation - does
imply what one might almost term an aesthetic dissatisfaction with certainty, a
desire for freedom, spontaneity and "adventure". In both writers' analogous
affirmations of the uncertain, a definite antipathy towards closure can be detected,
a resistance towards the kind of narrow path which the language of certainty forces
us to tread. Nevertheless, as has already been said, this aversion towards 'closure'
will always have different meanings in Eckhart and Derrida. For Eckhart, it is our
uncertainty about God which renders language fallible; the no-thingness of God
which constantly undermines the project of language. For Derrida the idea is
reversed: it is the uncertainty within language itself which undermines any
discourse we try to make about God, the text, the world ...if Eckhartian uncertainty
is the consequence of an "inarticulable presence"80, then Derridean uncertainty
springs from an ineluctable absence, an absence which is always already within the
text.




80the phrase is Spivak's , in her introduction to OfGrammatology (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1976) page xv
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2.2 The Elusiveness of Presence in The Homecoming : Pinter's Way and
the Via Negativa
A language...where under what is said, another thing is being said...
The speech we hear is an indication of that which we don't hear. It is a necessary
avoidance, a violent, sly, anguished or mocking smoke screen which keeps the
other in its place...
- Pinter in his lecture 'Writing for the Theatre'1
Pinter's language constitutes a mocking of presence: intentions are declared,
ironised, painfully re-evoked to be undermined once more. In darkened living rooms,
sombre faces make strange noises to one another, sentences, cliches, everyday
remarks whose 'meanings' oscillate relentlessly between various points of possibility,
never resting for a moment to reassure us. Cosy, familiar registers of language are
employed in bizarre contexts: likewise, alien, unheimlich exchanges occur in the
middle of perfectly 'normal' dialogues. And throughout all of this, silence wells up
and spills out onto the stage, saturating everything with pure possibility, unsettling
even our most minimal convictions about the play, echoing, mocking, negating.
Of course, this has all been said before. Words such as 'uncertain',
'mystification', 'possibility', 'unpredictable' occur so often in Pinter criticism that
they are rapidly becoming synonyms for that notorious adjective 'Pinteresque'.
Stevenson writes about the "mysteriousness which cannot wholly be explained"2,
John Russell Brown comments on the "fleeting and uncertain opportunities for
understanding".3 Kennedy concerns himself with human indeterminacy in Pinter4,
Almansi with the latent mendacity in his characters' speech, Kristin Morrison with
"the continual blend of the banal and the bizarre"5, whereas John Fuegi, in his
gloomy address to a Tallahassee conference entitled "Pinter and the Uncertainty
Principle", sees both Pinter and Beckett as the only postmodern hope in a theatre still
'cit in Randall Stevenson, "Harold Pinter - Innovator?" in Alan Bold(ed), Harold Pinter: You Never
Heard Such Silence (London: Vision Press, 1984) p32
2Alan Bold(ed), Harold Pinter, p38
3 John Russell Brown, Theatre Language: A Study ofArden, Osborne, Pinter and Wesker (London :
Allen Lane, 1972) p22
4Andrew Kennedy, Six Dramatists in Search ofa Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1975) ppl65-178
5Kristin Morrison, Canters and Chronicles (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) pi 82
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living in the predictable world of classical physics, which "presupposes the
possibility of clarification and of reaching a solution".6
The purpose of this section is also to investigate uncertainty in Pinter - the
uncertainty of presence - but with a different aim in mind than those of previous
critics, and from a radically different perspective. We would like to examine what the
word 'uncertainty' means in Pinter as opposed to its usage in Eckhart and Derrida,
how it is produced, where it leads us to, what feelings it arouses in its audience. The
linking motif in both parts of this section is the critique of presence, an exposition of
the illusion of presence which Pinter, as neither philosopher nor preacher, does not
have to theorize about, but only show. All three figures in this study perform a
critique of presence, with different intentions: this examination of The Homecoming
would like to propose that, whereas Eckhart's critique leads us to a nameless God
beyond God, and Derrida's investigations to "the joyful affirmation of the play of the
world"7, Pinter's own via negativa is a via which ultimately leads us nowhere.
Whether this, in turn, means that Pinter's characters are nothing more than an
array of guilty, Rousseauistic stooges, victims of a nostalgia, a yearning for an
absolute which will be forever denied to them, is a question which we will have to
answer later on. One could imagine a reading in which Pinter's texts, in a curious
way, enact the negative possibilities of Derrida's project by portraying what happens
when people refuse to affirm the play of the world and constantly - tragically - seek
assurance from the unstable signs around them...
But we are running ahead of ourselves. For now, the aim of this study is to
underline the uncertainty which manifests itself everywhere in The Homecoming,
disrupting the harmony of the play by suggesting - but never imposing - one or more
darker interpretations of a certain gesture, whilst leaving the gesture itself intact. The
title of the play is an example of this; its uncertainty hinges upon the ambiguity of the
word 'home' in English, the difference between saying "I am at home" and "I feel at
home". Is the home in The Homecoming simply a topographical reference - the
postal address whose building Teddy physically dwelled in up to the age of sixteen?
6found in Steve Gale(ed), Harold Pinter: Critical Approaches (London: Associated University Press,
1986) p206
7 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p292
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Or was - is - Teddy's home not just a Haus but also a Heimat, a collection of people
who nurture warmth and love for him? "They're very warm people, really," he
assures Ruth on their arrival, "They're not ogres".8 Teddy's father, Max, is equally
fond of evoking this image of a cosy family nest. "Well, it's a long time since the
whole family was together, eh? If only your mother was alive."(61) Barely three
minutes later, Max suddenly seems to be re-assessing his home in a slightly more
negative fashion: "A crippled family, three bastard sons, a slutbitch of a wife...and
here I've got a lazy idle bugger of a brother won't even get to work on time."(63) The
contradictions disconcert, startle, daze: which version is correct? Is Teddy's home
simply an uneasy nest of criminally inclined sociopaths, forever lapsing into golden-
days recollections and bizarre affectations of warmth? Or is it a 'home' whose
members really do feel genuine affection for one another (Max consoling Joey,
Teddy agreeing to cuddle his father, Sam and his desire to please Teddy), an affection
repeatedly thwarted by the kind of family disputes which, although unusual, are by
no means abnormal?
There is no denying that Teddy has come home: it is the kind of 'home' he has
returned to which is in doubt. The uncertainty of the title accounts for much of the
play's strangeness, as it expresses the increasing diffidence with which the audience
greets every remark and gesture of brotherly love or fatherly pride, expressions which
silently invoke their inverse as soon as the words leave the actors' mouths.
"Whatever we say of God is not true," says St Augustine, "and whatever we do not
say of Him is true".9 The strangeness of The Homecoming lies in the fact that neither
the affirmation nor the negation of the character's assertions seems very clear: the
audience is left to oscillate between the two in a kind of circolo negativo .
Before going on to examine these basic ideas in more depth, some attention
should be paid to the critical heritage of The Homecoming. Mention has just been
made of the play's 'strangeness': in order to develop some of the ideas arising from
this proposition , we will first have to deal with certain readings of The Homecoming
8p39.All textual references will be to the Methuen edition of The Homecoming in Pinter.Plays Three
(London: Methuen, 1978)
9 cit. in Clarke, Meister Eckhart, pl59
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which insist that the play is not strange at all, but simply a rational working-out of a
certain series of social circumstances.
2.2.1 The Critical Background: Rationalising Pinter.
One of the first things that becomes clear on reading the varied critical
reactions to The Homecoming is not just the impression that no-one actually agrees
on what the play means, but that there is a deep division between those who feel that
the play means something, and those who cannot imagine how the play could mean
anything. Stevenson suggests how six decades' ignorance of European modernism
may largely explain the Anglo-Saxon sense of baffled curiosity and vague resentment
which colours the prose of so many of Pinter's less sympathetic critics - "feeling
cheated", as the Guardian called it.10 Among those who cannot - or will not - totalize
the play to produce a single, explicable, coherent interpretation, the camp divides
once more into those who lament the fact and those who feel such enigma provides
one of the real sources of the play's undeniable power.
"Perfectly turned - but to what end?"11 asked Philip Hope Wallace in the
Guardian in 1965. The sense that something both puzzling and remarkable had been
produced, but that it concerned a remarkableness which neither playwright nor critic
could say they really understood, is a prevalent reaction to Pinter, invariably
accompanied by lamentations of incompleteness, unbalance and dissatisfaction. The
unpredictable actions of certain characters in The Homecoming also draws
accusations of bad plotting and inconsistency. For Trussler, Ruth's "change of heart
at the peripetea of action" is "sudden and lacking in conviction, unbalancing the
whole play".12 Others, such as Morrison, see the ambiguity and bizarreness of the
play as one of its major assets. For Hinchcliffe, "Fenny remains the enigmatic centre
10 see Randall Stevenson, "Harold Pinter - Innovator?" in Alan Bold (ed), Harold Pinter: You Never
Heard Such Silence (London: Vision Press, 1984) p29
1 'Michael Scott(ed), Pinter: The Birthday Party, The Caretaker and The Homecoming (London:
Macmillan Casebook Series, 1986) pl98
12Simon Trussler The Plays ofHarold Pinter (London : Gollancz, 1973) pl28
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of the play"13, an undecidable, unpredictable sign whose movement is "neither free
nor lost". Indeed, undecidability may well be the central motif of Hinchcliffe's
reading - "All the rich sentiments of family affection ...are contradicted, ironic, phony
or all three".(162).
Working against this current, a number of critics have insisted that "the play is
not puzzling at all" (as John Elsom wrote in the Listener) but, on the contrary, quite
rational and comprehensible.14 Such a movement in criticism of The Homecoming
was reinforced by Billington's 'naturalistic' production in 1978, where the familiar
characteristics of "Pinter's distinctive style - the long, ambiguous pauses, the hints of
distant menace"15 were played down to emphasise the power struggles going on
between the characters. It is therefore of no surprise that most of the 'rational'
interpretations of The Homecoming - that is, interpretations which insist on the
coherence and meaningfulness of the play as a whole - inevitably make use of the
various tensions and conflicts present in the fabric of the script. Two such readings,
those of Esslin and Wardle, supply us with two very different ideas of the play: a
socio-biological reading, in which the behaviour of the characters is seen as
analogous to the behaviour of animals in defending /attacking one another's territory
and a 'realistic' reading, which posits a series of credible explanations for the
characters' 'inexplicable' actions and contests the view that The Homecoming is at
all 'unconvincing'. We shall now consider these readings in a little more depth.
The object of this brief discussion is not to claim that the two interpretations
are 'wrong', but simply that their approaches exhibit two characteristics which, as we
shall see, will prove to be of fundamental importance to our own study of
uncertainty: i) a desire to make explicable - to ascertain - the causes and motivations
of The Homecoming's, characters and ii) an implicit though often selective trust not
only in the veracity of the characters' assertions but also in the general stability of
language. Both Esslin and Wardle are accomplished critics and their interpretations
make convincing reading. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to feel the subject of some
13Arnold Hinchcliffe, Harold Pinter( Boston: Twayne, 1967) pl62
14Scott (ed), Macmillan Casebook, pi98
15 ibid, pl98
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kind of Enlightenment project when moving through their works: the mystery of The
Homecoming is finally exposed, and all those ridiculous myths about its characters'
"apparently inexplicable motivations", indeed the "incredible" nature of the entire
story, are finally banished.16 Wardle, especially, insists on having discerned the
incontestable truth of Pinter's play, a truth which is obvious enough to anyone who
happens to have read Desmond Morris' The Naked Ape :
...all Pinter had done was to remove the conventional mask and show the naked
animal. The play, as a result, has to be understood in territorial terms or not at
all.17
Wardle's reliance on socio-biology in his reading of The Homecoming does, in a
literary dimension, render him vulnerable to the same charges of reductionism that
have already been leveled at Morris, Eibl-Eiblsfeldt and Lorenz. In his essay "The
Territorial Struggle", the motives and meaning for every line of the play, every
gesture made and remark uttered, are ultimately brought back to reinforce a single
principle: "territorial aspiration".18 Ruth's self-prostitution is seen as a bargained
contract, sex in return for property, her actions rendered explicable by the 'fact' that
when "a female passes out of a male stamping ground, she cancels her bond with
him." This, for Wardle, is precisely - incontestably - why Ruth's love "goes to the
male who owns the best piece of property".19 Wardle seems to forget the play's final
image, where an indifferent Ruth strokes Joey's head and stares into space as Max,
gasping and wheezing at her side, desperately tries to obtain her attention. The
various arguments and conflicts within the play are also seen as "status battles"20, the
effects of a "power contest" within a "family of predators".21 Little in Wardle's
reading of The Homecoming is left to chance, from Max's bullying of his younger
brother Sam - which he interprets as a display of "proprietary authority" - to Lenny's
attempts to provoke a philosophical discussion with Teddy, attempts which Wardle
sees as being ultimately "territorial" in their motivations.
16Martin Esslin,77!e Peopled Wound (London: Methuen, 1970) pl49
17Scott (ed), Macmillan Casebook, pi69
18ibid pi69
19 ibid, pl70
20ibid p 170 for all three quotations
21 ibid pl69
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Wardle calls The Homecoming "a very ironic play",22 and yet the space for
irony he leaves within his own reading of the text would not allow for a multitude of
senses. The suggestion which Almansi has raised - that every member of a Pinter cast
is a compulsive and pathological liar from beginning to end, indeed the possibility
that many of the characters' assertions which Wardle draws on to form his own
hypotheses and underline his own points may equally be true or untrue - does not
seem to unduly worry Wardle, although he is not unaware of the problem. In
affirming Max's role as the "hunter" in reference to his old job as a butcher, Wardle
remarks in parentheses:
Immediately we are on thin ice. Pinter always destroys things by explicit
reference; nobody's word is to be trusted. But as nobody challenges Max's
statements about his past, it's fair to take them as more than a mere strategic
fantasy.23
Wardle performs two gestures here: first of all, by speculating upon whether Max
really had been a butcher or not, he embarks upon what one critic has called the
"How many children had Lady Macbeth?" school of criticism24, an endless
hypothesizing about the ultimately unverifiable. In effect, he displays a belief in the
presence of a single intent behind Max's words as he utters them at that point in the
play, an intent we can stumble upon only if we study the play carefully enough.
Secondly, the curious method Wardle proffers of testing the truth-claims we hear
within the play - 'If no-one disagrees with a statement, then it is probably true' - relies
upon the implicit truthfulness and honesty of all the other characters. If a compulsive
liar such as Lenny had challenged Max's claims to being a butcher - what then? And
what about all the other statements in The Homecoming which Wardle recognises
are untrue (such as Ruth's "probably untrustworthy assertion" that she was born
nearby25) but which are never challenged?
This is by no means to say that Wardle is gullible: he displays a mistrust
towards the speeches in The Homecoming , but it is a selective mistrust, a mistrust





employed only when a negation of what the character has said would reinforce
Wardle's own reading. His assertion , for example, that "Teddy is a complete
outsider" is wholly based on the fact that Lenny assures him he is part of the family.
"Any reassurance from that mouth is bound to be untrue!".26 That Teddy is an
outsider in The Homecoming is by no means a wild and unjustifiable proposition -
but to insist upon him being "a complete outsider", categorically and without any
uncertainty, would involve denying or at least radically re-interpreting a number of
problematic moments in the play: Max's offer of a "cuddle" at the end of Act One,
the special relationship between Sam and Teddy, the strangely paternal remarks Max
offers to Teddy throughout the play ("Well, how you been keeping, son?" 64), even
the penultimate scene where Teddy is included in the "kitty" for the upkeep of Ruth
as a prostitute. Again, it is not that Wardle's reading is 'wrong' or 'improbable' - it is
that his assertions do not take into account the basic uncertainty within the play.
Esslin's reading of the play - though by no means anthropological - follows a
similar course to that ofWardle's, displaying a similar desire to clarify, de-mystify,
the meaning of the play, and consequently draws a number of similar criticisms.
Esslin's basic assertion that The Homecoming "can...stand up to the most meticulous
examination as a piece of realistic theatre" (172) invokes what some critics have
considered to be a basically naive reading of the text. Like Wardle, Esslin provides
an impressive series of explanations for Ruth's bizarre behaviour, involving an
unhappy and sexually unfulfilling marital relationship, incurable nymphomania and a
previous history of prostitution. Esslin presents them skillfully and in a way which
does exhibit a strong sense of internal coherence, creatively reconstructing a picture
of a broken down marriage from the snippets we are offered in The Homecoming -
the sudden trip to Venice, Ruth's reluctance to go straight to bed, the mention of the
college campus and Ruth's dissatisfaction with her new life in the New World.
In Esslin's reading of The Homecoming, no-one is ever actually accused of
telling a lie; the closest we come to this is on page 150 of The Peopled Wound, where
Esslin momentarily considers the possibility ofMax's tales about his gangland past as
being nothing more than "empty boasting". Otherwise, Esslin appears to believe
26ibid pi70
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everything he reads/hears, even Lenny's monologues, which do seem to have an air of
the theatrical about them, prompted as they are by the presence of a bemused yet
curious female audience. Esslin's explication of The Homecoming, to quote
Almansi/Henderson, constitutes an attempt to "satisfy a craving for
comprehension"27, a craving which formulates its certainties on the basis of an
unquestioning acceptance of the play's speeches.
If Esslin here is the affirmative theologian par excellence, one who believes
one can speak truthfully and meaningfully about The Homecoming in virtue of what
its characters say , then Almansi, to a certain extent, represents the negative
theologian: one can only speak truthfully about The Homecoming through what the
characters do not say. This is a central theme to Almansi's reading; Pinter's characters
embody dishonesty."The Pinterian hero...grunts in order to hide something else".28
Unlike Wardle, Almansi never gives his characters the benefit of the doubt. "You can
trust his characters neither when they are talking to others nor when they are talking
to themselves".29 Almansi's critique of Esslin, as we have seen, lies in the fact that
Esslin hardly ever seems to consider the possibility of the characters' mendacity. A
picture is painted of a bumbling detective, naively swallowing every alibi offered to
him. One could say, however, that Almansi - in his conviction that all Pinter
characters are "conscientious and persistent liars" (20) - commits the inverted version
of an identical error, by refusing to consider a priori the possibility that one
character may actually be speaking the truth.
In this sense, through a repeated use of terms such as 'lie' and 'liar',
Almansi's reading simply moves within the negative half of the same true /false
dualism. To lie is to know the truth but say something different - if Almansi feels that
Pinter's characters really do "hide the truth" (20) whenever they open their mouths,
then there is indeed a truth about the play to be understood, even if this means
arriving at the 'truth' through a negation of what the characters appear to be saying.
The aim of the remainder of this chapter is to show why neither Esslin's via
27Esslin, The Peopled Wound, p72
28Guido Almansi/ S.Henderson, Harold Pinter (London: Methuen,1983) pl9
29ibid, p20
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affirmitiva nor Almansi's via negativa can ever really be conclusive, as both
readings still rely on an idea of presence in The Homecoming, a semantic stability
which - as we shall see - simply cannot be obtained. What follows, therefore, is an
examination of how uncertainty is produced in The Homecoming under two different
headings: language and human relationships.
2.2.2 The Indeterminacy of Language
In attempting to write about language in The Homecoming, a very Derridean
problem arises: when one refers to the play known as The Homecoming by Harold
Pinter, what is being referred to? The written text, the film version or any one of the
various productions one might have seen over the years? The problem is Derridean
inasmuch that a reading of the script leaves a much greater impression of the play's
essential ambiguity; a good production aiming for clarity with a determined director
can - through the correct emphases and pauses - 'turn down' the uncertainty in the
play to its irreducible minimum. A less forceful production with blanker expressions,
longer silences and speeches which are not conveniently inflected to make them more
understandable, serves to widen the parameters of the play's possibilities and thereby
rob it of one overriding perspective.To read the script of The Homecoming is to
experience the play without any theatrical mediation - without anyone present to
nudge a line a certain way, or lend a remark a destination with a certain glance or
cadence.
The indeterminacy of language within The Homecoming manifests itself in
two ways: repetition and irony. At a number of points throughout the play, words,
commands or gestures are repeated, signs which change their meaning each time they
are evoked and reflected upon. The most obvious example of this is the 'table
episode' where Lenny, sitting with the family in the living room, starts to tease Teddy
provocatively with a philosophical conundrum:
LENNY: ...In other words, apart from the known and the unknown, what else is
there?
Pause.
TEDDY: I'm afraid I'm the wrong person to ask.
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LENNY: But you're a philosopher. Come on, be frank. What do you make of all
this business of being and non-being?
TEDDY: What do you make of it?
LENNY: Well, for instance, take a table. Philosophically speaking. What is it?
TEDDY: A table.
LENNY: Ah. You mean it's nothing else but a table. Well, some people would
envy your certainty, wouldn't they , Joey? For instance, I've got a couple of
friends of mine, we often sit round the Ritz Bar having a few liqueurs, and they
're always saying things like that, you know, things like: Take a table, take it.
Alright, I say, take it, take a table, but once you've taken it, what you going to
do with it? Once you've got hold of it, where you going to take it?
MAX: You'd probably sell it.
LENNY: You wouldn't get much for it.
JOEY: Chop it up for firewood.
Lenny looks at him and laughs. (68)
The scene can be played comically - Lenny's mischievous nod to Joey in the middle
of his philosophising always makes an audience laugh - but far more important is
how the 'table episode' invokes some of the underlying themes of the play: how do
we understand things? Do signs really mean anything? Can we trust them not to
change? For almost sixty seconds of stage-time, the audience's attention is directed
upon the small coffee table around which the family are sitting. Throughout this
minute, as soon as the word 'table' is repeated, interrogated, it acquires a bewildering
number ofmeanings: from the simple stage prop which Ruth lays the tray upon to
serve coffee to the rest of the family, it reveals itself to be an object of genuine
philosophical curiosity for Lenny, an attempt to undermine the security of his own
position for Teddy; for Max it represents a financial commodity, for Joey the pugilist
(intellectually the most basic member of the group) simply something to physically
break up and use as firewood. For the audience, the 'meaning' of the table suddenly
becomes an issue: it shimmers and changes as the discussion ranges backwards and
forwards across it. For a short period of time, the meaning of the word "table"
becomes indeterminate. Lifted out of its familiar semantic niche by Lenny's
provocative gesture, it oscillates for sixty seconds between a bewildering number of
different contexts, before sliding back into its place at the sound of the family's
laughter.
If the 'table episode' is indicative of anything, it shows how the repetition of
signs in Pinter is never predictable, even when nothing more than a pause for breath
separates the repetitions. Signs in The Homecoming are fundamentally indeterminate
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for this reason - they are not anchored safely to an immutable, unchanging, a priori
set of truths, one which they faithfully reflect whenever they are asked to do so. Even
apparently 'purposeful' and 'clear' language such as commands and requests seem to
take on odd, different meanings when repeated, as the first encounter between Ruth
and Lenny (the infamous glass-of-water scene) clearly shows. It is midnight and
Lenny has caught Ruth coming through the front door on the way back from a walk:
LENNY: And now perhaps I'll relieve you of your glass.
RUTH: I haven't quite finished.
LENNY: You've consumed quite enough, in my opinion.
RUTH: No, I haven't.
LENNY: Quite sufficient, in my own opinion.
RUTH: Not in mine, Leonard.
Pause.
LENNY: Don't call me that, please.
RUTH: Why not?
LENNY: That's the name my mother gave me.
Pause.
Just give me the glass.
RUTH:No.
Pause.
LENNY: I'll take it, then.
RUTH:If you take the glass, I'll take you.
Pause.
LENNY: How about me taking the glass without you taking me?
RUTH: Why don't I just take you?
Pause.
LENNY: You're joking. (50)
Ruth employs the indeterminacy of her own language upon Lenny to crippling effect
here, allowing the ambiguity of her response to accrue with each mocking repetition
of the word "take", repetitions which serve to add a new meaning to the word each
time it is repeated. The irony of Lenny's humiliation lies in the fact that this game of
indeterminate meaning - which Lenny loses so badly - is a game which he has
instigated. When Lenny proposes to "relieve" Ruth of her glass, he phrases the
question as a policeman might, asking someone to hand over their weapon, which
might explain Ruth's reluctance to do so. Or one might feel there is something
implicitly sexual about Lenny's phrasing - to 'relieve' someone of a glass in the same
way one might 'relieve' someone of a coat or garment. There is also the comic
possibility that Lenny, by phrasing his proposition in such a way, is also mocking his
sister-in-law's relative refinement and new social status, as he has already done
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several times (his offer of an "aperitif" earlier, or - after her mention of the trip to
"Dear old Venice", his mocking remark: "I decided to do a bit of snow clearing for
the Borough Council, because we had a heavy snow over here that year in Europe"
48).
Like the word "table" in the earlier passage, the glass now becomes the new
focus of attention, taking on several senses, none of which can be specifically
determined as the overriding meaning. The glass becomes the barometer of a power
struggle, a possible weapon of defence, a token sexual conquest, a means of subtle
ridicule...whilst remaining still a glass. The repetition of the word "take" underlines
this semantic splaying-open - when Ruth says: "If you take the glass, I'll take you",
she plays enigmatically upon the violent/sexual senses of "take" without committing
herself to a context which might betray one meaning or the other.
Ruth wins not only because she remains indeterminate, but because she
manages to do so whilst determining "Leonard". By evoking the infantile label
allotted to Lenny by his mother, Ruth effectively re-describes Lenny as a child,
forcing him into a context, inserting him between parameters of certainty which
Lenny clearly feels uncomfortable with. Lenny, on the other hand, is no longer able
to perform any such operation upon Ruth, who is suddenly transformed from the
passive audience of five minutes ago into a figure which is either a mocker or a
seductress. His inability to determine her exact intentions ("What are you doing,
making me some kind of proposal?" 50) only provokes her laughter. His uncertainty
as to whether Ruth really is joking paralyses him, prevents him from being able to
proceed with his game, not just because he no longer knows the rules, but also
because he is no longer sure of who he is playing with.
The indeterminacy of language in The Homecoming also manifests itself
through irony, even though this may not immediately seem to be the case. The
dictionary definition of irony - saying one thing whilst intending the opposite
meaning - seems to have little to do with the uncertainty of meaning and more to do
with the inverse of a certain meaning we examined in the previous section,
operations which lead us back to the presence of a particular, discernible intent
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behind the characters' actions. What is of importance to us here, however, is not so
much the ironic meaning of a certain line, but the oscillation of possibility between
the intended meaning of a line and its irony. When one calls into question the
presence of this determining, validating intent, something interesting happens to the
play: 'irony' ceases to be a simple verbal tool and becomes, instead, an ever-present
possibility. Who is to say which sentences in The Homecoming are ironic and which
are not? No longer merely a means of ridicule and barely perceptible mockery, the
ghost of irony grows to haunt each line of the play, be it serious or mocking, playful
or naive.
There are two kinds of irony in The Homecoming: the obvious and the possible.
'Obvious' irony usually occurs under the guise of the innocent - a straightforward
question or a bland remark - and is invariably malicious. When Sam tells of the
American he drove to the airport, Lenny interjects good-naturedly: "Had to catch a
plane there, did he?" (28). Lenny's irony, so obvious to the audience, is lost on Sam,
who never appears to suspect his nephew's curiosity in his profession as being tainted
with the slightest insincerity. "I bet the other drivers get jealous, don't they, Uncle?"
(29). Lenny's ironic adoption of filial sincerity in his mockery ofMax is always
noticed, however. After having called his father a "dog cook" earlier on, Lenny says:
LENNY: What the boys want, Dad, is your own special brand of cooking, Dad.
That's what the boys look forward to. The special understanding of food, you
know, that you've got.
MAX: Stop calling me Dad. Just stop all that calling me Dad, do you
understand? (33)
Ever aware of the contempt his son holds him in, Max's ears are always ready to
determine the sly, unpleasant realities beneath his son's loving praises and good-
natured advice. Max himself is not beyond irony, which he employs upon Sam to
devastating effect. "It's funny you never got married, isn't it? A man with all your
gifts" (30). And later: "When you find the right girl, Sam, let your family know...you
can bring her to live here, she can keep us all happy. We'd take it in turns to give her
a walk around the park"(31). Words which will acquire their own sense of irony later
on in the play.
65
All the above examples are examples of obvious irony, examples which
wring their effect by adopting a register or tone of language which the audience
knows is incompatible with the 'true' feelings of the speaker. When Lenny praises his
father's cuisine, the audience knows his words are ironic because, barely five minutes
earlier, he had compared Max's cooking to dog food. Instead of banally repeating this
to offend Max another time, Lenny employs the vocabulary of idolizing-son-wishing-
to-please-his-father to reiterate something which is - we feel - clearly untrue. This
highlights the problem of establishing where irony takes place in The Homecoming:
in a play so wrought with ambiguity, unpredictable characters, unreliable testimonies
and some frankly bizarre statements (Teddy explaining the plan of the house to Ruth:
"The structure wasn't affected, you see. My mother was dead." 37), one has to be
certain about the intentions of the characters before embarking upon any speculations
concerning the irony of their statements.
There are, indeed, a number ofmoments of 'possible irony' in The
Homecoming: that is, moments where it is radically uncertain whether a particular
line is ironic or not. A line may be potentially ironic - to arrive at any kind of
conclusion, however, would necessitate a series of assumptions concerning the
speaker's attitude towards the addressee, assumptions which are by no means
incontestable. Two such examples will suffice to show this, the first being Max's
indignant remark at the end of Act One, upon having Ruth presented to him at
breakfast:
MAX: ...we've had a stinking, pox-ridden slut in my house all night.
TEDDY: Stop it! What are you talking about?
MAX: I haven't seen the bitch for six years, he comes home without a word, he
brings a filthy scrubber off the street, he shacks up in my house!
TEDDY: She's my wife ! We're married!
Pause.
MAX: I've never had a whore under this roofbefore. Ever since your mother
died. (p58 - italics mine).
Either the grammatical ambiguity ofMax's remark is genuinely careless - and
therefore he does not consider his wife to have been the last "whore" to have slept in
the house - or the old man is deliberately playing with words because, deep down, he
really did feel his wife was a "whore". The two alternatives are equally plausible,
reflecting as they do something fundamentally ambiguous in Max's own feelings
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towards Jessie - "Mind you, she wasn't such a bad woman. Even though it made me
sick just to look at her stinking, rotten face, she wasn't such a bad bitch" (25). In
order to establish once and for all whether Max's remark does contain an unwanted
irony, one would somehow have to determine whether Max 'really' thought his wife
was a "whore" - or indeed, if she ever did anything which in his view might merit the
term. This would mean asking questions such as: was Sam's revelation that
"Macregor had Jessie in the back" of his cab really true? Is Max's description of his
wife in Act Two - "a woman...with a will of iron, a heart of gold and a mind" genuine
or simply a ruse to reassure Ruth?
Clearly, we are back in the land of 'How many children had Lady Macbeth?'.
Ruth's valedictory remark to Teddy as he leaves the house presents the would-be
seeker of certainties with a similar series of problems:
LENNY:Ta-ta, Ted. Good to see you. Have a good trip.
TEDDY: Bye-bye, Joey.
Joey does not move.
JOEY:Ta-ta.




Don't become a stranger.
Teddy goes, shuts the front door. (p96)
The remark is so strange that it often provokes laughter: actors have been unsure
whether to portray Teddy's reaction, suitcases in both hands, as puzzled (as in Roger
Michell's 1997 production at the National) or simply unflinching and indifferent (as
in Peter Hall's film adaptation). It is an uncertainty which reflects, as in Max's
remark, the fundamental ambiguity of the sentence. The fact that Ruth addresses him
as Eddie may suggest the sincerity of the line - although , as one critic has already
pointed out30, Ruth may also be mocking him in the same way she mocked
"Leonard", by refusing to address him by his preferred name. Therefore the 'possible
irony' of Ruth's farewell depends on whether she bears any malice or resentment
towards her husband, and whether this malice is actually expressed at that moment in
asking Teddy sarcastically not to alienate himself from the family. A cruel parody of
30Scott(ed), Macmillan Casebook, pi4
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uxorial affection or a genuine lapse into the kind of sentiments which - possibly -
both Teddy and Ruth felt for one another in the days before their marriage went
wrong? The remark remains uncertain - even if one does make a certain choice,
electing one interpretation of Ruth's words over another, the chosen interpretation
will always be haunted by its ghostly inverse, by the inescapable possibility that an
irony has just been uttered.
2,2.3 The Indeterminacy of Human Relationships.
It is not difficult to see how the indeterminacy of language is implicated in the
indeterminacy of human relationships within The Homecoming; if we understand the
meaning of a remark by its intention, then the hope of obtaining such a meaning
quickly becomes indeterminable in a play where characters can display such curious
reticence, behave unpredictably and speak a language which is so hermeneutically
elastic. Of course, there are other factors which contribute towards such 'hermeneutic
elasticity' - the bizarre interspersing of linguistic registers, for example (philosophical
discussions in the middle of family chats, stereotypically affectionate father-son
conversations going on while the daughter-in-law is rolling about on the floor with
the rest of the family, Lenny interspersing his strange, violent anecdotes to Ruth with
surreal hospitality). In his conference address "The Uncertainty Principle", Fuegi has
already written on how Pinter's characters have "the randomness of particles in the
post-Heisenbergian world view".31 What this section proposes is that the undecidable
ambiguity of language in The Homecoming is a direct consequence of the instability
of the relationships within the play.
As we maintained at the very beginning of this section, it is an instability
which forever oscillates between two positions. Elements of the play which purvey
an impression of traditional, patriarchal, homely life (Teddy wanting to see his old
bedroom upon his arrival, the family chat, Max's recollection of golden family
moments), elements which almost betray some sense of affection between the
members of Teddy's family, are juxtaposed in a surreal way between scenes and
3'Gale, Harold Pinter: Critical Approaches, p205
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speeches which give a diametrically opposite impression (Max's initial abuse of
Ruth, the violent quarrels between Max and Lenny, the antagonism between Max and
Sam, the family orgies and the quarrel about who is going to have the most sex with
Teddy's wife). For this reason, The Homecoming operates through a kind of dramatic
schizophrenia - one is never quite sure whether one is watching a play about a group
of vicious, sex-starved sociopaths or an East End version of The Waltons.
Given this constant oscillation between the two faces of The Homecoming,
this might be an opportune moment to mention Schrodinger, and take on board a
metaphor which shall prove useful to us in our investigations. For those unfamiliar
with the hypothesis, Schrodinger's cat was a famous attempt to illustrate how two
different waveforms might overlap and interfere with one another. A cat is placed in
a closed box along with a small source of radiation, a geiger counter and a small
phial of cyanide with a hammer poised above it. If, after a certain amount of time, a
stray alpha particle is detected by the geiger counter, the hammer falls, the flask of
cyanide is broken and the cat dies. Davies (1992) goes on:
One can therefore envisage two possibilities. In one case the atom decays, the
hammer falls and the cat is dead. In the other case, which has equal probability,
none of this happens and the cat remains alive. The quantum wave must
incorporate all possibilities, so the correct quantum description of the contents of
the box must consist of two overlapping and interfering waveforms, one
corresponding to a live cat, the other to a dead cat. In this ghostly hybrid state,
the cat cannot be regarded as definitely either dead or alive...It is as if nature
suspends judgment on the fate of the poor creature until somebody peeks .
(Italics mine).32
Until we open the box, the fate of the cat is uncertain: it is, in a strange way, both
dead and alive. Such quantum uncertainty, I would like to suggest, exists in The
Homecoming in abundance: the only difference is that we cannot lift off the tops of
the characters' heads and 'peek' inside to find out their intentions, because there are
none to evaluate. All we have is a text. Did Max really call Ruth a "pox-ridden slut"?
Is Ruth really mocking Teddy when she says goodbye? Can Lenny's anecdotes really
be trusted? Did Macregor really have Jessie in the back of Sam's cab? Did Teddy
really think his family are not ogres? Like the cat in Schrodinger's box, Pinter's
characters occupy an uncanny kind of quantum space - one in which, contrary to the
69
speculations of Esslin and Almansi, a definite answer to any of the above questions is
simply unavailable.
Let's take, for example, the figure ofMax - would it be possible to talk with
any consistency and certainty about his feelings towards those around him? Is he an
"ogre" or just "a confused old man" (58), as Joey explains? At the end of Act One,
the audience witnesses his extraordinary attack on both Teddy and Ruth ("Who asked
you to bring dirty tarts into the house?" 57) and his order to Joey to "chuck them
out". This is almost immediately followed by Max's request for Teddy to embrace
him - "Teddy, why don't we have a nice cuddle and a kiss, eh? Like the old days?"
(59). And Teddy does indeed embrace him - which convinces us either that the
preceding three minutes of stage time has all been an elaborate joke, of such an
intimacy that only Teddy and his father can really understand, or that Teddy has
decided to play along with the unpredictable, Protean nature of the old man's
derangement.
The uncertainty persists in the beginning of the next act, the scene of the
family lunch. Max is sitting next to his daughter-in-law, the "stinking pox-ridden
slut" and "dirty tart" of the previous scene. Max lights his cigar after a good meal and
says to her:
Well, it's a long time since the whole family was together, eh? If only your
mother was alive. Eh, what do you say, Sam? What would Jessie say if she was
alive? Sitting here with her three sons. Three fine grown-up lads. And a lovely
daughter-in-law. The only shame is her grandchildren aren't here. She'd have
petted and cooed over them, wouldn't she Sam? ... Mind you, she taught those
boys everything they know. She taught them all the morality they know. (62)
Of course, Almansi - Pinter's negative theologian - would say that Max is lying
through his teeth here. To consider the possible sincerity in Max's words would be
ridiculous - "three fine grown-up lads"? a "lovely daughter-in-law"? After a scene in
which Max has punched Joey in the stomach, spat in Lenny's face and called Teddy's
wife a "disease", Pinter is surely being ironic. Equally, Esslin - Pinter's affirmative
theologian - would probably suggest the opposite. Given Esslin's (justifiable)
conviction of the gangland background of Max's family, not to mention the
proposition that Lenny is very probably a pimp, Max may well be telling the truth
32 Paul Davies, The MatterMyth (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992) p211-212
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when he says how Jessie taught her sons "all the morality they know". Perhaps
Jessie - the hypothetical "whore" in Max's ambiguous solecism - really did teach her
children all they know.
The obstacle to any conclusive remarks concerning Max's lapse into nostalgia
is that, regardless of whether the irony is intended or not, there is no way of knowing
whether Max really 'means what he says'. If one sees the desire to impress Ruth and
create the facade of a happy family atmosphere as a motivation for producing such a
pack of lies, then one has to explain similar moments in the play when Max lapses
into some nostalgic thought-train, but without any audience he is particularly keen to
impress. "Our father!" he says in front of Sam. "I remember him...I was only that
big...he'd dandle me. Give me a bottle. Wipe me clean. Give me a smile. Pat me on
the bum. ...I remember my father." (35) Max is quite capable of sentimentalising his
past ex tempore - one hardly needs the presence of a cynical motive to provoke him.
Any attempt to reduce Max's behaviour to one simplistic set of adjectives
such as 'malicious', 'cruel', 'violent' is flawed by the contradictory moments of
paternal affection and human feeling which are interspersed throughout the play. His
offer to take Joey to the football match and his protective feelings towards him ("You
been shouting at Joey?" he demands to know from Lenny), his cuddle with Teddy,
his alarm in the night at Lenny's cries ("He wakes me up in the middle of the night, I
think we got burglars here, I think he's got a knife stuck in him, I come down here,
he tells me to pop off' 31)...all of this provides a ghostly counter-image ofMax, one
which complicates and renders problematic a 'straightforward' reading of the play.
The critic Dukore (1982), perceiving this difference between what characters in The
Homecoming purport to be and how they actually behave, writes:
The play disorients. A butcher cooks what one of his sons calls dog food. A
young fighter is knocked to the ground by his old father. A philosopher refuses
to philosophise. A chauffeur is unable to drive. A pimp takes orders from his
whore. The whore does not go all the way with a man. 33
The word 'disorients' is appropriate: signs such as 'father', 'wife', 'brother' indicate one
direction, whilst what we actually see and hear on stage sends us in the other. Pinter's
33Scott, Macmillan Casebook pi90
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characters present us with possibilities which are ultimately undecidable - as in the
case ofMax or Ruth, if we choose to interpret the signs one way, there is always a
problematic residue which de-stabilises the reading. Suspected lies are always
haunted by the possibility of their truth; apparently sincere remarks never quite
escape the shadow of irony which seems to fall over the entire play. Such linguistic
indeterminacy seems to lie at the heart of Pinter's script, producing an uncertainty
which - as we shall see - will be of a radically different kind from that of The
Birthday Party or The Dumb Waiter.
2,2.4 The Frustration of the Uncertain: One Possible Reading
Having examined some of the ways in which the text of The Homecoming produces
uncertainty, generating a finite number of indeterminate readings, this final section
aims to explore the attitude towards uncertainty exhibited by the other characters
within the play. In the first part of this section, we saw how the various
contradictions and ambiguities within The Homecoming thwarted any attempt at a
single, definitive, internally coherent reading of the play. What this final section will
now do will be to suggest a reading of the play which appropriates The Homecoming
purely from the perspective of our own investigations - namely, the effects which the
uncertain and the desire for certainty has upon the other characters. Such a thematic
treatment will serve to elucidate, I hope, the main point of this section: that whereas
in the texts of Eckhart and Derrida, the uncertainty of presence (however differently
understood) is seen as a liberating and productive concept, for most of the characters
in The Homecoming it is primarily negative, aggressive and, above all, frustrating.
Noel Coward, in his oft-quoted praise of Pinter, talks about words which are
both "unexpected and violent"34, a pairing of adjectives which would apply just as
well to The Homecoming as The Birthday Party or The Caretaker. Uncertainty has a
sinister and unsettling side in The Homecoming which manifests itself through
sudden bouts of violence, ambiguous threats, a startlingly open act of marital
unfaithfulness and several uncertain accounts of physical brutality whose veracity is
34 Coward , The Sunday Times , 15 Jan 1961, cit. in Christopher Innes' Modern Bridsh Drama
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difficult to gauge. Consider Lenny, who is relating to Ruth the story of his encounter
with "a certain lady" who "is falling apart with the pox":
LENNY: Well, to sum up, everything was in my favour, for a killing...But...in
the end I thought...Aaaah, why go to all the bother...So I just gave her another
belt in the nose and a couple of turns of the boot and sort of left it at that.
RUTH: How did you know she was diseased?
LENNY: How did I know that?
Pause.
I decided she was.
Pause.
You and my brother are newly-weds, are you? (47)
The intention of the anecdote is unclear, its relevance mysterious. I say 'mysterious'
and not 'uncertain', because there does seem to be some kind of enigmatic purpose at
work in Lenny's story, although he never actually states what it is, preferring to leave
it unexpressed. The anecdote is prompted - or at least appears to be - by Ruth's
refusal to let him hold her hand, which might imply a coded warning for Ruth to
comply with his request, or suffer the same fate as the "diseased" woman in the story
. The abrupt absurdity of the non-sequitur which follows ("You and my brother are
newly-weds, are you?") sees to underline the menace of the hint. Lenny's second
anecdote, which follows immediately after the first and concerns an assault he makes
upon an elderly woman, begins with his disconcerting declaration: "...I tend to get
desensitized, if you know what I mean, when people make unreasonable demands on
me" (48). There is just enough of an implicit threat in the line to give the whole
speech a sense of thinly-veiled intimidation. In contrast to Joey and Max, who blurt
out their feelings with little sense of mystery ("Don't you talk to me like that. I'm
warning you." 23), Lenny manipulates the uncertainty of his intentions to maximum
effect, alluding to but seldom stating the sinister possibilities of his semantics.
Seekers of Certainty.
If Lenny exploits uncertainty, then Teddy is frustrated by it. First and
foremost, Teddy is the archetypal seeker of certainty. He exacts it from his wife, from
his "critical works", from his homecoming. Unwilling to let his wife roam out on the
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p279
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street alone, reluctant to answer questions which do not apply to his specialist,
philosophical field, Teddy's 'certainties' soon reveal themselves to be far from certain.
When Teddy insists that a table is nothing more than a table, Lenny is quick to mock:
"Ah. You mean it's nothing else but a table. Well, some people would envy your
certainty, wouldn't they, Joey?" (68). One critic has already remarked how, in this
exchange, Teddy talks like an analytical philosopher, whilst Lenny appears to be an
existentialist.35 Teddy sees the table and cannot imagine it to be anything else, such is
his faith in the stability of the sign. Lenny, on the other hand, entertains no such
naivete: as a devious and cunning manipulator of signs himself, he is fully aware of
their exploitable uncertainty.
Teddy's belief in the steadfast link between signs and the things they
represent has, amongst other things, the effect that his sense of certainty is always
tied to a sense of place.
LENNY: Eh, Teddy, you haven't told us much about your Doctorship of
Philosophy. What do you teach?
TEDDY: Philosophy.
LENNY: Well, I want to ask you something. Do you detect a certain logical
incoherence in the central affirmations of Christian theism?
TEDDY:That question doesn't fall within my province.
LENNY: Well, look at it this way...you don't mind my asking you some
questions, do you?
TEDDY:If they're within my province . (67-8)
Teddy's visible aversion towards straying out of the familiar, leaving his natural
environment, finds its expression in this desire to remain within his "province".
Teddy's sense of certainty requires that everything has its own place, that every field
has its own proper questions - hence his pleasure at coming home and finding that
"Nothing's changed". Everything is still in its place, "still the same". This need for
things to stay as they are, where they are, manifests itself later on in Act II, when
Ruth declares: "I was ...different...when I met Teddy...first." Teddy, resilient as ever
to the faintest suggestion ofmutability, insists: "No, you weren't. You were the
same" (66). It is this desire to be in control of the signs around him which explains
Teddy's disorientation when he encounters a sign that won't stay in its place. When
35Hinchliffe, Harold Pinter, pl60
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Ruth, late at night, expresses the desire to go out for a "stroll", Teddy cannot believe
it:
TEDDY: At this time of night? But we've...only just got here. We've got to go to
bed.
RUTH: I just feel like some air.
TEDDY: But I'm going to bed.
RUTH:That's all right.
TEDDY:But what am I going to do? ...I'm not going to bed without you. (40)
Unsettled by the signifier that won't stay in its natural place, in its "bed", Teddy
simply does not know how to react. Regarding things which belong to his "province",
Teddy does not handle unfamiliar behaviour any better than he handles unfamiliar
questions. It is a scene which replicates itself at the end ofAct II, when Teddy tells
Ruth:
You just rest. I'll go and pack. (71)
Teddy's ineffective "will-to-power", if one can call it as such, becomes pathetic to
observe as we finally see Ruth step out of her husband's "province" altogether. For
someone who allegedly teaches philosophy (or possibly because he teaches
philosophy), Teddy's view of reality is fundamentally naive: if he can only supply a
comprehensive enough context, he need never worry about the sign wandering out of
control. All that's required is the correct phrase or gesture, a reminder of Ruth's
motherhood, perhaps, or a second honeymoon to Venice, and Ruth will always
perform predictably in the role of her husband's wife. The last thirty minutes of the
play show just how epistemologically inadequate Teddy's world view is: despite all
his efforts to engineer the physical conditions which might render Ruth's actions
predictable (to reduce her parameters of play, as it were) and force her to play the
game of Faithful, Loving Wife, Ruth flouts them all without even displaying the
semblance of a conscious intention. Events which render Teddy's dramatic outburst
concerning his "critical works" in Act Two both absurd and comic:
You wouldn't understand my works. You wouldn't have the faintest idea of what
they were about...You're very behind. All of you...Might do you good...have a
look at them...see how certain people can maintain...intellectual
equilibrium...You're just objects. You just ...move about. I can observe it. I can
see what you do . It's the same as I do. But you're lost in it. You won't get me
being...I won't be lost in it. (78)
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The irony, of course, is that Teddy is already "lost in it", and has appeared so from
the very beginning. In the final sentence, he even loses himself in the middle of
saying how he hasn't lost himself. The inherent uncertainty of Ruth's behaviour make
an explicit mockery of the speaker's claims to "intellectual equilibrium". Again,
Teddy's words echo balance, harmony, order, words made farcical after the sight of
his wife, rolling off the sofa with both of Teddy's brothers. It is interesting to see how
Teddy expresses the difference between himself and his family, a difference which is
neither based on "intelligence", nor on any essential difference in their behaviour ("I
can see what you do. It's the same as I do.") What separates the philosopher from his
family, Teddy declares, is knowledge. Being aware of what one is constitutes,
presumably, this "intellectual equilibrium". Not for Teddy the unexamined,
unreflective life - "It's a question of how far you can operate on things and not in
things"(77). In a play so riddled with uncertainty and unpredictability, Teddy's
outburst constitutes a curious flash of Enlightenment thinking, a re-surfacing of the
old, deterministic, pre-quantum idea that uncertainty only occurs because of a lack of
knowledge. The more one knows about the conditions of an experiment - its
variables, its constants, its fluctuations - the more certain one can be about
forecasting its results. The fact that all Teddy's attempts to determine his wife's
faithfulness fail so dismally only serves to show how obsolete such a mode of
thinking is in The Homecoming.
Although Hinchcliffe has called Lenny the "enigmatic centre of the play"36, it
is becoming quickly obvious as our argument progresses that the only character in the
entire play who genuinely feels at home in uncertainty is Ruth. Never flustered,
perturbed, disconcerted or at a loss for words even when faced with the most bizarre
scenarios, Ruth exceeds even Lenny in her dealings with - and exploitation of -
uncertainty. In contrast to her determinist of a husband, Ruth seems to have
understood exactly the quantum nature of reality in The Homecoming: she is not tied
to some notion of the stable sign, does not expect the world around her to work in a
certain way, and therefore is not 'disoriented' (to use Dukore's words) when the
unexpected occurs, such as her father-in-law calling her a "disease" or her brother-in-
36ibid, p!62
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law asking her to hold her hand. Unlike Lenny, she does not "get desensitized" when
people "make unreasonable demand" on her, because she is not tied to any constant,
unchanging idea of the word 'reasonable'. We have already examined in section 2.2.2
how Ruth manages to 'determine' Lenny whilst remaining 'indeterminate' herself.
What I would like to examine in this final section is how Ruth, as the most uncertain
element in the play, wreaks havoc and frustration on those certainty-seekers around
her by constantly thwarting their attempts to constrain her parameters of play.
Mark C.Taylor, the deconstructive critic and theologian, writes in a passage
which has some interesting resonances for our own investigation of the feminine and
the uncertain:
When the subject is driven by the need to close gaps and fill holes, the
phallus becomes the focus of the sexual relation. From the phallocentric
perspective, "The obscenity of the feminine sex is that of everything which
'gapes open'. It is an appeal to being , as all holes are. In herself, woman appeals
to a strange flesh which is to transform her into a fullness of being by penetration
and dissolution."37
Taylor is citing Sartre here in terms which quickly become graphically carnal:
certainty as the filling of an emptiness, the vanquishing of a nothingness, the closing
of a gap. "Christ, she's wide open" says Joey (74), upon returning into the front room
to find Ruth kissing Lenny in front of her husband. Aware that Ruth is no longer
exclusively tied to any one male, he makes the mistake of assuming anyone can
appropriate her. "She's a tart...Old Lenny's got a tart in her." Naturally, both Lenny
and Joey are elated to find that Ruth's marital status is no longer so clear. Ruth's
transgressive dance with Lenny, culminating in their kiss, frees her from the certainty
of Teddy's "province" and allows her to roam where she will, with whom she will.
Thus begins the final episode of the play, where Teddy's family prove
themselves to be just as inept in dealing with Ruth's unpredictability as Teddy has
been. The uncertainty personified in Ruth now manifests itself in the question: is she
a "tart" or a "tease"?
LENNY: The girl's a tease.
37Taylor, Mark C., ErRing: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984) p28
, cit. Sartre, Being and Nothingness , p728
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MAX: What?
LENNY: She's had Joey on a string.
MAX: What do you mean?
TEDDY: He had her up there for two hours and he didn't go the whole hog. (84)
Time and time again, Ruth unnerves her would-be 'employers' with one unexpected
move after another: she allows Joey to caress her, even lie on top of her, then
suddenly gets up and takes immediate control of the situation, abruptly demanding
food and drink from her suitors of three seconds ago. Joey's failure to "go the whole
hog" with her, to dispel the uncertainty Ruth represents, constitutes another example
of the enigma's resistance to all seekers of knowledge. Joey is "frustrated", both
sexually and epistemologically. No-one can believe it. "My Joey? She did that to my
boy?" cries Max (84). In a scenario where everyone is obsessed with who "gets the
gravy" (Lenny's interesting euphemism for sexual consummation), the irony of The
Homecoming seems to be that no-one ever does get the gravy. The mystery of Ruth,
so to speak, remains intact.
Of course, Ruth's complicity in their plans to prostitute her - not to mention
the drawing up of a contract - might signify the final, contractualised determining of
her status, 'legally-binding' in all senses of the word. Could this not be seen as the
final triumph of Certainty, successfully confining and commodifying Ruth on the
basis of a series of rigid obligations? In response to this, four points must be made.
Firstly, although Ruth considers the family's proposition a "very attractive idea", she
appears enigmatically reluctant to finalise the arrangement at that moment. "Do you
want to shake on it now, or do you want to leave it till later?" asks Max. "Oh, we'll
leave it till later" says Ruth (94). Secondly, it is Ruth who proposes the contract and
practically draws up all its conditions, handling Max and Lenny with childlike ease
as she delineates the conditions of the arrangement, even down to the size of her
wardrobe. "I'd need an awful lot. Otherwise I wouldn't be content" (93). Thirdly, it is
by no means clear that contracts actually mean anything to Ruth. Why should she
consider her 'marriage' to the family anymore authentic and binding than her marriage
to Teddy? Finally, after Ruth's deception of Joey, there is the possibility that Ruth
will not take her new-found vocation 'seriously' enough - that she will play with the
clients, rather than satisfy them, a possibility which seems to worry Max more than
most:
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But there's something worrying me. Perhaps she's not up to the mark. Eh?
Teddy, you're the best judge...I mean what about all this teasing? Is she going to
make a habit of it? That'll get us nowhere. (89)
The old uncertainty still remains: "tart" or "tease"? It is an important question for
Max, who sees Ruth as introducing an undesirable element of unpredictability into an
otherwise sound commercial venture, not to mention Max's plans for his own sexual
gratification. This inability to forecast Ruth's actions with any degree of certainty
problematizes the whole money-making scheme. Uncertainly, suddenly, becomes an
obstacle to pleasure and profit. Consider the old man's rant at the end of the play:
I've got a funny idea she'll do the dirty on us, you want to bet? She'll use us...I
can tell you!...You want to bet?
Pause.
She won't ...be adaptable! (97)
Ruth has her 'employers' so confused that they are no longer even certain of being
uncertain anymore ("Do you think she's got it clear?"). In his desire to "use" her, Max
contemplates the appalling possibility that she is using them. Ruth simply remains
enigmatically silent, a move which underlines the helpless pathos of the old man's
unanswered question. His fear that Ruth will not prove "adaptable" is all too ironic:
ultimately, it is the family which has shown itself completely unable to adapt in any
way to the indeterminate cluster or beliefs and desires that calls itself "Ruth". Despite
all their attempts to quantify Ruth, determine her, insert her into the commercial
order of their own arrangements, even to the extent of trying to find a different, more
appropriate name for her - "Spanish Jacky" suggests Max - Ruth, at the end of the
play, remains indefinably, elusively in control.
Negative Possibilities.
Perhaps such a rendering of the play as the triumph of Uncertainty over
Certainty is not without its problems. In order to arrive at such a reading, certain
choices have been made, certain ambiguities overlooked, the paradoxical language of
certainty has been used which even a discussion of the uncertain cannot avoid.
Nevertheless, the point remains: in Eckhart, uncertainty is that which instigates
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initiation into "the mystery of God"38 and allows the believer "to know God in a
divine manner".39 In Derrida, uncertainty produces the "joyous affirmation" which
will enable the one-time truth-seeker to "pass beyond man and humanism" and obtain
a different kind of innocence, the "innocence of becoming".40 In The Homecoming,
however, the state of uncertainty only ever seems to produce frustration and
subjection. Far from being positive and productive, uncertainty is used strategically
to disarm, bewilder and subdue.
Esslin, in The Theatre of the Absurd in 1968, writes:
The Theatre of the Absurd has renounced arguing about the absurdity of the
human condition; it merely presents it in being - that is, in terms of concrete
stage images. This is the difference between the approach of the philosopher and
that of the poet; the difference, to take an example from another sphere, between
the idea of God in the works of Thomas Aquinas or Spinoza and the intuition
of God in those of St John of the Cross or Meister Eckhart - the difference
between theory and experience. 41
One could take issue with the slightly simplistic scholastic /mystic - theory /practice
scheme into which Esslin fits Aquinas and Eckhart; Eckhart surely does a lot more
than merely translate the Thomist God into Eckhartian practice. Esslin, writing barely
a generation after L'Etranger and L'Etre et Le Neant, cannot see Beckett, Ionesco
and Pinter as anything other than a direct consequence of French existentialism. To
paraphrase Esslin: the Theatre of the Absurd, as opposed to the Philosophers of the
Absurd, does not tell but shows. Not only does it depict an encounter with the
Absurd, it seeks to replicate an identical sense of the absurd in the audience. Tired of
'rationalizing' about the irrational, it engineers a series of conditions in which the
absurd is directly experienced by the spectator.
Esslin's exposition of Pinter's existentialist heritage is by no means erroneous -
the Sartrean dictum of existence preceding essence, for example, could be applied
perfectly well to Ruth in The Homecoming. What I would finally like to suggest,
3801iver Davies, Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings (London: Penguin, 1994) pi 37, taken from the
sermon Eratis enim aliquando in tenebrae
39Davies,Meister Eckhart, p224, from the sermon Et cum factus esset Jesus
40Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1978)
p292
41Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1968) p25
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however, is that for a reader/spectator of 1998, The Homecoming may equally well be
construed as a play about epistemological skepticism42, about a wandering, unruly,
enigmatic text that can never quite be mastered. In the first part of this section,
reference was made to a possible reading of The Homecoming as depicting "an array
of guilty, Rousseauistic stooges", a reading which sees Pinter's text as enacting "the
negative possibilities of Derrida's project by portraying what happens when people
refuse to affirm the play of the world and constantly - tragically - seek assurance from
the unstable signs around them." Pinter's The Homecoming could be seen as an
admonitory representation of what happens when people tie themselves to things, or
to their desires for things, instead of acknowledging - as Ruth does, and as Lenny
tries to do - the unmasterable, ever-changing reality of the Heraclitean flux which
surrounds them. The effect is two-fold: we feel uncertainty as we watch the play
proceed and unfold its bizarre series of volte-faces and mood changes upon us
(father-in-laws hurling abuse at their offspring and then asking for cuddles, brother-
in-laws trying to seduce their kin's wives, etc). Simultaneously, in the midst of our
uncertainty, we recognise the uncertainty of the family as they try to wheedle Ruth
into co-operating with them. Their inability to predict Ruth's behaviour parallels our
own uncertainty as to where the play is heading, about what it all 'means'. If this is
what Esslin intends by translating "theory" into "experience", then The Homecoming
seems to be an efficient realisation of such a project.
42Laurence St John Butler's "Beckett's Stage of Deconstruction" (in Brian Docherty's Twentieth
Century European Drama [Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1994]) has already examined the






3.1 The Motif ofWandering in Eckhart and Derrida
In the previous chapter, we examined uncertainty in terms of the critique of
presence - and how such uncertainty is seen by both negative theology and
deconstruction as a liberating and generative condition. The aim of this chapter is to
examine and re-propose the same sentiment, from a radically different angle: the fact
that both Derrida and Eckhart, in completely different contexts, talk about 'joyous
wandering', will form the basis of our investigations. Uncertainty understood as
'wandering' - that is, as an abandonment not just of origins and motivations, but also
of goals and destinations.
In both Eckhart and Derrida's 'pathless ways', the wandering motif acts as an
important symbol of their affirmation of the uncertain. It is a motif, this section will
suggest, which is both descriptive (describing the inherent errancy/unmasterability of
the divine or of the text) and also prescriptive (suggesting new ways of responding to
the divine or to the text). However, before looking at what Derrida and Eckhart have
to say about the peregrinary, it will first be necessary to briefly review the scriptural
echoes and resonances of the verb 'to wander', in order to understand precisely why
Eckhart and Derrida's positive re-appropriation of irren and errer is so ironic.
3.1.1 Some Biblical Considerations.
Although it is difficult to write anything substantially original about the
concept of 'wandering' after Mark C.Taylor's sprawling, quotation-studded work
ErRing: A Postmodern A/theology, the initially negative significance of 'to wander'
in the Bible (and all its various synonyms: to err, to deviate, to stray) is clear. The
Psalmist writes: "My steps have held to your paths: my feet have not slipped." (17:5).
To wander is to lose sight of such a path, to deviate from a certain code of behaviour,
to veer away from a certain destination. Christ's assertion in John 14:6 illustrates this
thematic link between the itinerary and the quest for certainty: "I am the Way and the
Truth and the Life". If the path (in Greek hodos, from which we derive the word
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'method') is to be associated with truth, then clearly any deviation from it leads to
error, confusion, despair. One does not, however, always have to choose to wander -
the tradition in the Old Testament of wandering as punishment is also evident: the
eviction from one's land, as God's admonition to Cain suggests ("Thou shalt be a
restless wanderer upon the earth" Genesis 4:12), the wandering tribes of
Israel...wandering understood as homelessness, as destitution, as exile.1
Working against this negative interpretation of the peregrinary, both Eckhart
and Derrida's affirmation of pathlessness do evoke, consciously or no, some of the
more positive motifs of the errant glimpsed in the New Testament. "Foxes have holes
and birds have nests, but the Son of Man has no place to rest his head." (Luke 10:24).
Christ the wandering, itinerant preacher, moving from village to village, town to
town, with no family, home or occupation to tie him down, constantly inciting those
around him to participate in the same kind of homelessness: "Sell everything you
have and give to the poor...then come, follow me" (Luke 18:22). To wander is a
symptom of the divine: to have no need of origins, to scoff at destinations.
Therefore, the meaning of erring in the Bible displays the very ambiguity
which the verb retains today. On the one hand, to wander is seen as an act of
transgression, a departure from a certain path, or even a march along the wrong one.
On the other, it also constitutes a gesture of freedom, an unwillingness that the
infinite divine should be tied to a finite place, image or dictum. "The wind blows
wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you cannot tell where it comes from or
where it is going to. So it is with those born of the Spirit." (John 3:8). To what extent
does the Eckhartian/Derridean corpus replicate and exploit the resonances of this
biblical motif? To what extent does it depart from it?
1 One thinks ofMr Deasly's anti-Semitic ramblings in Ulysses: "-They sinned against the light, Mr
Deasly said gravely. And you can see the darkness in their eyes. And that is why they are wanderers on
the earth to this day." Ulysses (London: Bodley Head, 1960 ) p41
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Attitudes Towards Pilgrimages and Wandering in Eckhart's Time.
And ye that seek St James and saints of Rome,
Seeketh St Truth, for he may save you all.2
It is difficult to evaluate, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, exactly how
Eckhart's contemporary audiences (both scholarly and unlearned) would have
responded to the phrase 'pathless way'. What Constable has already underlined as
"the ambiguity of medieval attitudes towards" pilgrimage complicate the reception of
Eckhart's thoughts on wandering and his exhortation to live a life free of motives and
goals, plans and destinations.3
By Eckhart's time, the ritual of the pilgrimage in all its bewildering variety of
forms was one of the most common forms of religious practice in Europe. Apart from
Constantinople and the Holy Land, the four main shrines in Europe - Rome, Cologne,
Canterbury and Santiago de Compostella - were drawing increasing numbers of
pilgrims, creating by themselves a network of inns, transport, tours and ultimately
clerical indulgences. Historians such as Sumption see the development and
elaboration of the medieval pilgrimage - from St Jerome's first journey to the Holy
Land in the fourth century to the travels of Felix Fabri in the fifteenth - as a
spiritually downward degradation of an essentially private activity into a more public
and less sincere obligation - a "progression from private austerity to popular
enthusiasm and thence to abstract ritual".4 Pilgrimage, concludes Sumption, had
"begun as an accessory to the moral teaching of the Church, and ended as an
alternative".5 It is difficult not to agree with such a verdict, particularly bearing in
mind the efforts the church took (especially in the century of Eckhart) to capitalize on
the popularity of pilgrimages by accepting monetary indulgences as a substitute for
actually travelling there.6
2
Langland - cit. without reference in Johnathan Sumption, Pilgrimage: an Image ofMedieval
Devotion (London: Faber & Faber, 1975) p290
3Giles Constable in his essay "Opposition to Pilgrimage in the Middle Ages" from Constable,






Amongst numerous examples, Sumption relates the instance of Clement VI, who in 1352 "allowed
the population of Mallorca to claim the jubilee indulgence without actually going to Rome, in return
for a money payment equal to the cost of the journey". Sumption, Pilgrimage, p291
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Even in the beginning, however, critics of the pilgrimage were many in
number. St Jerome's opinion, in a passage from his fifty-eighth letter, was oft-
quoted: "It is praiseworthy not to have been in Jerusalem but to have lived well for
Jerusalem".7 Gregory of Nyssa's remark that "travel cannot bring a man closer to
God", along with Augustine's own observation in the Contra Faustum that "God is
in all places and ...is not contained or enclosed in any one place" (a statement
Eckhart would completely agree with)8 stands in contradiction to the basic idea of
pilgrimage: that the believer's physical presence in a certain place, their physical
witness of a certain spectacle or location, could bring about direct spiritual benefits
and even the forgiveness of sins.
Although Gregory of Nyssa's objection that a mere journey is no substitute
for spiritual contrition remains valid, it is Augustine's much deeper objection to the
idea of the pilgrimage which interests us. "He is everywhere on account of His
infinity, and is everywhere complete..." writes Eckhart in a similar vein9 - and it is
precisely this conviction of the omnipresence of God in all things (and consequently
all places) which would make Eckhart's 'pathless way' so difficult to accept in an
age dominated by the practice of the pilgrim. The idea that God is to be found in one
particular place - and not in 'all things' - runs squarely against the whole spirit of
Eckhart's thought. Dorothea R. French's excellent essay on pilgrimages to the Holy
Land and medieval cartography graphically illustrates how the practice of pilgrimage
gradually transformed Mt Calvary into the centre of the sacred world:
The 'real' world of sacred cartographers in Late Antiquity had become the literal
world of Christian cartographers in the High Middle Ages. The world was infused
with multiple levels of meanings that drew one into the centre in ever-smaller
concentric rings.10
A far cry from Eckhartian wandering, the popularity of pilgrimages would have
convinced most of Eckhart's listeners that the closer one physically came to the Holy
7
"Opposition to Pilgrimage in the Middle Ages" in Giles Constable, Religious Life and Thought ll"'
to 12th Centuries, pi26
8 both quotes are found in "Opposition to Pilgrimage in the Middle Ages" in Giles Constable,
Religious Life and Thought 11th to 12th Centuries, pl25-6
9
Davies, Meister Eckhart, p258 - Latin Sermon XXIX
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Land, the closer one came to God. Eckhart's exhortation to wander without a
destination, to ramble without a motivation, would have fallen on if not deaf, then at
the very least bewildered ears.
Purely theological objections apart, pilgrimages were often criticised for a
number of other, more material reasons. Erasmus' "A Pilgrimage for Religion's
Sake" (circa 1524) is probably the most famous and certainly the funniest satire on
the desire to pereger. Comprising of a dialogue between the cynical Menedemus (lit.
"stay-at-home") and the enthusing Ogygius, the latter tells of his visit to the shrine of
St James at Santiago ("Tell me, how is the excellent James?" "Much colder than
usual").11 Amongst other things, we learn how Mother Mary is grateful to Luther for
discouraging the growth of pilgrimage, thereby allowing her a little more peace and
quiet, undisturbed by entreaties. Menedemus, fond of "mocking the saints", allows
the reader to relish his friend's naivete, particularly when he reports how, on a visit to
the shrine of St Thomas, a fellow pilgrim asks the guide an especially awkward
question:
'I say, good father, is it true, as I've heard, that in his lifetime Thomas was most
generous to the poor? 'Very true', the man replied, and began to rehearse the saint's
many acts of kindness to them....Gratian again: 'Since, then, the saint was so liberal
towards the needy, though he was still poor himself and lacked money to provide for
the necessities of life, don't you think he'd gladly consent, now that he's so rich and
needs nothing, if some, poor wretched woman with children at home.. .carried off a
bit of all this wealth to rescue her family...?'12
Erasmus' satire, as subtle and as accomplished as ever, brings to light what was
probably a key motive in many objections against pilgrimages in the Middle Ages -
the disconcerting zeal with which many would try and profit from the spirituality of
others, not to mention the incongruity between the wealth and ostentation of the
saints' shrines and the frugality of the lives they actually led.
Not all accounts of the standard pilgrimage were so scathing, however.
Margery Kempe's Book (written - or rather transcribed for her - around 1433) relates
10 Dorothea R. French, "Journeys to the Center of the Earth" - found in Barbara N. Sargent-Baur (ed),
Journeys Toward God (Michigan: Medieval Institute Publications, 1992) p64
11 taken from Collected Works ofErasmus (trans. Craig R. Thompson - London: University of Toronto




the travails and sufferings of a woman on pilgrimage, with striking emphasis on the
spiritual significance of the experiences and little on their actual description:
This creature, when our Lord had forgiven her her sin (as has been written
before), had a desire to see those places where he was born, and where he
suffered his Passion and where he died, together with other holy places where
he was during his life, and also after his resurrection. 13
Readers hoping to find in Kempe's narrative some description of the shrines at
Assisi, Rome, Santiago and the Holy Land will be disappointed. What Kempe relates
above all are the difficulties she encountered there - difficulties, moreover,
concerning the fellow pilgrims just as much as the actual pilgrimage itself. In Chapter
30, for example, the narrator's desire to climb "Mt Querentayne" (where Christ was
believed to have fasted for forty days) is hampered not only by the physical difficulty
of the climb, but also by her fellow pilgrims' unwillingness to have her accompany
them on their journey. As no one is willing to help her up the mountain, she sits at
the foot of it, feeling miserable until
...a Saracen, a good-looking man, happened to come by her, and she put a groat into
his hand, making signs to him to take her up the mountain. And quickly the Saracen
took her under his arm and led her up the high mountain where Our Lord faster forty
days. Then she was dreadfully thirsty and got no sympathy from her fellow pilgrims,
but then God, of his high goodness, moved the Grey Friars with compassion, and
they comforted her...14
More than satisfying any kind of spiritual curiosity, Kempe's pilgrimages seem to
take on the role of ordeals. The narrator's world is invariably a dangerous, hostile
place, one which the practice of pilgrimage (particularly in Italy, see Chapters 30 -
42) only exacerbates. One cannot imagine a more different account of pilgrimage
than Friar Felix Fabri, whose fifteenth century account - far from being any record of
austere, self-righteous deprivation and spiritual ordeal - is intended to be read "with
pleasure and amusement in the intervals ofmore fruitful studies".15 No record of
visionary experiences and inner struggles a la Kempe, but on the contrary a collection





H.F.M.Prescott, Jerusalem Journey (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1954) pl4
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of "great things and true, grave things and holy" interspersed with things "silly,
improbably and comical".16 It is difficult to imagine a more different kind of pilgrim
from Kempe. Felix, on the historian Prescott's own account, is "no great scholar or
11thinker" , drawing uncritically as he does on a collection of extremely dubious and
often contradictory sources for the cosmology and geography in his books (Ludolph
von Suchen, for example, from whom Felix obtains the fact that, on the straits of
Gibraltar, "where the African and European coasts are closest together, stand a
Moslem and Christian washerwoman, each abusing the other from her native
18
shore"). Although the motivation of the more altruistic pilgrims often lay in a desire
to describe the sights they had seen to those back home who could not embark upon
the voyage, Friar Felix seems at times to be more interested in pagan sights than
Christian ones. Fond, on his own confession, of "seeing strange and curious sights",
he tries desperately upon his arrival in Jerusalem to enter the Dome of the Rock (the
Haram ashsharif) - out of bounds to Christians and Jews.19 His journals are filled
with references to and descriptions of the Saracens he encountered there and in Syria,
and he is keen to remark upon their customs and dress, their chants {allah illahah
allah illah - "There is no God but the God Allah") and behaviour - a curiosity for
other cultures which puts him nearer the travelling orientalist rather than the grim,
earnest shrine-seeker.
And yet, the question remains: why exactly did people go on pilgrimages?
The reasons are varied - certainly Constable, in the article "Monachisme et
pelegrinage au Moyen Age", is correct in linking together the monastic urge with that
of the pilgrim, a physical voyage "at the same time ex patria and ad loca santa"20:
"In this, the ideal of the pilgrimage is not very different from that of monasticism,
which also implies a new spiritual life...".21 Robert Worth Frank, Jnr reports how







20 20 "Monachisme et pelegrinage au Moyen Age" in Giles Constable, Religious Life and Thought 11th
to 12,h Centuries, pi 19 own trans
21 ibid, pi20
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This they define as like liminal experiences (rites of passage) in some respects
but unlike them in being voluntary. Liminal experience is characterized by
release from mundane structure; homogenization of status; communitas; healing
and renewal; ordeal; removal from a mundane center to a sacred periphery.22
The idea of pilgrimage as a renewing experience - one which would bring about a
revival of one's inner faith through a physical change in one's immediate
environment - is certainly the driving motive for Margery Kempe, if not for the Wife
of Bath. Of course, pilgrimage was sometimes imposed as a punishment - Sumption
spends a chapter of his book offering a deluge of instances where sinners were
punished with an enforced pilgrimage, such as the emperor Otto III (St Romuald
ordered him to walk barefoot to Mt Gargano after the murder of a Roman senator).23
Often such sins were extremely 'public' sins which had caused great scandal in the
community - misbehaving clergy, for example, were often required to undertake this
penitentia publica non sollemnis.24
Many desired to visit the Holy Land out of a simple yearning to relive the
experiences of the New Testament in the very place and climate where they happened
- a "desire to recreate in their imagination the scenes of Christ's ministry and
passion".25 J.G.Davies, in his essay on "Pilgrimage and Crusade Literature", relates
how the first itineraries "soon developed into pilgrim diaries", embellished with the
pilgrim's own religious observations.26 It is interesting to see how, as the centuries
progressed, a much more pious desire to see Calvary or the Mount of Olives soon
began to broaden into a less holy, more secular curiositas for new places and
experiences - "a shift in motivation that was eventually to distinguish the
Renaissance voyager from the medieval pilgrim".27
Of all the examples of pilgrimage available to us, probably the nearest any of
them came to Eckhart's aimless wandering were the Irish pilgrims of the seventh and
eighth centuries, referred to in both AIII and Sumption. Pilgrims without any kind of
22 taken from Robert Worth Frank, Jr.'s essay "Pilgrimage and Sacred Power" in Sargent-Baur,











destination, they expressed the spirit of St Columban's teaching by wandering freely
throughout the world in heavenly exile - as one twelfth century follower put it: . .be
exiles for God's sake, and go not only to Jerusalem but everywhere, for God himself
is everywhere."28 Although Sumption notes imitative examples of these "Irish
wanderers" in Germany as late as the twelfth century, the practice of freely itinerant
clerics wandering from monastery to monastery was discouraged by St Boniface in
740 and strictly forbidden by a Frankish synod in 751. Such unauthorised
wanderings, relates Sumption, were considered "destructive of ecclesiastical
discipline" by Benedictine monasticism and "instrumental in spreading 'unnecessary
doubts' among the people" (a charge which would , much later, be applied to Eckhart
himself).29
3.1.2 Eckhart's "Pathless Way".
A response to these two questions, on Eckhart's part, must carefully delineate
exactly how the motif of wandering manifests itself in Eckhart's sermons. It is not
difficult to imagine how such sermons - with their emphasis on spiritual spontaneity,
divine aimlessness, unconditional actions and the ontological 'opening' and
'emptying' of oneself to God - can be considered examples of a 'wandering thought'.
Sermons which have not only directly inspired titles such as Reiner Schtirmann's
1972 work Maitre Eckhart ou la joie errante, but also Angelus Silesius' famous
Cherubinic Wanderer30, whose poem "The Rose is without Why: it blooms because
it blooms" is written in clear homage to the Eckhartian tenet of the sunder warumbe,
the 'without-why'.
The term 'pathless way' (wee arte wee) is mentioned in Eckhart's sermon
Intravit lesus in quoddam castellum - the pathless way which "is free and yet fixed,
in which we are raised and exalted above ourselves and all things, with neither will





a work to which, incidentally, Derrida devotes considerable attention in his long 1993 essay on
apophatic theology Saufle nom (Paris: editions galilee, 1993). For more on the link between Angelus
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alliu dine ane willen und dne hiLie...)?1 Eckhart's phrase is deliberately paradoxical,
and in this it reflects what Eckhart sees as the necessity of a spiritual direction, but
simultaneously the danger that such a direction will be codified and institutionalised
into a doctrinal path. Can we arrive at where we want to go without adhering to such
paths? In such an adherence to the itinerary, Eckhart seems to perceive a certain
danger: "For whoever seeks God in a special way gets the way and misses
-a -A a, 32
God..."(Wan swer got suochet in wise, der nimet die wise und lat got...): Just as
Derrida sees structuralism's main flaw as an exclusive obsession with the concept of
structure at the expense of the text, a concept of structure which "becomes in fact and
despite his theoretical intention the critic's sole preoccupation" , so Eckhart sees a
path to God as potentially becoming more important than God Himself. In following
such a path, one risks deifying it, idolizing it, transforming it into the object (and the
end) of one's attentions.
Thus Eckhart's 'pathless way' is not an incitement to moral abandon or self-
indulgence, but an attempt to find a different, 'wayless' way of breaking through to
the Godhead, free of images, concepts and doctrines. The errant, therefore, is not
necessarily erroneous. One is tempted to ask: when do people err (sinfully) in
Eckhart, if such pathlessness is seen as spiritually enhancing? Eckhart's response to
this, in one sermon, is to stress the need for the soul to be free of all conceptions of
God, self and external obligations. "Therefore the only reason why anyone has ever
erred in anything is that they have departed from this and have turned too much to
external things".34 In order to breakthrough to the Godhead, the soul must be as "free
and untrammelled" as God is, which is where - as we will see - the Eckhartian theme
of 'detachment' takes on a central role, distinguishing itself from the attachment to a
"special way". In short: people only ever err, for Eckhart, when they methodically
follow a path.
Silesius and Eckhart, see John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1978) pp97-99
31 Oliver Davies(ed), Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994) pl97,
taken from the sermon Intravit Iesus in quoddam castellum - Sermon 86 in Quint 3:486
32 M.O'C. Walshe, Meister Eckhart: German Sermons and Treatises (London: Watkins, 1979) vol 1
pi 17 - from In hoc apparuit caritas dei in nobis- Largier, Predigt 5b, 70
33
Writing and Difference , pl5
34 Davies, Meister Eckhart, p217, from the sermon Ubi est qui natus est rex judaeorum?
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Wandering as Identity with God.
Why does Eckhart urge us along his "pathless way"? Why is the ramble
superior to the journey, the uncertainty of the peregrinary preferable to the destination
of the pilgrimage? Eckhart's suspicion of the pathbound and the goal-orientated (a
suspicion which translates 'destination' as 'motivation') as ultimately constituting
that which sterilizes and reifies faith, is one response to this question. However, on a
much more basic level, Eckhart's affirmation of errancy lies in conjunction with his
desire to breakthrough to the Godhead: to 'wander', in the Eckhartian sense, is to
imitate God. Which in turn means that if God is a divine uncertainty, then we must
become a kind of uncertainty ourselves.
In order to understand this better, two points need to be made - first of all, a
standard motif in Christian thought is the desirability of the soul's likeness to God.
The soul is born in a state of unlikeness - Augustine's regio dissimilitudinis - and
must strive to resemble more and more its Creator in order to achieve union with it.
Eckhart is in perfect accordance with this: "Our masters say union presupposes
likeness. Union cannot be without likeness." (Daz sprechent unsermeister: einunge
wil haben glichnisse. Einunge enmac niht gesin, si enhabe glichnisse.)36 It is only
through identity with God that Eckhart can achieve the birth of God in the soul: "A
master says: all likeness means birth. He says further that like is not found in Nature
unless it is born".37 In order to undergo the mystical experience of engendering God
in the ground of the soul, the soul must become 'like' God.
Secondly, the Eckhartian Godhead which the wandering soul imitates is
nameless, place-less, image-less. It has no origins and no destination. We saw in the
previous chapter how the Eckhartian Godhead, like the Derridean text, is resistant to
all totalisation, to use Kevin Hart's phrase. "No-one can really say what God
35 from Confessions , Bk 7, Ch 10
35





isez enkan von gote nieman reden eigenliche daz, daz er ist). Just as all the
effects of the Godhead are unconditional and unmotivated, a simple 'overflowing' -
God's love essentially being 'without why' - so must all our actions and words be
bereft of result-seeking motives and expectations. To have no destination, to not care
about one's origins, is a step towards the divine.
If the likeness of the soul to God is essential as a prerequisite to their union,
and if such a God is a divine no-thingness, aimlessly ebullient, we can begin to
understand why Eckhart sees errancy as anything but error. Schiirmann writes:
"Identity is gained only this way; identity with God is wandering". The fact that the
Eckhartian Godhead possesses no co-ordinates, cannot be linked to a particular
shrine or mountain-top, reinforces Eckhart's preference for the wanderer over the
pilgrim:
A pagan master says: the nothingness of God fills all things while his somethingness
is nowhere. And so the soul cannot find God's somethingness unless first she is
reduced to nothingness wherever she may be...Therefore a master says: whoever
40
wishes to come to God should take nothing with him.
It is a passage which , in many ways, reminds one of Borges' famous essay on the
non-location of the deity "The Fearful Sphere of Pascal"("God is a fearful sphere
whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere")41. IfGod's
"somethingness" is no-where, then whoever wishes to find this "somethingness"
must forget the pilgrimage, must abandon all their itineraries, must rid themselves of
any notion of where - for God lies "no-where". This abandonment of destination, one
may say tentatively, is the first real similarity the Eckhartian motif of wandering has
with the Derridean notion of 'centrelessness'. The passage cited could be re-
described as an urge to abandon the onto-theological centre we rely on to furnish our
conceptions and images of God, in virtue of a spiritual 'centrelessness', one which
would let God be God.
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The principal reason why one should abandon such a centre, however, is
different in both writers: for Eckhart, one might say, the centre (the idea of a
'somewhere') is false quite simply because it is not where God lives, its 'somewhere'
and the space-bound vocabulary and images that go with it are too finite to embrace
the infinite incommensurability of God. For Derrida, however, the 'centre' should be
forgotten not because of some semantic inability to fully constitute a certain meaning,
but simply because it is nothing more than a sign: a sign which, when called upon to
explain its centrality, could only ever produce more signs, which in turn would lead
to more ad infinitum - destinations leading to other destinations, endlessly. The
centre, therefore, is always chained to an illusory presence. This difference between
the two writers is a consistent one, one which admittedly still paints Eckhart as the
victim (or perpetrator) of a persistent logocentricism - it is a difference, however,
which will be increasingly called into question as our project progresses. For now,
Eckhart's 'somewhere' is abandoned ("in its literality at least"42) because it is
ontologically inadequate, whereas Derrida's 'somewhere' is rejected because it is
always, infinitely 'elsewhere'.
Eckhartian Whylessness - the Sunder Warumbe
What is unsaid in the saying, and everything depends on this, is rather that man,
in the most hidden ground of his essence, first truly is, when he is in his own way
like the rose, without-why.
-Heidegger43
To briefly recap: Eckhart's "pathless way" is proffered for three reasons. Firstly, in
following a path too closely, there is a danger that the soul will follow the path
instead of God (a danger whose implications will be examined more closely in the
next chapter). Secondly, as God's ebullience is aimless, the soul that wishes to
achieve union with God must become aimless too. Thirdly, as "God is nowhere...not
here or there, not in time or place"44, then no path can ever lead to Him.
Therefore, Eckhart performs two gestures: he describes the wandering nature
of the Godhead - that is, nameless, ebullient, aimless - and then prescribes the
42
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errancy necessary in order to breakthrough to the Godhead. It is important to note
that the soul in Eckhart 'wanders' not simply in order to imitate the divine, but also
because it already knows the divine, for knowledge (in scholastic terms) brings
likeness. Here Eckhart quotes Augustine: "As you love, so you are. If you love the
earth, you will become earthly; if you love God, you will be divine".45 If you love
errancy, then you too will become errant. In this sense, 'wandering' in Eckhart is
simultaneously a response to the aimless ebullience of the divine , and also a
consequence of it.
Eckhart's motif of the 'without-why' is perhaps the clearest example of how
God's purposelessness is translated into practice:
All things that are in time have a why. Thus when someone asks a man: "Why
are you eating?" "In order to gain strength." " Why are you sleeping?" "For the
same reason". And so with every thing that is in time. But if someone asked a
good man: "Why do you love God?" "I do not know, because of God. " "Why do
you love the truth?" "Because of the truth." "Why do you love justice?"
"Because of justice." "Why are you living ?" "My word, I do not know! But I
am happy to be alive!"46
When challenged, why does the model reply of Eckhart's "good man" not refer to
anything outside of itself? Why does the "good man" refuse to supply an external,
rational reason for his love of justice? Partly, as we have seen, because in order to
imitate the divine, one's good works must be groundless - that is, without
motivations and without conditions. Although this moves remarkably close to
Kierkegaard (doing things "on the strength of the absurd"47) and the idea that "only
lower natures...have the premises for their actions outside themselves"48, Eckhart
actually wants to get beyond any idea of a premise at all. If one bears in mind Jabes'
words on the vitality of uncertainty, the relevance of Eckhart's 'without-why' to this
affirmation of openness becomes clear. Eckhart here refuses to connect causally a
series of completely Christian gestures to some kind of conceptual, programmatic
fossilizing scheme of thought. It is the refusal to chain one's gestures to a finite,
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motivating concept, thereby turning one's actions into a simple series of "in-order-
to"'s. This resistance to the desire to justify our actions will always play a central
role in Eckhart - in his sermon Qui sequitur iustitiam he writes: "The just person acts
precisely as God acts, without a Why, and so as life lives for its own sake, seeking
nothing to justify itself, in the same way the just person knows no Why to justify
what they do".49 Eckhart, for all his Dominican primacy of the intellect, seems in
these passages to relegate the intellective and powers of the soul to a secondary role,
in favour of a more pre-reflective course of action - to love God "non-mentally"
(.nichgeistliche50), as he says elsewhere. In this aversion towards intellectualizing
about the origins of one's actions - even to the extent of refusing to give such origins
a name - the desire to wander a certain way without keeping to a path manifests itself
once more. How this 'way' differs from the Nietzschean "way" which Derrida
nudges us towards at the end of "Structure, Sign and Play", we shall examine soon.
In the sermon In hoc appartuit caritas dei, Eckhart writes: "...as long as you
work for the sake of God or heaven or eternal bliss, from without, you are at
fault."(... al die wile du diniu werk wiirkest urnbe himelriche oder umbe got oder
umbe din ewige saelicheit von uzen zuo, so ist dir waerliche unreht).51 Everything
which is done with an end in mind is "at fault", even if that end is pleasing God. If
such is the case, how should the soul produce good works? Once again, Eckhart's
prescription for all our actions lies in a description of the divine:
...if one were to let a horse run about in a green meadow...it would be the horse's
nature to pour forth its strength in leaping about the meadow. This would be a
joy to it and in accordance with its own routine...It is a joy to [God] to pour out
His nature and His being completely into His likeness...52
Just as the horse's movement is in no way premeditated or motivated but simply an
expression of its energy, so the "good man'"s actions must be a consequence of what
he is, and not a purposeful striving towards some idealized state. It is a movement of
'excess' and 'overflowing' which Eckhart is fond of repeating in his sermons ("life
lives from its own ground, and gushes forth from its own" ...wan leben lebet uzer
49
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sinem eigenen grunde und quillet uzer sinem eigen ), a movement which conveys
the goallessness of divine actions and depicts them as the effects of an ebullience, not
the means to a de-spiritualizing end.
Eckhart's aversion towards the justification of one's actions - a justification
which , inevitably, must have recourse to some kind of theological/metaphysical
structure - does seem to veer a way from the more orthodox understanding of "good
works". It is certainly no surprise that a number of scholars have seen in Eckhart's
sunder warumbe an anticipation of Luther54 - and equally no surprise that, amongst
the various charges of heresy brought against Eckhart at his trial, number eighteen
reads: "Let us offer up fruits not of external works, which cannot make us good, but
of internal works..".55 However, despite the proximity with which Eckhart's sunder
warumbe brings us towards the rather tired Protestant/catholic debate over his
writings, Eckhart's desire to see our actions not as conceptually-motivated (and
therefore result-orientated) but rather as the spontaneous effects of a divine play
within us, does bring to mind a point Raoul Mortley makes towards the end of his
1986 work on Greek and Christian negation, From Word to Silence. Beginning with
the remark that there is no"formal via negativa in the Christian thought of
antiquity"56, Mortley portrays the via negativa as a response to "the progressive
Hellenization of Christianity". Mortley, we must remember, is talking about the
classical via negativa - the orthodox version of negative theology which is seen as a
corrective to the language of affirmative theology. As Christianity became
Hellenized, "Greek intellectual problems" such as 'What is God?' (problems which,
as Mortley rightly observes, are never mentioned in the Gospels) began to emerge as
the thought of Christian antiquity slowly acquired an intellectual vocabulary. Thus
Christian thought came to be dominated by a Hellenic, essence-seeking ontology. In
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this respect, Eckhart's attempt to bypass onto-theological metaphysics - his
reluctance to tread the narrow path of doctrine and concept, his desire to love God
non-mentally - could be seen as an attempt to return to this pre-Hellenic state of
Christianity, one in which faith would be the simple expression of what one is, and
not the result of intellectual reflections.
Of course, Derrida would doubtless see this attempt to return to a 'purer',
concept-free epoch of Christian experience, uncontaminated by Greek metaphysics,
as just another logocentric delusion, similar to the Rousseauistic myth of innocence
Levi-Strauss falls victim to when he feels he has 'corrupted' a tribe by introducing
them to writing. From a deconstructionist point of view, Christian experience - be it
'pre' or 'post' Hellenic - will always involve a metaphysics of presence. For Derrida,
all of Eckhart's wanderings - even at their most aimless - will ultimately have a
destination.
3.1.3 Derridean Errancy: the "joyous wandering of the graphein"
The question of writing could be opened only if the book was closed. The
joyous wandering of the graphein then became wandering without return.
La question de I'ecriture ne pouvait s'ouvrir qu'a livre ferme.L'errance
joyeuse du graphein alors etait sans retour.51
If Eckhart sees wandering as an imitation of the unnameably divine, then
Derrida sees errancy as a response to the unmasterable text. Peregrinary motifs run
throughout Derrida's work; wandering texts, errant signifiers, signs gone astray,
uncertain points of departure, indifference towards destinations. Topographically, the
images are juggled - sometimes we wander amidst the uncertain play of the world,
sometimes an uncertain future wanders towards us. At times Derrida's terms are
descriptive, at times prescriptive: some passages depict 'wandering' as the
ineluctable fate of all communication, others extol it not just as a consequence of the
instability of the sign but as the only of way of confronting positively the
unpredictable 'play' of the world.
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Having examined Eckhart's use of the peregrinary, what remains now is to
understand Derrida's own re-consideration of the errant - exactly how Derrida both
describes and prescribes the errant - and then, finally, to see how analogous both
writers' treatment of "joyous wandering" actually are.
The 'Naturally' Errant Text.
What does the verb 'to wander' mean in Derrida's texts? What place does the
peregrinary motif have in Derrida's works (if the question is not oxymoronic)? Might
not such an acknowledgement of the errant, the wayward, constitute an ironic blind
spot in the fabric of Derrida's texts, a semantic uncertainty about where Derrida's
texts will finally 'end up'? If 'dissemination' means never being able to control the
future of a text, how can Derrida - the theorist with something to say - affirm such a
precarious state of affairs?
The motif of wandering and its various synonyms and resonances in
Derrida (deviation, errant, floating, orphaned, overflow, adventurous excess)
occur so frequently that one risks lapsing into a concordance whilst simply
trying to chart them. Perhaps a glance at five or six brief examples will be
enough to provide the beginnings of an enquiry:
...language itself is menaced in its very life, helpless, adrift in the threat of
limitlessness... (OfGrammatology , p6)
Like the desert and the city, the forest, in which the fearful signs swarm,
doubtless articulates the non-place and the wandering, the absence of prescribed
routes...(Writing and Difference , p72)
The Socratic word does not wander, stays at home, is clearly
watched ...(Dissemination , p 124)
This signifier of little, this discourse that doesn't amount to much, is like all
ghosts: errant...Wandering in the streets, he doesn't even know who he
is ...(Dissemination , p 143)
...the wandering of the language always richer than knowledge, the language
always capable of the movement which takes it further than peaceful and
sedentary certitude.)Writing and Difference , p73)
The return is a moment of wandering...(Writing and Difference , p295)
There is a certain risk , of course, in plucking these sentences out of their original
con-texts, straddling them alongside one another in unfamiliar company - a risk
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which Derrida, reader of Jabes ("How can I say what I know/ with words whose
signification / is multiple?" Comment dire ce que je sais / avec des mots dont la
signification /est multiple?58) is all too familiar with. Nevertheless, a number of
points need to be made: first and foremost, Derrida is talking about texts. The text
which wanders not simply because there is nothing to tie it to its origin, but because
one cannot account for the future of its hermeneutics. No-one can say what kind of
readers it will 'bump' into, what appropriations it will suffer, what signs it will
evoke, being at "everyone's disposal".59 Hence Derrida's oft-cited metaphor of
infancy: the text is a child, wandering orphan-like through the world, willing to be
adopted by anyone who takes it in.
As a result, wandering subsequently carries within it an ambiguous sense in
Derrida, one of both liberty and vulnerability. To wander because we are lost - or
because we have finally realised that there never was a path, a point of departure, a
destination? The impossibility of being 'lost' when you have no place to go does not
resolve such ambiguity; Derrida mentions words such as 'menace' and 'adrift'
enough times to show he is more than aware of the ambivalence of his motifs.
From the extracts above, two types of wandering slowly begin to emerge, two
kinds of errancy which Derrida is dealing with: wandering as the a priori,
inescapable condition of textuality, and wandering as the a posteriori, elected
response to such a condition. On the one hand, one is always already wandering, one
cannot do otherwise: for Derrida, such a fact underlies the illusion of the preface,
which forever claims and fails to "announce in the future...the conceptual content or
significance...of what will already have been written".60 The Nietzschean legacy of
this gesture has already been noted: "Every single time that something is done with a
purpose in view, something fundamentally different and other occurs."61. Here
Nietzsche sees all singlemindedness as fundamentally producing an otherness, all
'purposefulness' as resulting in an unforeseen alterity. This is why for Derrida even
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homecoming which is 'always already' undermined, partly because 'home' never
stays the same, and partly because there never was any 'home' to come back to.
On the other hand, wandering is also proffered in Derrida's early works as a
positive gesture, one might even say a more interesting gesture, one which is
somehow "richer" than the poverty of "peaceful and sedentary certitude".62 It is
richer to wander than to march: in what would this richness consist? Presumably the
peregrinary motif in Derrida is richer than the itinerary because of a certain
limitlessness, a refusal to follow a certain route, in favour of that which lies outside
it. The desire to wander, as opposed to the desire to journey or to march towards a
predetermined goal, indicates an almost aesthetic preference for the possible over the
certain, introducing a (for Derrida) problematic dissatisfaction with the immediate
and the present, in favour of the unplanned, the unexpected, the yet to be.
Ironically, this is leading us astray from the point: that if wandering is
affirmed in Derrida, such an affirmation finds its expression in a certain
acknowledgement of instability, in a recognition of the text's inherent errancy - a
condition which Derrida has called in several places an "adventure".63 In this sense,
the two motifs of wandering in Derrida - the uncontrollability of the unruly text and
the 'proper' response to it - merge once more together. Sterne's traveller in A
Sentimental Journey puts it well: "I think there is a fatality in it - I seldom go to the
place I set out for".64 Applied to Derrida, what would this mean - that one should
desist from naming destinations in order to arrive at them? In a number of passages,
Derrida has already hinted that a certain way of thinking about names - be they
departures or destinations - is now obsolete :
If the preface appears inadmissible today, it is on the contrary because no
possible heading can any longer enable anticipation and recapitulation to meet
and merge with one another. To lose one's head, to no longer know where one's
head is, such is perhaps the effects of dissemination. 65
The preface is obsolete "today" because the pathway it "announces" can never be
followed, will always already have been left, ignored, abandoned. Derrida almost
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implies that there was a time when headings could control the trajectory of their
contents, when a preface could anticipate and recapitulate the body of work it
preceded (and post-dated), when the moment of return was not necessarily a moment
of wandering. If such a time ever existed, it would surely be the naive, faithful, pre-
Nietzschean epoch alluded to in "Structure, Sign and Play", the epoch which existed
up until the "event" of the "rupture" - before "language invaded the universal
problematic" and "everything became discourse"(towf devient discours).66 For
Derrida, the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the Freudian critique of self-
presence and the Heideggerian Destruktion of onto-theology have set us free (or
condemned us) to wander; the preface and the signpost are now nothing more than
the tokens of an obsolete way of thinking, one which naively refuses to think "the
structurality of structure"67 and pretends to itself that one can actually stop wandering
and go somewhere.
To recap: Derrida proffers a scenario in which, after a certain series of
irreversible gestures, a form of wandering is seen as the fate of all textuality. The
itinerary has dissolved into the peregrinary - rather like Sterne's sentimental traveller,
no matter how purposefully the text sets out for one destination, it always ends up
somewhere else. The preface becomes an ironic comment on where the text would
have liked to arrive. Derrida's call, therefore, to abandon the hopes of the preface, to
ignore the call of the homeland ("Why should an old name...be retained? Why should
the effects of a new meaning ...be dampened by memory?"68) does beg the classic
question: can one ever decide to wander? Can one ever resolve to ramble, without
turning one's ramblings into a telos themselves?
One can see how, in certain aspects of Derrida, wandering may suddenly
become the oblique, may suddenly be appropriated as a means to an end:
Instead of tackling the question or the problem straight on, directly,
straightforwardly, which would doubtless be impossible...should we proceed
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It's easy to anticipate a kind of comic logic here: if we never arrive at the place we
set out for, then perhaps we should set out for somewhere we don't want to go. Back
to the closet logocentrics of the via negativa , as some of Derrida's critics would say.
In a sense, the question of whether the 'wandering' motif in Derrida is employed as a
strategy - that is, as a purposeful, profitable, 'false' wandering, as opposed to a
'sincere', joyous celebration of the uncertain play of the world - all depends on
whether we feel there are certain places Derrida wishes to go. Is Derrida's wandering
just a different kind of marching?
Freud certainly had paths he wanted his writings to travel along - as Derrida
points out so cleverly in "Coming into One's Own" - and was quick to admonish his
followers whenever he saw a text straying from its desired trajectory. In his essay on
Beyond The Pleasure Principle, Derrida examines Freud's paternal hold on his
writings, his desire to keep psychoanalysis 'in the family', as it were , not to let any
of his texts run about on their own, orphan-like: "...the establishment of a
science...should have been able to do without the family name Freud. Or able, at
least, to make forgetting that name the necessary condition and the proof that science
itself is handed on, passed down".70 Comments which, cynically speaking, do cast a
somewhat ironic light on way the fortunes of the word 'deconstruction' have
disagreeably surprised its author.
The point, however, is not to try and vilify Derrida for some kind of
'contradiction' or 'inconsistency' - thereby lapsing into an all-too-familiar debate -
but simply to note how even a writer who wishes to affirm the "irreducible and
generative multiplicity" of dissemination71, who celebrates the writing which is
"inaugural", which "does not know where it is going"(«e> sait pas ou elle va)12,
nevertheless still feels a fear being misunderstood. The question might be better
phrased: are there any places Derrida would not like his texts to wander? Is there
anything he would not like the "generative multiplicity" of his texts to produce?
The notion of risk in Derrida is, in part, an answer to this: to wander is always
to risk finding oneself in a place one does not wish to be. Or indeed in no place at all
70 taken from Geoffrey Hartmann, Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Text, pl42
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- to write, as Derrida says, is to risk meaning nothing. That this possibility is
sometimes translated as "risk" and sometimes as "adventure" may suggest not simply
an awareness but also an indecision on the part of Derrida regarding the
consequences of the joyfully goal-less. This concerns the destiny/destination not only
of Derrida's texts, but of all those other texts, unforgivably capitalized - Society,
History, Philosophy - whose eventual unfolding is still uncertain. Writing is, after all,
"inaugural"; exactly what it inaugurates, however, cannot be determined, anticipated
or recapitulated. As we observed in the previous chapter (Section 2.1.2), towards the
end of his essay on "La Differance" Derrida admits to the Heideggerian resonances of
his phraseology, whilst making a crucial distinction: if writing does "inaugurate" - or
as Heidegger might say, "usher forth" - it is because of a certain nothingness which
precedes the act of writing, a nothingness which Derrida is content to call the
"unnameable". However suspiciously theological the term may sound, Derrida
takes pains to stress how his version of the 'unnameable' would not be "an ineffable
Being which no name could approach" (i.e. Heidegger's Sein) but rather "the play
which makes possible nominal effects"(/e jeu quifait q'il y a des effets nominaux).74
Derrida, in effect, de-theologises Heidegger. If philosophy really is "wander(ing)
towards the meaning of its death"75, such a wandering would be the consequence of
the unstable play of textuality ("The accident or throw of dice that 'opens'...a
text"76), and not the 'advance' and 'withdrawal' of some ineffable, transcendent
force. The element of risk, therefore, would remain - but manifested in the form of a
very un-transcendental textual instability, and not in the unknowable whims of some
pseudo-deistic presence. Which means, in the terms of this project, that Derrida's
wandering is a consequence of textual play, and not the coming-forth
(hervorkommen) and withdrawal (sich entziehen) of Being.
Ironically, a moment occurs in "Violence and Metaphysics" where Derrida is
keen to defend Heidegger from a perception of danger in his work by evoking the
motif of wandering. The charge, made by Levinas, is a familiar one - that
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Heidegger's eschatology of Being, not to mention his treatment of the Land and the
Dwelling, ultimately serves as "a nationalism or Barresism" (Derrida's words).77 In
Heidegger's defense, Derrida cites his motif of Irren - "this thought of interminable
JO
wandering" cette pensee de I'errance interminable - as proof of an anti-nationalism
in the Heideggerian oeuvre, an abandonment ofHeimat and Patria in his texts.
It is interesting that Derrida sees "interminable wandering" as a sufficient
antidote to the threat of an "empirical nationalism": wandering not just understood as
the loss of centre but also as the death of the capacity to tyrannize. Wandering cannot
threaten, is by no means territorial, has no claim to stake. To wander is to affirm
one's non-attachment to any kind of -ism, to celebrate one's detachment
0Gelassenheit) from goals, motivations, origins. The ambiguity of the as yet
unnameable, however ominous, is still preferable to the tyranny of the already
named:
Can one not affirm the non-referral to the centre, rather than bemoan the absence
of the centre? Why would one mourn for the centre? Is not the centre, the
absence of play and difference, another name for death ? The death which
reassures and appeases, but also , with its hole, creates anguish and puts at stake?
Ne peut-on affirmer I'irreference au centre au lieu de pleurer 1'absence du
centre? Pourquoi ferait-on son deuil du centre? Le centre, 1'absence du jeu et
de difference, n'est-cepas un autre nom de la mort? Celle qui rassure, apaise
mais de son trou angoisse et aussi met en jeu?79
To wander means to abandon assurance, to never know where one is going. Derrida
seems willing to acknowledge that the pilgrimage always provided a kind of comfort,
an assurance that one was not lost. At the same time, however, there was also the
"anguish" of never arriving, the negative re-description of everything that stood
between the pilgrim and his goal as 'obstacle', 'distraction', 'temptation'. To
"bemoan the absence of centre" means to constantly view everything in the light of
such an absence - to see wherever we are as a prelude to the illusory destination
which forever recedes before us. To wander, ultimately, is to affirm life, to affirm the
uncertainty of life: to journey, to resist this uncertainty, is to seek death - a death,
paradoxically, which one can never experience.
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3.1.4 .The Affirmation of the Errant: Junctures and Disjunctures.
Therefore, two versions of errancy are being extolled: one in which a theology
of justifications and motivations is displaced by a unique specie of spiritual
voluntarism, and another in which a philosophy ofpresence and explications is no
longer a sufficient response to the errant play of textuality. Two versions of
centrelessness are being proffered: one in which the onto-theological 'God' is
abandoned in favour of a 'God beyond God', another in which the very concept of
the centre is replaced by an "a-centricity". Two variants of an analogous distrust
towards the 'path' are being examined: one which sees the path as never leading to a
God Whom no path can reach, a path which risks becoming in itself the sole object of
the pilgrim's devotions, and a pathlessness which sees all attempts to follow a path as
a futile (and potentially violent) gesture towards an illusory (and potentially
tyrannical) destination.
To what extent are these two vocabularies of the peregrinary analogous? How
80
far does the Eckhartian wanderer resemble Derrida's "destinerrant indirection"?
How is the "openness" extolled by both writers towards the text and towards the
Godhead constituted? Would such openness "absolutely welcome" (to use Levinas'
phrase) the same things? Would it share the same concerns?
Of course, before embarking upon a final comparison of Derridean and
Eckhartian errancy in this section, one point must be made clear: it is not the aim of
this chapter to try and transform a thirteenth century Dominican into some kind of
Nietzschean 'philosopher of the dangerous perhaps' (Philosophen des gefaerlichen
Vielleichts).81 Eckhart, for all his innovation, is still writing in a cultural context that
simply cannot be dismissed, a context which requires "recognition" and "respect" in
order to provide, in that famous phrase from OfGrammatology, an "indispensable
guardrail" for our investigations.82 All of which does not mean that a comparison
80 from the essay "Passions" in Wood, Derrida: A Critical Reader p24




cannot be made, and that a certain occasionally striking resemblance cannot obtain,
within a freer perspective, a similarity which may well prove more than superficial.
Perhaps the main similarity between the two vocabularies is the idea that any
kind of 'attachment' to a centralizing point of reference, a 'centre' which would
orchestrate a series of both motivations and justifications for all our actions, is both
illusory and obstructive. For both Eckhart and Derrida, one cannot truly wander
whilst one is still attached to this centre. In Eckhart, this clearly means that one
cannot breakthrough to the Godhead whilst one is still chained to a concept of 'God':
The soul must exist in a free nothingness. That we should forsake God is
altogether what God intends, for as long as the soul has God, knows God and is
aware of God, she is far from God...this is the greatest honour that the soul can
pay to God, to leave God to Himself and to be free of Him.83
In order to obtain this state of "free nothingness", the soul must separate itself from a
certain 'God', the God of onto-theology. The freedom which Eckhart speaks of
cannot be reached as long as there are images or names to restrict the parameters of
one's wanderings. In order for the soul to unite with the Godhead, 'God' must be
absent. In his essay on Jabes, Derrida sees this absence as a silence, the silence of a
Creator which allows His creation to speak:
God separated himself from himself in order to let us speak, in order to astonish
and interrogate us. He did so not by speaking but by keeping still...This
difference, this negativity in God is our freedom...
Dieu s 'est separe de soi pour nous laisser parler, nous etonner et nous
interroger. II I'a fait non pas en parlant rnais en se taisant...Cette difference,
cette negativite en Dieu, c'est notre liberte...84
Derrida leaves us in no doubt as to what this freedom constitutes - ecriture :
Writing is the moment of the desert as the moment of separation.
L'ecriture est le moment du desert comme moment de la Separation.85
Just as one can only wander in the absence of 'God', one can only write in his
silence. That is, one can only begin to write when one is separated from God - and
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here, the ecriture Derrida refers to is the open text of the poet, not the closed book of
the rabbi. Derrida calls writing "the moment of the desert", the very same image
Eckhart uses for the Godhead beyond God (Eckhart's word for desert is einoede). For
both Eckhart and Derrida, separation from 'God' - the detachment from the centre -
is a necessary prerequisite for the freedom (liberte and vriheit) both writers speak of.
The freedom to wander for both writers only begins through the abandonment of a
concept of 'God' which would govern and orientate all our actions and thoughts. And
it is in the meaning of this freedom, and the motivation of its desire, that the real
differences between Eckhart and Derrida begin to make themselves manifest.
Exactly why should the centre be abandoned? In both writers, the motivations
behind this 'event' are different: Eckhart detaches himself from a concept of 'God' in
order to achieve union with a "God beyond God". In this sense, wandering is
understood as an essentially spiritual gesture, as opposed to an aesthetic or an ethical
one, a gesture which does not lead away from God, but only from a false and limiting
conception of God: "When I said that God was not a Being and was above Being, I
did not truly contest His Being, but on the contrary attributed to him a more elevated
Being" (Quasi stella matutina).86 By no means a 'death of God' theology (indeed,
more a 'birth of God' theology), it is not surprising that Derrida sees this gesture as
remaining "enclosed in ontic transcendence".87 From such a perspective, Eckhart's
wandering is no wandering, but simply the return of the Hegelian releve to its
satisfying conclusion.
This would be an unfair judgement, as Derrida himself has increasingly
begun to admit.88 One could see Eckhart's wandering as the abandonment of the
name in favour of namelessness, of the Why in favour of whylessness, of finite
(earthly) certainty in favour of infinite (divine) uncertainty. Whether one can recover
all of this under the label of 'onto-theology' all depends on the extent to which the
Eckhartian Godhead can be understood as a "transcendental signified", a familiar
question. However, regardless of whether we feel Eckhart's wandering to be a
86 cit. by Derrida in "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials" in Coward and Foshay (eds), Derrida and
Negative Theology (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993)p78
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genuine indication of "unknowing"89 or simply a strategy to return to a "more
elevated Being", we should not forget the obvious religious context of the
Dominican's gesture: that Eckhart's motivations for advocating a 'centrelessness', as
opposed to Derrida's, are not primarily aesthetic or even ethical, but spiritual. They
lie within the desire to enter into "the mystery of the darkness of the eternal
Godhead"(diii verborgen vinsternisse der ewigen gotheit).90 Eckhart's wandering is a
means of achieving union with such a 'mystery'.
The suggestion that, first and foremost, Derrida's advocating of wandering is
an aesthetic gesture, and only later an ethical one, does embark upon a reading of the
evolution of Derrida's thought which Derrida himself would not be entirely happy
with. Dismayed not only by the thought of a possible "remoralization of
deconstruction", but also by the idea that he is devoting an "increasingly intense
attention" in his works to "the fine names of 'ethics', 'morals', etc"91, Derrida is keen
to avoid lapsing into a "moralism", and insists that his deconstruction has always
taken place "in the name of a higher responsibility".92 This insistence of Derrida's on
a continuing and abiding concern with ethics within his works is by no means false -
one thinks immediately of his 1964 essay on Levinas. Many of his early essays,
however ("Ellipsis", "Structure, Sign and Play", "Edmond Jabes and the Question of
the Book"), do promote 'centrelessness' as a "richer" and more interesting gesture,
and not as one necessarily concerned with the tyrannical implications of marching
towards a destination.
In his essay on Jabes, Derrida extols the wandering of the poet above the
quest of the rabbi. The errant interpretation of the poet, which would "leave speech"
in order to be "the diaphanous element of its going forth"93 is contrasted with the
rabbinical interpretation of interpretation, one which (to use Alan Bass' apt phrase)
"sees interpretation as an unfortunately necessary road back to an original truth".94
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As we have observed in the previous section, Derrida does seem to find something
more exciting in this "seminal adventure of the trace" - not the cloistered, rabbinical
quest for the single meaning of a name, but the name as the possibility for an infinity
of meanings ("The name must germinate" writes Derrida, quoting Breton, "otherwise
it is false".)95 The poet exalts the "absence of prescribed routes" which allows him to
wander, a wandering which is
always richer than knowledge, the language always capable of the movement
which takes it further than peaceful and sedentary certitude.
toujours plus riche que le savoir, ayant toujours du mouvement pour aller plus
loin que la certitude paisible et sedentaire. 96
The Heideggerian dictum of possibility always being higher than actuality comes to
Q7
mind here. For Derrida there seems to be at once something both restrictive and
banal about the destination, something sterile and inhibiting about the 'closure' of the
path. It is an aesthetics of the errant which does not really figure centrally in
Eckhart's motivations for detachment, even though Derrida has remarked elsewhere
to the contrary: "I wonder if it isn't a matter there, beauty or sublimity, of an essential
trait of negative theology" (je me demande s'U ne s'agit pas la, beaute ou sublimite,
QO
d'un trait essentiel de la theologie negative). Eckhart's apophatic aversion towards
names and destinations, although similar to an aesthetically-motivated preference for
the sublime, is ultimately concerned with a truer understanding of what 'God' is, and
not for the freedom of "a world of signs...without truth".99 In short: Derrida and
Eckhart agree on the pathlessness, but not on the Way.
Obstacles to the Wandering Thinker.
What we are now going to do is consider some of the analogous difficulties of
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Wandering is not a problem for those who have nothing to say, who do not
seek to be understood, who do not care where they arrive. In a sense both Eckhart
and Derrida, in their appraisal of uncertainty and resistance towards the certain, do
share a common obstacle: that of abandoning the path, and yet simultaneously
wanting to go in a certain direction - and do certain things - which could be
misconstrued as pursuing such a path to a certain extent. Having expounded upon the
unmasterability of God and the text, the response of both theorist and theologian is
not simply a mystical silence, nor the passive acceptance of a drifting state. It is an
attempt to embark upon a course of action without lapsing into the very names one is
trying to leave behind. For Eckhart, this means there is something in the path which
prevents one ever arriving:
The more one seeks Thee, the less one can find Thee. You should seek Him in such a way as never
to find Him. If you do not seek Him, you will find Him.
So man dich ie me suchet, so man dich ie minder vindet. Du solt in suchen, also das du in niena
vindest. suchest du in nit, so vindest du in.100
Eckhart still wants to arrive at a truer understanding of what God is by bypassing
"God" - the "God", as Jean Luc Marion says, "who by his quotation marks is
stigmatized as an idol".101 The paradox of not seeking God in order to find Him
obviously brings us back to namelessness: to seek something is to already know what
one is looking for, to give it a name. And yet, if we seek a name, we will never find
God, who is nameless. If we follow a path somewhere, it will never lead us to God,
who is nowhere. What I am going to suggest is that, in Eckhart's "pathless Way,
which is free and yet fixed", the word "pathless" puts^a^" under erasure. It enables
Eckhart to get to where he wants to go without following a path.
How does this paradoxical advocating of pathlessness and the insistence upon
a direction apply to Derrida? Although Derrida, like Eckhart, may be abandoning one
version of "God", this does not mean he is seeking to replace it with another. Any
attempt to see the two thinkers' difficulties as analogous must recognize Derrida as
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facing certain questions: how can a "thought of interminable wandering"102 theorize
about such wandering without revealing itself to be a goal-orientated, truth-seeking
pilgrimage? how can an ecriture which "does not know where it is going" claim to
have any kind of ethical agenda? Questions which constitute two familiar obstacles
to the deconstructive enterprise: i) the problem of describing and analysing, in texts
and through texts, the unstable nature of all textuality , and ii) the difficulties which
1 fH
lie in re-affirming deconstruction's much-vaunted synonymity with "justice"
without giving "ammunition to the officials of anti-deconstruction".104
Both thinkers, so to speak, have problems in reconciling their pathlessness to
their ways. Eckhart is well aware that any attempt to talk about God, even about the
ineffability of such a God, is a futile project:
One of our most ancient masters...considered that whatever he could say about
things contained in itself something alien and untrue, and therefore he wanted to
keep silent.
unser eltesten meister...den duhte des: allez, daz er sprechen mohte von den
dingen, daz daz etwaz vremdes und unwares in im triiege; dar umbe wolte er
105
swigen.
Every remark concerning God contains within it something "alien and untrue", an
ineluctable element of falsity which forever undermines any attempt to say "what
God really is". Of course, as Kevin Hart has already pointed out, Eckhart has in mind
an original purity of speech here, a pre-lapsarian state of perfectly communicable
meaning which our fallen language cannot possibly hope to re-attain. In Derrida,
however, the "alien and untrue" element in language which renders the truth-claim
obsolete is not the incommensurable but the uncontrollable, as Derrida points out in
OfGrammatology:
...all that desire had wished to wrest from the play of language finds itself
recaptured within that play...10
102
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It is this ungovernable "play in language" in all critique which is, for Derrida, the
disruptive "alien and untrue", and not some fallen incapacity to convey a
transcendental signified. The infinitely divine remains forever out of reach for
Eckhart's words, just as the finite play within the text will forever resist Derrida's
attempts to arrest it. The differences are substantial, although as obstructions they are
analogous: the subjects of both writers are implicitly resistant to their discourses.
Analogous obstructions which explain why Derrida feels "the detours,
locution and syntax" of deconstruction to which he "will often have to take recourse
will resemble those of negative theology, occasionally to the point of being
indistinguishable from negative theology".107 In a sense, both Derrida and Eckhart's
'pathless ways' are a response to the threatening futility of their projects, an attempt
to overcome the "alien and untrue"/ 'uncontrollable' in language by continually
placing it 'under erasure'.
The term "sous rature" ultimately comes from Heidegger's 1956 work Zur
Seinsfrage {Towards A Question ofBeing ). Here Heidegger is trying to reply to
Junger's request for a "good definition of nihilism" (eine gate Definition des
Nihilismus ).108 Heidegger tells us how "no information [keine Auskunft] can be
given about nothingness and Being...which can be presented tangibly [griffbereit
vorliegen] in the form of assertions". This already sounds like something similar to
Eckhart's paraphrase of Avicenna: "God is a being to whom nothing is, or can be,
similar".109 Such a problem, insists Heidegger, "leads us into a realm which requires
a different language [der ein anderes Sagen verlangt]".110 In such a realm, Being
could only ever be written as ^eitjg , just as Eckhart's God can only ever be spoken
of as„j£srWT. Such a crossing out (Durchkreuzung) is not merely negative, not simply a
reminder of what one cannot say, but also a pointer towards how much infinitely
remains to be said. Spivak is quite correct in her remark concerning the different
things Heidegger and Derrida put "under erasure". Whereas Heidegger's^ei^g
refers to an "inarticulable presence", Derrida's concept of thejgpacfe indicates rather
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"the absence of a presence, an always already absent present".111 In Derrida, words
are placed under erasure because of a restless play within language, and not because
of some semantic inability to express an elusive signified 'out-there'. Semantic
instability - that is, radical indeterminacy within finite parameters of play - makes
such Durchkreuzung necessary, not the presence of some ineffable unsignifiable
which constantly makes us lament how 'finite' and 'imperfect' our language is.
This textual strategy of forever deleting the validity of one's assertions as soon
as they are written - but nevertheless retaining the gesture that one has deleted - can
be seen most explicity in Eckhart's careful attempt to detach one's 'good' actions
from 'goodness' ("To be free of virtue is the perfection of virtue"112) - that is, from a
value-laden vocabulary of external practices, a conceptual system which can have no
place within the image-less non-space of the Godhead:
St Augustine says: God is wise without wisdom, good without goodness,
powerful without power.113
It is a passage which Derrida obviously finds interesting, referring to it as he does in
two different essays.114 At first, there seems to be something of the absurd in
Eckhart's paraphrase of Augustine - the desire for a wise, loving, omnipotent God
who is nevertheless free of all names. However, such a detachment of the singular
from the general, of the gesture or word from the very vocabulary which would
transform such gestures and words into examples and characteristics, is consistent
with Eckhart's apophatic aversion towards the concept. Concepts can ultimately have
no truck with God - they 'fill up' the soul when it should be empty, they give the soul
destinations when it should be wandering, they take up that space in the soul which
should be "potential receptivity".115 Derrida, interestingly, sees something akin to his
own project in Eckhart's use of Augustine's phrase:
In the same word and in the same syntax it transforms into affirmation its purely
phenomenal negativity, which ordinary language , riveted to finitude, gives us to
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understand in a word such as without, or in other analogous words. It
deconstructs grammatical anthropomorphism."6
Derrida seems to recognise Eckhart's difficulties here: the difficulty which lies in the
desire to attribute 'goodness' - and not 'evil' or 'indifference'- to a divine and
unspeakable hyperessentiality, in a language which is "riveted to finitude" and
thereby continually runs the risk of lapsing into a "grammatical anthropomorphism".
The possibility of affirmative theology 'anthropomorphising' a nameless deity is, of
course, one of the classic raisons d'etre of negative theology. The desire to affirm the
goodness and wisdom of an ultimately unnameable God without humanising Him
(sic), cannot escape a certain analogy with deconstruction and its attempt to affirm
the "responsibility" of unnameable dijferance without turning it into a humanism.
Derrida seems to feel the Augustinian 'without' succeeds in deconstructing this
potential anthropomorphism, at least in part - God is SPigg , g&sd , pcBSssffiil. Is
Derrida making a similar claim about deconstruction - that it is
hurPRrffitai'ian ? To what extent is the same kind of erasure at work?
Three years later, in a briefer and much more guarded reference to Augustine's
assertion Derrida writes in "Post-Scriptum":
Meister Eckhart cites [Augustine] often; he often cites the 'without' of St
Augustine, that quasi-negative predication of the singular without concept, for
example: "God is wise without wisdom...
Maitre Eckhart le cite souvent, il cite souvent le "san" de saint Augustin, cette
predication quasi negative du singulier sans concept, par exemple: "Dieu est
sage sans sagesse.... "II7
The Augustinian deconstruction of "grammatical anthropomorphism" has become
1 1 8
the almost negative gesture of the apophatic. An "apophatic boldness" whose
Christian version, although always inclining towards Godlessness (as Leibniz
remarked), will never completely negate God without re-affirming Him beyond such
negations. After having underlined the deconstructive nature of Augustine's
"without" in "Denials", Derrida's slightly more reserved comment in "Post-
Scriptum" (in itself a response to a Jerusalem conference linking Derrida with the
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corpus of various negative theologies) omits reference to any kind of alliance with
deconstruction, choosing instead to infer how Augustine almost (but never quite)
manages to sever the singular from the concept, the 'good' from 'goodness'.
Of course, the vast question of the relationship between 'ethics' and
'deconstruction' far exceeds the parameters of this final section, and will be dealt
with more directly in Chapter Four. All that is of interest to us at the moment is how
the attempts of both writers to re-establish the 'ethicity' of their apophatic
/deconstructive discoufses are fraught with analogous problems and potentially
interfere with a 'pathless' thought. Derrida's remarks on Augustine's 'without' tell us
that, if deconstruction really is 'caring' without 'charity', 'ethical' without 'ethics',
'just' without a conception of 'rights', then it puts these adjectives - and the concepts
they refer to - under erasure for reasons which are radically different from those of
Augustine /Eckhart. Unlike God's 'goodness' and 'wisdom', which are negated - or
quasi-negated - because of a certain "finitude", Derrida seems to place 'ethics',
'morality' and 'humanism' under erasure because they no longer have any
metaphysical ground. They are simply signs, names, marks, noises, "riveted" not so
much to a mortal finitude but to a metaphysics of illusory self-presence. Eckhart puts
'goodness' under erasure because such a term can never adequately express the
divine, hyper-essential 'goodness' that cannot be spoken of. Derrida, on the other
hand, puts words like 'morality' under erasure not in favour of some infinitely
perfect, super-morality yet to be grasped, but because of the never-ending play of
absences and presences within the word 'morality' which always already
deconstructs it. Therefore, although both writers embark upon pathless Ways, they do
not feel their Ways to be pathless for quite the same reasons.
Of course, one could quickly cite a minor objection to this difference between
the Eckhartian and Derridean versions of sous rature. As we have seen, Derrida's




to break"119 always seems to involve Eckhart's words (I quote Derrida's French
translation of the phrase):
When I said that God was not a Being, and was above Being, I did not truly
contest His Being, but on the contrary attributed to Him a more elevated Being.
[italics mine]
Quandj'ai dit que Dieu n 'etait pas un 'etre et etait au-dessus de I'etre, je ne lui
ai pas par Id conteste I'etre, au contraire je lui ai attribue un etre plus eleve. 120
Eckhart is out to reassure, keen as ever to veer his writings away from that very
Gottlosigkeit Leibniz felt unsettled by. Derrida sees this as a re-joining, a re¬
affirming at a higher level of the ov in onto-theology. To what extent can a similar
operation of reassurance be detected in Derrida's "Passions"? Derrida insists that if
he has deconstructed 'ethicity'...
...it is in the name of a higher responsibility and a more intractable moral
exigency that I have declared my distaste, uneven as it may be, for both
moraIisms.(pl4)12'
Can we ever reassure without being re-appropriated? If Derrida contested the
"ethicity" of ethics, was it in the name of a more elevated ethics? The qualifying
adjective 'higher' is interesting: does this mean 'out of reach'? yet to be grasped?
above that "finitude" which our language is "riveted" to? What is, ultimately, the
difference between Derrida's "higher responsibility" and Eckhart's "more elevated
Being"? A more hostile critic would see the Derridean suspicion of Eckhart's
qualifying re-assurance as a clear case of Freudian self-projection, the projecting of
one's own logocentric lapses onto the writings of another. However, the word
"intractable" (intraitable), with its suggestion of 'unmanageable', 'ungovernable',
does lead us back to a more familiar Derridean vocabulary, one which would link the
unnameable name of this "higher responsibility" with a semantic indeterminacy,
rather than a theological inexpressibility.
As we have seen, both Eckhart and Derrida embark upon pathless Ways, ways
which wander in different directions, for different reasons, with different results.
Although both writers reject the idea of a path, Eckhart's wee is abandoned because
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there are no destinations which can indicate the "God beyond God", a God beyond
topography. Derrida's chemin, on the other hand, is rejected because it is always
already abandoned, because it becomes an illusion the moment it is announced. We
have, therefore, two examples of a centreless 'wandering thought' with ultimately
different desires: the Eckhartian soul wandering because it seeks to imitate the
ebullient divine and finally obtain "oneness with the Father" (einunge sines
vaters),122 and the Derridean text erring, blissfully free of any "centre of absolute
anchoring"123, because it wishes to embrace a freedom which only the "absence of
prescribed routes" can provide.124
"The only true joy is the joy of loss," writes Altizer.125 The loss of all the
reasons why we feel we have to say things, write things, do things. The loss of all the
places we feel we have to go to. In Eckhart, one loses an idol, a sense of self and a
shallow theology; in Derrida, one loses a restrictive metaphysics of presence, an
oppressive nostalgia and a centre which can no longer command. Although both
gestures are separated by centuries, are radically rooted in disparate vocabularies,
they remain nevertheless similar gestures of liberation, however differently
understood. Both writers discern the importance of remaining 'open' and 'empty',
which in Eckhart takes the form of a "potential receptivity" towards God, a God who
must respond to such openness:
As for what it profits you to pursue this possibility, to keep yourself empty and
bare...it contains the chance to gain Him who is all things...It would surely be a
grave defect in God if He performed no great works in you whenever He found
you this empty and bare. 126
In Derrida, Eckhart's 'emptiness' towards God translates itself into an 'openness'
towards the Other and towards the future:
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What I call messianicity without messianism refers to the promise of someone or
something to come in such a way that does not anticipate at all what or who will
come, when or where. An absolute openness to what is coming. 127
If wandering is ultimately understood as a kind of 'openness' towards whatever lies
before one, a willingness to go anywhere, then we can begin to understand how the
absence of destinations in both writers ultimately translates itself into an absence of
motivations, and therefore of justifications. Both extracts propose the dismantling of
all preconceptions of the other (be it 'God' or 'future' or 'neighbour'), the removal of
all anticipations of where one is likely to arrive. Within both extracts, we see two
versions of a thought of 'non-destination', a thought which extols openness towards a
space ultimately resistant to all names, icons and speculations. In the next chapter, we
shall explore this Eckhartian/Derridean theme of openness to the Other more fully,
delineating its relationship towards the understanding of uncertainty as a kind of non¬
violence, and questioning the extent to which an ethics of Gelcissenheit in
Eckhart/Derrida can ever really let Beings be. For now, it suffices to re-emphasize
how both Eckhart and Derrida, as Altizer might have said, recognize that the loss of
the destination is a cause for celebration, not lamentation, and the condition for a new
kind of understanding, not an all-too-familiar state of mourning.
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3.2 Vagrancy and Whylessness in The Caretaker : Pinter's Version of
the Sunder Warumbe .
I wouldn't know a symbol if I saw one.
- Pinter, cit. in Knowles, Text and Performance , p 13
We have seen, in the previous section, how both Eckhart and Derrida extol the
wanderer over the pilgrim. In Eckhart, to wander joyfully is a consequence of blissful
union with the Godhead; to perform good works spontaneously, free of all motivation
and premeditation, is to imitate the divine. In Derrida, the errancy of the text is
celebrated as liberating and "adventurous", the emancipation of the signifier from its
signified. In The Caretaker, however, wandering only seems to bring desperation and
terror to the wanderer. The aim of this section is to show how the joyful errancy in
negative theology and deconstruction finds a darker counterpart in the anguished
homelessness of The Caretaker. Again, the 'whyless' spontaneity of another's
actions, advocated by both Eckhart and Derrida as 'Godly' and 'authentic', manifests
itself in Pinter as a means for unpredictable violence and groundless malice.
"Homelessness becomes a world destiny," writes Heidegger.1 To begin our
study of The Caretaker with such a quote suggests yet another existentialist reading
of Pinter's play, underlining the solitary anguish of Davies' Dasein, the
precariousness of his situation, the fragility of his sense of identity, the
unpredictability of human relationships...a category of readings Knowles has
mockingly summed up as "Modern Man in Search of His Insurance Cards".
Nevertheless, The Caretaker is of relevance to our project inasmuch that it
concerns a homeless wanderer, whose ramblings have no apparent destination, and
two brothers, whose conflicting behaviour has no apparent motivation. However,
instead of concentrating on the existentialist resonances of Pinter's play, which -
although manifold - are already well-documented, this section will have two aims.
Firstly, to show exactly where the uncertainty of The Caretaker lies - both through
1 Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" cit in David Krell (ed), Martin Heidegger.Basic Writings
(London: Routledge & Kegan, 1978) p220
2 Michael Scott(ed), Pinter: The Birthday Party, The Caretaker and The Homecoming, Macmillan
Casebook Series ( London : Macmillan, 1986) p247
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the drifting, plotless movement of the play's denouement, and through the mysterious
benevolence/ hostility of the two brothers who 'befriend' the homeless tramp Davies,
their inconsistent treatment of him and the enigmatic possibilities of their 'faint'
smiles at the end of the play. Secondly, to propose a re-reading of The Caretaker
exclusively concerned with the issue of textuality, a reading which sees Davies'
sufferings at the hands of the two brothers as analogous to the (mis)fortunes of the
text, which wanders vulnerably from one reader to another, forever uncertain of how
it is going to be (mis)appropriated next. Such an approach will serve to elicit how the
themes of wandering and whylessness, understood as positive and spiritually
generative in Eckhart and Derrida, seems to bring out, from the barrenness of Pinter's
various landscapes, only vulnerability, anguish and dismay.
3.2.1 Disagreements over The Caretaker .
Before examining The Caretaker, it might be worthwhile briefly surveying the
critical response to the play, in particular the various points and issues within its
numerous performances which seemed to have stirred up dissent amongst the critics.
First and foremost among such critical aporia within The Caretaker is the problem of
Davies, and how to react to him - helpless object of pathos or twisted, vindictive old
tramp? Davies' ugly streak of racial prejudice, exhibited in the first minutes of the
play, wins him little favour with the audience: "...I couldn't find a seat, not one. All
them Greeks had it, Poles, Greeks, Blacks, the lot of them, all them aliens had it".3
Such ingrained and malicious xenophobia, blended together with a willingness to
cheat and steal from the first simpleton naive enough to trust him, is enough to
convince critics like Esslin that Davies' torment is ultimately brought on by himself.
Davies, confronted by the social "inadequacy" of Aston, cannot help exploiting his
benefactor - thus displaying the stupid, arrogant pride that, for Esslin, is "the hybris
of Greek tragedy which becomes the cause of Davies' downfall".4 Morrison takes a
similarly unforgiving view of Davies' "underlying viciousness" and "parasitism",
rather unproblematically painting Mick as the Caring Brother, who succeeds in
3
p 17 - all references to The Caretaker are taken from Pinter Plays:Two (London: Methuen 1977)
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revealing to Aston the "true nature" of the dishonest vagrant he has unwittingly let
into their house.5 Even John Pesta, in an otherwise even-handed treatment of the
play, sees Davies as another one of "Pinter's Usurpers" and correspondingly feels the
"blame...lies chiefly with Davies".6
Other critics have tended to feel a little more cynical towards Pinter's alleged
n
comment on the play - "It's about love" - a cynicism which ranges from a definite
distrust of Aston (Knowles) to a full-blown demand for empathy with Davies' lot
(Minogue). Boulton relates to Davies as a symbol of "present day humanity"
embarking upon an "uncertain road" with "no certain destination"8, Ruby Cohn
interprets Davies' sufferings in The Caretaker as "the virtual annihilation of an
individual"9 and Trussler, who sees Davies as an "almost pathetically predictable"
figure, voices his own suspicions about a "pre-arranged plot" on the brothers' part.10
Valerie Minogue's essay is by far the most impassioned defence of Davies, seeing in
the tramp, as he tries to curry favour first with one brother, then with the other, our
own "vain efforts to discover exactly ... 'which way the wind is blowing'".11 All
these readings, in one way or another, see Davies as a desire for certainty and refuge,
caught helplessly adrift in an uncertain world.
Equally, critical opinion is divided on the best way to evaluate Aston's role in
The Caretaker. Some critics see Aston as nothing more than a good-natured version
of an idiot savant - a figure of "quiet charitableness and tolerance" writes
Almansi/Henderson, unaware of "the menace all around him".12 In Esslin the
simpleton takes on a more artistic air, who enjoyed "a life of heightened sensibility
and imagination" before being "reduced" to the shell that he is through the shock
therapy forced upon him.13 Trussler, on the other hand, paints a more indecisive
Aston, torn between his sympathy for the tramp and loyalty towards his brother.
4 Martin Esslin, The Peopled Wound, (London: Methuen, 1970) p99
5 Kristin Morrison, Canters and Chronicles (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) pi64-5
6 "Pinter's Usurpers" in Arthur Ganz(ed), Pinter: A Collection ofCritical Essays (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1972) pl28
7 confided to Charles Marowitz, in Scott(ed), Macmillan Casebook, pi64
8
Ganz, Pinter: A Collection ofCritical Essays, plOl
9 "The World of Harold Pinter" in Ganz, Pinter, p78
10 Simon Trussler, The Plays ofHarold Pinter (London: Gollancz, 1973) p82
11
"Taking Care of the Caretaker" in Ganz, Pinter, p76
12 Guido Almansi and S. Henderson, Harold Pinter (London: Methuen, 1983) p55
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Cohn, moving a step further in her defence of Davies, focuses on Aston's final, cold-
hearted refusal of the old man's plea to stay, ultimately seeing "only surface
contrasts" between Mick and Aston "in their attitudes towards the old man".14
Knowles, finally, sees Aston as a mentally-damaged figure "haunted by revenge" and
intent upon "vindicating himself and impugning those who have harmed him".15
From innocent dimwit to vengeful psychopath, the characters in The Caretaker are
uncertain enough to provoke a variety of responses.
Another issue which seems to provoke dissent among the critical readership
of The Caretaker is the extent to which 'signs' in the play must necessarily be
considered 'symbols'. It is a debate which, as Hinchliffe relates, was in part provoked
by a reply Pinter made to an observation of Rattigan's: "When Rattigan saw [the
play] as an allegory about the God of the Old Testament, the God of the New
Testament, and Humanity, Pinter replied that the play was about a caretaker and two
brothers".16 Pinter's dry reductiveness here, however well-intended, is indicative of
the artist's stereotypically disparaging attitude towards interpretations - few writers
welcome the nailing of their works to fixed and coherent meanings, and Pinter is
certainly no exception. Asked what his work was "about", his reply has now become
famous: "The weasel under the cocktail cabinet".17 Knowles writes:
Some views of The Caretaker...dumbfounded the playwright, who considered
the play simple and straightforward. Psychological interpretation, on the other
hand, explained the play in terms of the conflict between the superego, the ego
and the Id. In the struggle for private property between the owners and the
ownerless, Marxists saw the class war. Alternatively, a theological view
allegorised Davies as Everyman, Aston as a Christlike figure and Mick as
Satanic!18
Although Pinter's resistance to ideological appropriations of his work is
understandable, his insistence on critics seeing his play as "simple and
straightforward", without attempting to construct any kind of reading which might
make sense of the bewildering array of sounds and language one encounters during a
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16 Arnold P.Hinchliffe, Harold Pinter (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1967) p88
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Scott, Macmillan Casebook, p9
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Pinter play, does seem rather naive. Pinter's insertion of such incongruous elements
as the Buddha figure and Aston's visionary "shed" does invite some element of
hermeneutics, however distasteful the playwright may find this to be. Can a writer
ever insist on his signs not being understood as symbols? How could such an
insistence ever be reinforced?
Hinchliffe , having acknowledged how "the urge to allegorize is of course
reasonable", goes on to declare: "Cosmic implications are out of place in The
Caretaker....Pinter's tramps do not discuss cosmic matters".19 Hinchliffe, in his talk
of "cosmic matters", seeks to distinguish Pinter's tramps from those of Beckett.
Whereas Gogo and Didi discuss memory, suicide and the Gospel of Luke, Aston and
Davies merely swap half-mumbled remarks about sleeping habits, leaky roofs and
Sidcup. This is enough, for Hinchliffe, to justify Bamber Gascoigne's assertion that
Pinter's work "is the very essence of naturalistic drama".20Although this sounds
rather like John Lahr's own identification of Pinter with Chekhov, Lahr at least sees
Pinter as using "the conventions of Naturalism to go beyond them".21 Hinchliffe's
definition of naturalism as a work which excludes any direct treatment of abstract
universals is slightly problematic - particularly when one bears in mind the Absurd's
preference for the precise, the detail, the particular. If, for a work to have "cosmic
implications", a discussion of "cosmic matters" is deemed necessary, then a large
number of Kafka's short pieces, notably lacking in any kind of explicitly abstract
theme (Ein Landarzt, Der Kuebelreiter, Der Schlag ans Hoftor, Der Aufbruch22 )
would also fall under the category of "naturalistic". Whereas critics like Dukore see
the realistic setting of The Caretaker as a springboard towards different ideas of their
own, a play which "suggests more than the literal"23, Hinchliffe is made more
cautious by the "wealth of naturalistic detail".24 Despite a favourable consideration of
Boulton's own reading of the play, which sees Davies as the archetypal symbol of life
as a journey, Hinchliffe still feels that "The Caretaker remains obstinately and simply
19
Hinchliffe, Harold Pinter, pl03, 105
20
ibid, pl05, quoting Gascoigne, Twentieth Century Drama , p54
21 "Pinter and Chekhov: The Bond of Naturalism" in Ganz, Pinter, p61
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a play about two brothers and a caretaker", an assertion which simply returns us to
the very debate initiated at the beginning of his study.25
3.2.2 The Errancy of Language in The Caretaker
The first thing to be said about The Caretaker is that, linguistically and
thematically, it sprawls. Characters ramble on, indifferently, obliquely, stopping only
when interrupted by the ramblings of another. Points quickly get lost in
misunderstandings, incomplete repetitions and muddled back tracking. Blindingly
irrelevant anecdotes and asides suddenly appear in the middle of completely
unrelated explanations or interrogations, prompted by a chance association never
revealed to the audience. As the errant line of dialogue weaves from moment to
moment, topics of conversation follow one another with little or no continuity - jig
saws, offers of sex in local cafes, birth places, household plugs...listening to the
dialogue of The Caretaker is like trying to follow a radio which is constantly
changing stations.26
Not surprisingly, a number of critics have drawn attention to the 'aimless'
feel of the language in The Caretaker, a language which is "relatively inarticulate,
illogical and oblique, wandering directionless with the signposts of a
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plot"(Knowles) and which contributes to the play's "related sense of drifting"
(Trussler).28 To a lesser extent, the meandering movement of The Caretaker is
enhanced by the relative openness of the play's structure. This is not to say that Pinter
is as bereft of narrative as Beckett or Robbe-Grillet - The Caretaker is still a play
with a situation, a complication and a resolution (the decision to evict Davies), a play
which develops and whose characters change in a way which Gogo and Didi simply
do not. However, characters do wander on and off the stage without warning - Mick's
wordless appearance at the beginning of Act One and closing re-appearance in the
final minutes of the same act, the continual entrances and exits of both brothers
23
Hinchliffe, Harold Pinter, pi07
"6 A fact which leads one Romanian linguist to observe how Pinter's plays "are excellent lessons in
contemporary spoken English". Doina Lecca, Human Communication - Models for Analysis ,
(Bucharest: Universitatea din Bucuresti, 1990) p28
27 Ronald Knowles,Text and Performance (Macmillan, 1988) p 12
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throughout Acts Two and Three, enabling Davies to cultivate an individual
relationship with both Aston and Mick. The abrupt manner in which the play both
begins and ends in the middle of a conversation, the irregular placing of the first
interval barely ten seconds after Davies has seen Mick for the first time, the brusque
scene shifts immediately after unanswered questions (Mick asking "What's the
game?" 38, Davies asking for a pair of shoes 61) or unfinished answers (Davies
trying to explain why someone might be "after" him 53) all introduce a slightly
erratic and plotless quality to the performance, underlining what Esslin has called the
play's "indeterminacy, open-endedness and mystery of real life".29
To return to language: although all three characters in The Caretaker are guilty
of rambling, irrelevancy and abrupt digression, this does not necessarily mean that
they all ramble for the same reasons. The zig-zag nature of Davies' language, for
example, stems for a simple sense of insecurity, one which - combined with a
garrulous nature - seeks to fill a silence whenever one presents itself. It is a trait
which exhibits itself in the opening minutes of the play, as Aston is showing Davies
around the flat. Davies has just related how he had to "go all the way down to Luton"
in a bad pair of shoes:
ASTON: What happened when you got there?
Pause.
DAVIES: I used to know a bootmaker in Acton. He was a good mate to me.
Pause.
You know what that bastard monk said to me?
Pause.
How many blacks you got round here, then? (23)
Davies' sudden, anxious flurry of unrelated sentences is difficult to explain
rationally, as Aston's questions (unlike those of Mick) are neither irrelevant nor
unpleasantly interrogative, but simply a prompt to have Davies relate his experiences
at Luton. It may be that Davies never reached Luton, which would account for the
erratic roll of non-sequiturs which Davies, in a mild panic, provides as a response to
Aston. In his non-reply to Aston's innocent question, Davies manages to confuse the
three preceding topics of conversation in one go: i) the problem of acquiring a decent
pair of shoes ii) Davies' negative experiences at the monastery and iii) the Indian
28
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immigrants who live next door to Aston. Davies' irrepressible desire to always have
something to say, to retain the illusion of control in a conversation even when no-one
is replying to his questions, seems to overcome the rational impulse of staying with
one subject at one time, a single topic which one can explore coherently and
consistently in dialogue with another. This shifting, unpredictable movement of
Davies' speech betrays a sense of insecurity which, in turn, could be explained by a
poor memory and an inarticulateness that produces the largest number of unfinished
sentences in the play:
I haven't had a proper sit down...well, I couldn't tell you... (16)
Oh, I got all that underway...that's ...uh...that's...what I'll be doing. (36)
Man who was here..he...Pause. (43)
Well, I...I never done caretaking before, you know...I mean to say...I never...
(51)
But...but...look...listen...listen here...I mean... (86)
Davies' inability to recall even the most basic details of his origins, his identity, his
experiences, his intentions, plays a key role in the errant nature of his speech. Davies
rambles, in both senses of the word, because he can no longer remember where he
was going to, what point he was making. It should not be forgotten, however, that
such a sense of insecurity is also the consequence of a poor, uneducated tramp
finding himself in the company of two literate, articulate brothers. It is a class
distinction which Mick's cutting irony never lets the tramp forget ("You must come
up and have a drink sometime. Listen to some Tchaikovsky" 73). Even Aston,
unintentionally, reminds Davies of his cultural inferiority with his questions about
Buddhism and technical terms. Significantly, the most coherent and consistent of all
Davies' speeches occurs when Davies manages to forget for a moment his inferior
status - his vicious diatribe against Aston. "Treating me like a bloody animal! I never
been inside a nuthouse!" (76). For almost ninety seconds of stage time, Davies can
actually feel superior to someone, disparities of class and status are forgotten as
Davies maliciously capitalizes on his 'sanity' at the expense of Aston ("You think
29
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you're better than me you got another think coming.") It is hardly a speech which
endears Davies to the audience, although we do see a rare self-confidence in Davies
as he delivers it, startlingly free of the stammering and rambles which dominate his
language for most of the play.
If Davies' rambling speech springs from a poor memory and a class-
cultivated sense of inferiority, then Aston's own circuitous semantics have a much
more clinical cause, one which is only revealed two thirds of the way through the
play. Like Davies, Aston has difficulty in developing conversational themes in a
rational, connected choosing instead to leap from topic to topic without attempting to
relate them in any way together. After explaining to Davies how a jig-saw is different
from a fret saw, Aston continues in the same breath:
ASTON: You know, I was sitting in a cafe the other day. I happened to be sitting
at the same table as this woman...Anyway, we were just sitting there , having this
bit of a conversation...then suddenly she put her hand over to mine...and she
said, how would you like me to have a look at your body?
DAVIES: Get out of it.
Pause.
ASTON: Yes. To come out with it just like that, in the middle of this
conversation. Struck me as a bit odd.
DAVIES: They've said the same thing to me. (34)
Aston appears detached from the flux of reality around him - like Davies, his
thought-trains wander, with complete disregard for any sense of context. The very
fact that Aston considers the woman's question, unrelated to anything that preceded
it, as "odd" suggests not only an irony on the part of the playwright, but also a
complete unawareness (on Aston's part) of his own eccentric behaviour. In a sense,
Aston - in his disregard for the relevance of one topic to another - displays something
of what the Stoics called apatheia (not quite the same as 'apathy'), a word the
medieval most often translated as impassibilitas, or equanimity.30 Apart from the
singular significance of his "shed", an idea whose criticism by Davies provokes the
only potentially violent response from Aston in the whole play, Aston seems to see
all topics of conversation - whether it concerns changing a plug, drinking Guinness
or finding a job - as being of equal interest (or disinterest), which may explain how
he can abandon them so easily. Nevertheless, however tempting it may be to ascribe
30
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the spontaneity of Aston's conjectures to some kind of Eastern, guru-like serendipity,
the fact remains that Aston's thought-trains wander because he is mentally ill.
Having been subjected, against his will, to electro-shock therapy, we leam in the
famous monologue at the end of Act II how the process has damaged Aston:
The trouble was...my thoughts...had become very slow...I couldn't think at all...I
couldn't ...get...my thoughts...together...uuuhh....I could...never quite get
it....together. The trouble was, I couldn't hear what people were saying. (66)
Unlike Davies, whose erratic, sprawling dialogue constitutes a desperate attempt to
lunge for attention and repair his self-esteem, Aston is serenely indifferent to what
people think about him. It is an equanimity which stems from a mental incapacity to
relate to the world around him, a symptom Davies mistakes for callous indifference
("...he don't seem to take any notice of what I say to him" 68). Whereas Davies
rambles partly because of his poor mental faculties, and partly because he is
anxiously searching for the right track, the right topic, the right remark, Aston
rambles indifferently because all topics seem to mean the same to him.
Like Aston and Davies, Mick's speech can hop unpredictably from topic to
topic at the slightest whim. Unlike Aston and Davies, Mick employs his irrelevancy
and obliqueness to devastating effect. Mick's abrupt digressions and sudden,
unconnected questions, far from reflecting any degree ofmental slowness, insecurity
or inferiority complex, are subtle strategies to maintain control of the conversation
and bully, startle or confound the other. To digress without warning, for Mick,
implies a certain sense of power in a dialogue - it reserves, for the speaker, the tacit
right to select the topic of a conversation without consultation. Little wonder that
Mick, like Lenny in The Homecoming, employs the digression as an indirect means
of asserting control, a strategy which is exhibited most frequently in his first
encounter with Davies:
MICK: What did you say your name was?
DAVIES: Jenkins.




A drop sounds in the bucket. Davies looks up.
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You remind me ofmy uncle's brother. He was always on the move, that man. ...
(40)
A twenty-line monologue follows as Mick relates to a terrified Davies, in an amiable
manner, a bizarre biography of his uncle's brother, ending with a good-natured return
to the conversation: "I hope you slept well". Having taken up once more the original
line of questioning, thirty seconds later Mick digresses again:
You know, believe it or not, you've got a funny kind of resemblance to a bloke I
once knew in Shoreditch. Actually, he lived in Aldgate. I was staying with a
cousin in Camden Town. (41)
Another twenty-line monologue follows. The succession of London place names is
bewildering - Aldgate, Camden Town, Finsbury Park, Putney, Fulham. Mick even
relates in detail the possible bus services his friend's mother could have taken ("She
could get a 38, 581, 30 or 38A..."). Davies must listen to all of this, anxious and
uncomprehending. Such irrelevancies, coming from the man who minutes earlier had
violently forced him to the ground, are by no means harmless rambles. By abruptly
veering off into a friendly, confiding digression about bus routes in a friend's
neighbourhood at precisely the point when Davies is anticipating violence or abuse,
Mick does something far more effective than any act of violence could ever be: he
makes Davies wait. The sudden transformation of linguistic register (from the
language of threatening-thug to mate-in-the-pub) places his listener in a confused
state of uncertainty, forcing Davies into the role of interpreter, desperately awaiting
an intelligible sign, a familiar gesture. In such a process, comprehension becomes a
gift, a concession, a privilege, something Mick may possibly bestow upon Davies, if
he chooses to do so. As it is, Davies is paralysed by the flood of irrelevancy ("I used
to leave my bike in her garden on my way to work") and seeks in vain a sinister
meaning beneath it all. The moment he hears something he can understand, a threat
or an insult, he can react - but Mick is far too clever to become intelligible.
"If you wish to be ...transformed into justice, do not intend anything particular
by your works and do not embrace any particular Why...".31 If one substitutes here
'words' for "works", one can see how the aimlessness and spontaneity of Mick's
31 Oliver Davies, Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994) pl45, taken
from Sermon 39 - lustus in perpetuum vivet
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language in The Caretaker, so liberating in Derrida and so spiritually desirable in
Eckhart, becomes as a strategy for cruelty and terror. It is precisely this absence of a
"particularWhy" which enables Mick to disarm and paralyse his victim, keeping
Mick's motives safely and invulnerably uncertain, just as Ruth exploits Lenny's
uncertainty about her own intentions.
Thus, although unpredictable language patterns are a feature of all three
characters' speech in The Caretaker, by no means do they take place for the same
reasons. Davies' speech wanders as a consequence of a poor memory, a social ill-at-
ease and a stammering desire to ingratiate himself first with one, then with the other
brother; Aston drifts from one topic to another because, detached from the world
through the cerebral violence of shock therapy, practically all discourses have
acquired a kind of 'sameness' for him. Out of all three 'ramblers' in the play, only
Mick tactically chooses to ramble and avoid the vulnerability of "straightforward"
(70) discourse (ironically the very adjective the deceived Davies attributes to him).
Mick alone employs an inconstant, peripatetic style as a strategy to hurt and humiliate
others - in this sense, his 'errancy' is a falsehood, for Mick knows precisely where he
wants to go.
3.2.3 Whylessness in The Caretaker.
The just person acts precisely as God acts, without a Why, and so as life lives for
its own sake, seeking nothing to justify itself, in the same way the just person
knows no Why to justify what they do.
- Meister Eckhart32
Having briefly examined how the language of The Caretaker wanders without a
point, we will now examine how the actions in The Caretaker occur without a
motive. The aim of this section is to show how the whylessness of both Mick and
Aston's actions in The Caretaker ultimately contributes to an unresolvable
indeterminacy of meaning in the play. In The Homecoming, we saw how the
paradoxical and inconsistent behaviour of the characters produced an uncertainty
which rendered the play resistant to any 'conclusive' and 'coherent' interpretation, an
uncertainty which sends the would-be exegete forever shuttling between a finite
32
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number of various interpretations, unable to arrive at a final, unproblematic reading.
To a lesser extent, the same kind of uncertainty is at work in The Caretaker - a text
which oscillates endlessly between two irreconcilable interpretations, each of which
hinges on how one understands the enigmatic smiles exchanged between the brothers
at the end of the play.
I write "to a lesser extent" because, in our study of Pinter's plays - The
Homecoming (1964), The Caretaker (1959), The Birthday Party and The Dumb
Waiter (both 1957) - we are actually moving backwards. Although it is not the aim of
this project to speculate upon the chronological development of Pinter's work, such a
backwards movement will reveal two kinds of uncertainty in Pinter, an uncertainty
which in The Birthday Party and The Dumb Waiter stems from the unknown, but in
The Homecoming and The Caretaker is produced by the undecidable. In Pinter's
early works, uncertainty is generated through a mysterious event or occurrence;
information is withheld from the audience (Where do McGann and Goldberg take
Stanley away to? Who do Gus and Ben work for?), thereby creating a sense of
'mystery'. In The Homecoming and The Caretaker, however, uncertainty arises not
so much through an absence of facts or deferred information, but because the
information given is contradictory and leads the audience first in one direction, then
the other (Is Aston's altruism genuine or simply Pinter's version of some bizarre
'good cop/bad cop' routine? Is Max's abusive monologue against Ruth simply a joke
or a display of genuine resentment?). Endless oscillation between finite possibilities
produce the uncertainty of such plays, and not the infinitely speculative depths of
unknowable circumstances.
Aston's Love Without Why.
Aston is, in the words of Davies, a "a funny bloke". A taciturn, slow-speaking,
benign figure with a penchant for Buddha figures, bric-a-brac and DIY, a character
whose unchecked generosity and unquestioning good nature strikes an uneasy note at
the start of a Pinter play - witnessing the unproblematic expression of Aston's good
nature in the opening minutes of The Caretaker is rather like watching the 'happy
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family' scene at the beginning of a horror movie. A certain cynicism - fuelled by
expectations of what a 'Pinter play' will bring - nurtures unpleasant sensations in us,
forces us to scrutinise Aston's open benevolence towards Davies for even the vaguest
hint of a more sinister nature. The problem with Aston, however, is that so much of
what he does fails to reveal any motive at all. His purchase of the statue, for example
(26):
DAVIES: What's this?
ASTON: (Taking and studying it) That's a Buddha.
DAVIES: Get on.
ASTON: Yes, I quite like it. Picked it up in a...in a shop. Looked quite nice to
me. Don't know why. What do you think of these Buddhas?
DAVIES: Oh, they're ...they're all right, en't they?
"Don't know why". The absence (at least until the 'shock therapy' monologue at the
end of Act II) of any information surrounding Aston's past, his childhood, his
friends, coupled with Aston's own reluctance to speak at any length about himself or
his feelings, makes the unreflective spontaneity of his gestures even more difficult to
evaluate. "You don't know where you are with him" complains Davies (70). If there
are passionate motives lying beneath the surface of Aston's apparent calm, his
aloofness seldom betrays them. The Buddha statue, in a sense, comments ironically
throughout the play on the almost ascetic tone of Aston's impassivity, a tranquillity
induced more through the unwanted side effects of failed shock therapy than any
notion of nirvana. The absurd significance he attributes to apparently minor matters -
the best way to drink Guinness, the building of his garden shed, the drip in the bucket
- reflects, as we mentioned earlier, this equanimity towards all things. Women fail to
interest him , or so we gather from his detached account of the 'cafe' episode. Even
the sight of Davies thrusting a knife towards his chest fails (literally) to move him.
The opaque inscrutability of Aston's psychology finds its most positive
expression in the unconditional hospitality he extends to Davies until very late in the
play, displaying a faith in the tramp's honesty which surprises even Davies:
DAVIES: ...don't you want me to get out...when you're out?
ASTON: You don't have to go out.
DAVIES: You mean...I can stay here?
ASTON: Do what you like. You don't have to come out just because I go out.
DAVIES: You don't mind me staying here?
ASTON: I've got a couple of keys.... (33)
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Davies' incredulity at the good will of his new friend mirrors our own. Aston,
without any reservations, offers him a bed, a pair of shoes (twice), money for some
food and a job. Even after encountering signs of Davies' behaviour which would
have dissuaded most people from further acts of charity - Davies' rude and ungrateful
acceptance of the shoes (74), for example, or his attempt to swindle more money out
of Aston the following morning - Aston continues in his kind, patient manner
towards him. The audience's suspicion of Pinter's Good Samaritan gradually turns
into alarm for his vulnerability at the hands of an exploitative vagrant. The self-
centred motivations which some critics have offered to 'explain' Aston's altruistic
actions - that he is lonely and seeks company, or that he performs such actions out of
a redemptive sense of 'goodness' and 'charity' - make little sense. Aston's solitary,
introspective nature, along with his alleged ignorance of Davies' presence ("...he
wasn't talking to me," says Davies, "he don't care about me" 68) hardly paints the
picture of a lonely introvert, driven to inviting the homeless into his house out of a
need for human companionship. Similarly, at no point in the play does Aston display
any awareness of the 'good' and 'moral' implications of his actions, which calls into
question whether Aston has any notion of 'charity' at all. In a sense, he is the perfect
example of Eckhart's Man Without Why, the "just person" who knows "no Why to
justify what they do". For most of the play, Aston treats Davies as his brother ,
without recourse to any kind of ideological phrase - Christian charity, a sense of
humanity, a desire to help the oppressed - which might clarify and render
comprehensible an otherwise 'mysterious' benevolence.
Mick's Malice Without Why.
Where Aston's actions , however erratic and inexplicable, have mainly positive
benefits (only towards the end provoking unwarranted anger on the part of Davies),
the unpredictability ofMick's own mood-swings reveal a groundless desire to
degrade and torment. Mick's sociopathic spontaneity ("You saying my brother hasn't
got any sense?" 79) represents the inverse of Aston's unmotivated acts of goodness, a
134
darker version of his brother's impromptu benevolence. Where Aston gives without
motivation, Mick attacks without provocation:
DAVIES: ...you been playing me about, you know. I don't know why. I never
done you no harm.
MICK: No, you know what it was? We just got off on the wrong foot. That's all
it was. (56)
In Act Two, Mick adopts an openly aggressive tone against Davies, sadistically
interspersed with friendly, well-meaning interrogatives ("How do you like my
room?" 40, "Sleep well?" 41, "Who do you bank with?" 45). As we saw in the
previous section, Mick employs brief flashes of cordiality and politeness to unsettle
and stun the tramp into terrified confusion. In the third act, the strategy is retained but
reversed: this time, it is Mick's confiding, "straightforward", down-to-earth
behaviour which is foregrounded, sprinkled with incongruous moments of genuine
menace. Consider Mick, asking Davies for his opinion on his brother's laziness, after
forty lines of friendly banter over a shared cheese sandwich:
MICK: I'm coming to the conclusion he's a slow worker...What would your
advice be?
DAVIES: Well...he's a funny bloke, your brother.
MICK: What?
DAVIES:I was saying, he's ...he's a bit of a funny bloke, your brother.
Mick stares at him.
MICK: Funny? Why?
DAVIES: Well...he's funny...
MICK: What's funny about him?
Pause.
DAVIES: Not liking work.
MICK: What's funny about that?
DAVIES :Nothing.
Pause.
MICK: I don't call it funny.
DAVIES: Nor me. (58-9)
Mick's abrupt changes in the social signals he sends out, occurring as they do just
when Davies is beginning to grow confident in his interpretation of them, forever
thwart the tramp's naive hermeneutics. Mick simply does not wish to be ascribed a
characteristic. The unpredictable nature of Mick's behaviour patterns, however much
they resemble the arbitrary whims of a bored monarch, are not without their
philosophical significance. In the exchanges between Mick and Davies, Davies
33 Davies, Meister Eckhart, pl46
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hardly ever asks a question - Mick commands almost all of the interrogatives. It is
Mick who exacts motives, names, assurances from Davies, who perpetuates Davies'
vulnerability by rendering him accountable for his words and actions. Mick, abusing
the privileges of his culture, economic position and physical superiority, needs to
provide no 'why' for his actions. In this sense, Rattigan's comparison ofMick and
Aston to the Gods of the Old and New Testaments may have been more acute than
Pinter gave him credit for. In his alternating abuse and kindness towards Davies,
Mick's manner does resemble the God of Job and Joshua, who 'giveth' one minute
and 'taketh away' the next. From the position of power that Mick enjoys, how could
Davies, the non-paying tenant, ever dare to demand a 'why'? It is Mick who defines
what is "funny" and what is not, who selects which questions are to be asked
(repeatedly, if necessary), who decides when to digress and when to get to the point.
Even if there was a reason behind such gestures, Davies would never be able to ask
for it. Therefore, although Mick's brusque transformations of character form part of a
strategy to disable his victim, at the same time their unpredictability also reflects the
very real sense of power Mick enjoys over his subject.
The impulsive, inexplicable benevolence/malevolence of the two brothers,
however different in their effects, ultimately contributes to the same mood of bizarre
spontaneity which pervades the play. There is no verifiable way of understanding
precisely why Mick goes to such trouble in his psychological torture of Davies,
anymore than there is a clear reason why Aston makes such an effort to help him. Of
course, one could paint Aston as the truly Eckhartian 'Man Without Why', the good
soul who thoughtlessly performs good works with no result in mind; Mick would be
the pathological inverse of such a type, one who provides an inexplicable hostility
alongside Aston's equally inexplicable hospitality. The uncertainty which provides
Aston's unmotivated assistance is the same uncertainty which supplies Mick's
baseless malice. An uncertainty, as we shall now see, which lies central to the textual
instability of the play.
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The Enigma of the Smile.
Blake writes: "There is a Smile of Love,/ And there is a Smile of Deceit, / And
there is a Smile of Smiles / In which these two Smiles meet".34 There are two smiles
in The Caretaker, one reported, one observed, although it is by no means clear
whether they indicate "Love" or "Deceit". The first smile is never seen - the audience
learns of it second-hand through the comprehensive catalogue of complaints about
Aston which Davies makes to Mick, related near the beginning of Act Three (72):
Listen, I wake up in the morning...I wake up in the morning and he's smiling at
me! He's standing there, looking at me, smiling! I can see him, you see, I can see
him thro' the blanket. He puts on his coat, he turns himself round, he looks down
at my bed, there's a smile on his face! What the hell's he smiling at? What he
don't know is that I'm watching him through that blanket...He just looks at me
and he smiles, but he don't know that I can see him doing it!
Davies' anger at a sign he cannot interpret is interesting, reflecting as it does his
yearning for the "straightforward" which Mick, on occasions, is happy to supply. Just
what the hell is Aston smiling at? Is it the smile of a father over his sleeping child?
The smile of the eldest over his sleeping baby brother? That the sight of Davies'
recumbent figure might provoke some sentimental memories is not implausible -
Davies, after all, reminds Mick of his "uncle's brother" (40), someone Esslin
suggests might well be his father. Nevertheless, the possibility that Aston's smile
constitutes some genuinely positive feeling towards Davies' presence is slightly
undermined by the fact that, as Davies points out, Aston completely ignores him
when he is awake: "I mean, we don't have any conversation, you see?" (69). Does the
smile, therefore, represent Aston's hidden, malicious delight at his own deception of
Davies? The smile becomes a secret, something which Aston can only reveal to
Davies when his eyes are closed. The second smile, occurring at the end of the play
after Mick has smashed the Buddha statue, does nothing to clarify matters:
DAVIES: What about me?
Silence. MICK does not look at him.
34 lines 1-4 of "The Smile" - found in David Erdman (ed), Poetry and Prose ofWilliam Blake (New
York: Doubleday, 1979) p474
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A door bangs.
Silence. They do not move.
ASTON comes in. He closes the door, moves into the room andfaces MICK.
They look at each other. Both are smiling, faintly.
MICK (beginning to speak to ASTON): Look...uh... (83-4)
'Faint smiles' which bring to mind once more Trussler's suspicions of a "pre-
or
arranged plot". In a sense, the smiles in The Caretaker (both reported and observed)
introduce a vacuous aporia into the text, one which forever has us in circles, chasing
our hermeneutical tails. The meaning of Aston's unmotivated charity - in short,
whether a sinister motive lies beneath it - depends on whether the clandestine smile,
reported by Davies, are smiles of "Love" or "Deceit". And yet we cannot know
whether Aston's smile reflects "Love" or "Deceit" until we are sure of the motives
behind Aston's charity. The uncertain significance of Aston's actions can only be
explained by the enigma of the smile, which can only be explained by referring to the
significance of Aston's actions. It is a lacuna in the text which prevents the
interpreter from remaining conclusively with one of two equally flawed readings,
both of which contain within themselves elements which justify the other: either a
play about two scheming brothers who ensnare a helpless tramp to play psychological
games with (but how easily can the convincingly vulnerable picture of Aston's
mental instability be explained away as 'scheming'?), or the story of a released
mental patient who falls prey to the schemes of a thieving vagrant, and is ultimately
rescued by a violent but loyal younger brother (but why the cunning smiles of
complicity between the two brothers at the end?). Like Ruth's enigmatic farewell to
Teddy as the end of The Homecoming ("Don't become a stranger"), a remark whose
ultimately unverifiable intentions render its meaning undecidably ironic or serious,
the cryptic smiles of Aston and Mick keep us forever switching between two
alternative sets of data, neither of which can ever wholly account for the actions in
the play. Such smiles possess multiple significations, none of which can be
satisfactorily 'justified' by the text without some degree of problemata arising. As the
poet says, Aston's smile over the sleeping tramp oscillates impossibly between both
35
Trussler, The Plays ofHarold Pinter, pi 82
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"Love" and "Deceit" - textually, it constitutes an irresolvable "Smile of Smiles/ In
which these two Smiles meet."
3.2.4 A Semiotic Reading : Davies as the Wandering Text.
This signifier of little, this discourse that doesn't amount to much, is like all
ghosts: errant. It rolls this way and that, like someone who has lost his way...like
someone who has lost his rights, an outlaw, a pervert, a bad seed, a vagrant, an
adventurer , a bum. Wandering in the streets, he doesn't even know who he is,
what his name is...uprooted , anonymous, unattached to any house or country,
this almost insignificant signifier is at everyone's disposal, can be picked up by
both the competent and the incompetent, by those who...knowing nothing about
it, can inflict all manner of impertinence upon it.
- Dissemination , 143-44
Having gone to some lengths to show the indeterminacy of meaning in The
Caretaker, the object of this final section is to suggest a new reading of The
Caretaker, a reading whose intention is not by any means to reveal some hitherto
undiscovered 'truth' about the play (one which might set it ludicrously 'above' other
interpretations), but simply to examine how the play relates to the exclusive
concerns of this project. It is, in a sense, an unashamedly Derridean appropriation
(and not a 'deconstruction') of The Caretaker, one which sets the issue of textuality,
interpretation and its related problems as the central concern of the play.
Derrida's persistent fascination with the errant nature of the sign, once it is
"abandoned to its essential drifting"36, and his imagery of vagrancy and adoption in
-37
describing the consequences of "being severed from its referent" make The
Caretaker, from a deconstructionist point of view, a particularly apt choice of play.
The story of a homeless tramp with an unreliable memory and a false name,
wandering in search of an illusory set of ID papers and unable to recall his origins,
who tries to win favour with two brothers by constantly presenting and re-presenting
images of himself in accordance with their expectations...such a story has all the
ingredients of a Derridean parable, complete with ready-made characters (the Errant
Bum, the Generous Reader, the Malicious Appropriator) and an elusive moral.
36Jacques Derrida, Margins ofPhilosophy(trans. Alan Bass, Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982) p317
37 ibid 318
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Precisely how does the character of Davies resemble Derrida's wandering
sign? How efficiently does a play like The Caretaker translate into dramatic fiction
the implications of philosophical texts such as "Signature, Event, Context" and
Dissemination? Perhaps 'rootlessness' is the first and most obvious indicator of
Davies' semantic vagrancy:
ASTON: Where were you born, then?
DAVIES {darkly)-. What do you mean?
ASTON: Where were you born?
DAVIES: I was...uh...oh, it's a bit hard, like, to set your mind back...see what I
mean...going back...a good way...lose a bit of track, like ...you know...(34)
"Not to know where one comes from...is not to know how to speak at all" writes
TO
Derrida. Not only does Davies' mysterious amnesia physically prevent him from
talking about the past, it also prevents him from asserting himself in the present.
Davies, in a sense, is a signifier who no longer recalls whatever it was he was
supposed to signify. This absence of origins instigates the tramp's insecurity and
explains the constant references to his "rights", "rights" which for Davies are not
'self-evident' but tenuously linked to his own fragile, shifting sense of identity. A
kind of Caspar Hauser figure, adrift without a past in world which insistently seems
to ask him about it, Davies' hopes of 'legitimising' himself - of 'recovering' the
original meaning of his existence - lie (of all places) in Sidcup:
DAVIES: I got my papers there!
Pause.
ASTON: What are they doing at Sidcup?
DAVIES: A man I know has got them. I left them with him. You see? They
prove who I am! I can't move without them papers. They tell you who I am. You
see? I'm stuck without them. (29)
Much has been written about the philosophical import of "them papers" which
needn't be repeated here - the existential validity they lend to Davies' existence,
their symbolism as a kind of epistemological guarantor , the theological speculations
concerning the "man I know", and so on. Pinter, possibly anticipating such esoteric
interpretations, quite rightly deflates them in advance by placing Western Man's
ontological raison d'etre not in Rome or Jerusalem but in Sidcup, Kent. What is
interesting is how Davies feels paralysed without a referent - as if he were afraid of
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straying into new, unfamiliar contexts without the reassuring presence of an
originary meaning to tell people who he 'is'. The idea that one's living (and even
one's life) may depend on a collection of papers does make us think of K. at the
beginning of The Trial, rifling through his bureau for the precious
Legitimationspapiere - unlike Josef K., who is ultimately condemned for possessing
the identity he has, Davies seems rather to suffer for not possessing any identity at
all.
In fact, it is Davies' aboriginality, the uncertainty surrounding his 'real'
name, which seems to be the key factor in his ultimate misfortune. Davies is no
Ruth, who takes advantage of Lenny's unfamiliarity with her background to tease
and confound him. Whereas Ruth uses the indeterminacy of her own identity to
puzzle and exploit her would-be 'interpreters', the uncertainty of Davies' identity
allows Mick to impose whatever identity he wishes upon the tramp ("...you're a born
fibber" 43, "You stink" 44, "...you're a man of the world" 57, "You're an interior
decorator" 80). Davies' namelessness - that is, his inability to supply the
documentary evidence of his original name - is negative, depicted as a state of
vulnerability, not unpredictability; rather than the freedom of being able to adopt
whatever name one chooses, not to have a name for Davies means to have to submit
to whatever name is imposed upon him. Davies' non-existent biography effectively
OQ
means he is - as Derrida would say - "at everyone's disposal".
Hence the tramp's desperate search for any identity which might make him
feel 'at home'. Davies, the errant text with no history or author to speak for him,
spends the entire play looking for a context, a desire for stability which ultimately
plays him right into Mick's manipulative hands. One might even say Davies finds,
in Aston and Mick, two kinds of reader: a passive reader and an exploitative one. In
the first act, Davies' benevolent reception from the patient, softly-spoken Aston
encourages him to construct and develop, with increasing confidence, a general
image of himself as a clean-living, deserving, honest Englishman, unfairly dismissed
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I might have been on the road for a few years but you can take it from me I'm
clean. (18)
I might have been on the road but nobody's got more rights than I have. (19)
I'm not the sort of man who wants to take any liberties. (35)
...they're trying to do away with these foreigners, you see, in catering. They want
an Englishman to pour their tea, that's what they want... (36)
Each of these four assertions is wholly undermined by evidence in the play - Aston's
insistence upon the open window reveals the olfactory truth about Davies'
'cleanliness'; the absence of any papers throws doubts upon his "rights"; Davies'
rummaging about the flat in Aston's absence shows he is precisely the sort of man
who would want to take "liberties"; finally, the tramp's claim to be an "Englishman"
is ridiculed not only by his allegedly 'real' name ("Mac Davies") but also by a
complete inability to recall any place of birth - at one point, Aston even suggests he
is Welsh.
As we have seen in the previous section, it is difficult to discern whether
Aston is a passive or simply a naive reader of Davies' signs. Despite the obvious
disparity between the image Davies constructs and the image the audience actually
receives, his listener - although not particularly forthcoming with assurances - raises
few objections. At no point does Aston attempt to inscribe upon Davies his own
preconceived notions of who Davies might be, nor contradict any of the tramp's
assertions with an interpretation of his own. Aston's 'open' hermeneutics allows
Davies' text to unfold as it is, without being duped or coerced into a pre-arranged
context.
With Mick's appearance at the beginning of Act II, Davies comes face to
face with a different kind of interpreter - one who, unlike Aston, refuses to allow
Davies any kind of textual space in which to proffer a reading of himself. Cynical
and suspicious, Davies' new reader receives nothing from him unquestioningly,
forces him to repeat his name continually, even calling into question his much-
prized Englishness ("You a foreigner?...Born and bred in the British Isles?" 42). The
most oft-cited words in The Caretaker, delivered by Mick to Davies near the very
end of the play, reveal more about Mick than they do about Davies (82):
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What a strange man you are. Aren't you? You're really strange. Ever since you
come into this house there's been nothing but trouble. Honest. I can take nothing
you say at face value. Every word you speak is open to any number of different
interpretations.
As most critics have commented, the irony in Mick's accusations of strangeness is
undeniable, especially when he goes on to call Davies "violent", "erratic" and
"completely unpredictable" (82). The moment is obviously comic - Mick the shape-
changer, who has bullied and tormented the tramp for almost an hour of stage-time
with his split personality, is now the symbol of enraged common sense, accusing
him of violence, inconsistency and deceit. Nevertheless, when Mick accuses Davies'
speech of being "open to any number of interpretations", he is quite serious. Mick
not only believes in the openness of Davies' language, he is delighted with it - this
absence of any context or background which might have given Davies' words a
specific meaning is precisely what Mick has been exploiting all along. Had Davies
already possessed a context of his own - in other words, had he possessed a
background, a job, an address, a proper name - then Mick would hardly have been
able to supply so many different ones.
Throughout the play, Mick effectively 're-reads' Davies, changing his
interpretation each time. The method operates in two ways: when in 'hostile' mode,
Mick aggressively imposes his own context upon Davies, using his education, youth
and position to enforce his reading . When 'friendly' to Davies, Mick lures him into
his context, convincing the tramp of his own reading through flattery and promises.
Thus, in his first encounter with Davies, Mick is quick to interpret Davies' actions
as those of an illegal squatter ("You got no business wandering about an unfurnished
flat" 44), a "fibber" and a thief ("This bag's very familiar" 47). By maliciously
offering to sell the flat to him, Mick reminds Davies of his inferior socio-economic
status, offering the tramp credit terms and instalment deals with degrading irony.
The proffered text of Davies the Dignified Tramp, fallen on hard times through no
fault of his own, becomes Davies the Thieving Scrounger, ready to steal the first
thing he can lay his hands on.
On his second encounter with Davies, Mick initiates a new, more sympathetic
reading of his "brother's guest", dismissing his previous interpretation as having
"got off on the wrong foot" (56). With slow, gentle tones of assurance, Mick
143
disarms the tramp's wariness with a version of Davies that practically includes him
in the family - "...you're my brother's friend, aren't you?" (56). Requesting opinions
on his brother's laziness, admiring his "impressive" self-assertiveness, confiding in
him his plans for a dream "penthouse"...Mick is sadistically aware of the tramp's
need for an identity, and offers Davies role after role, context after context -
confidant, bosom-buddie, man-of-the-world, even war veteran:
MICK: Well, I could see before, when you took out that knife, that you wouldn't
let anyone mess you about.
DAVIES: No one messes me about, man.
MICK: I mean, you've been in services, haven't you?
DAVIES: The what?
MICK: You been in the services. You can tell by your stance.
DAVIES: Oh...yes. Spent half my life there, man. Overseas...like...serving...1
was.
MICK: In the colonies, weren't you?
DAVIES: I was over there. I was one of the first over there.
MICK: That's it. You're just the man I been looking for. (60)
Mick is so effective at engineering contexts, he even gets Davies to create his own.
A simple prompt and Davies is off, busily re-writing himself as a hardened, self-
disciplined soldier with years of experience in the colonies, presumably keeping the
Empire safe from "them Blacks". The speed with which Davies sweepingly re-
describes his past in the space of three sentences ("Spent half my life
there...")reveals to us two things. Firstly, how desperately eager Davies is to fulfil
the slightest expectation presented to him - whether it is feigning a knowledge of
Buddhism or carpentry, or claiming an ability to re-furnish a flat. Rousseauistic
resonances aside, there is something movingly pathetic about Davies' desire for
semantic stability, the way Mick plays so easily with the tramp's need for an
ontological home. Unlike the Eckhartian soul and the Derridean text, whose joyful,
centreless errancies celebrate the loss of the centre and the pathlessness of the way
before it, Davies' wandering is anguished and involuntary, a constant desire for
stability. Secondly, no one who had a past could produce a fictitious one so quickly -
the absence of Davies' background facilitates this lightning re-description of himself
. In a sense, Davies claims cannot constitute "lies", as Mick says, for the tramp can
recall no "truth" about his past which might make his claims mendacious. They are
simply different stories from the mouth of a wandering amnesiac.
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This absence of Davies' Urtext not only assists the tramp's desperate self-
creation and re-creation, it also makes possible Mick's final reading of Davies in his
work of exploitative hermeneutics - the transition from Davies the Interior Decorator
to Davies the Impostor. When Mick finds out that Davies won't be able to fit "teal-
blue linoleum squares" and have their colours "re-echoed in the walls" after all, the
'truth' is revealed:
MICK: Christ, I must have been under a false impression!
DAVIES: I never said it!
MICK: You're a bloody impostor, mate!
DAVIES: Now you don't want to say that sort of thing to me. You took me on
here as a caretaker...I never said nothing about that...you start calling me names-
MICK: What is your name?
DAVIES: Don't start that -
MICK:No, what's your real name?
DAVIES: My real name's Davies.
MICK: What's the name you go under?
DAVIES: Jenkins!
MICK: You got two names. What about the rest? Eh? (82)
Faced with a text of no origin, Mick is the malicious, uninformed reader, one of
those "who, knowing nothing about it, can inflict all manner of impertinence upon
it." (Dissemination, 144). Mick's feigned indignation at the 'discovery' of his own
misreading is the coup de grace in his torment of Davies. He is too busy faking his
anger at a misinterpretation he deliberately engineered, to ask how a man without a
past can be an impostor. Having imposed so many identities upon him, Mick
ironically castigates Davies for the very non-identity which permitted his
proliferation of readings in the first place. Nevertheless, after having described and
re-described Davies so many times ("Listen, sonny. You stink." 44, "You don't
stink." 79, "...you stink from arsehole to breakfast time" 83), perhaps Mick, in his
final and conclusive reading of Davies as Impostor, arrives closest towards the
'truth' about Davies' 'non-truth', the fact that Davies has no 'proper' name, just an
endless potentiality for improper ones. Both Aston and Mick may well have
understood this deeper 'homelessness' of Davies' from the very beginning; only
their reactions towards Davies' amnesia were different - where Aston chose to
accept and to welcome, Mick resolved to appropriate.
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Thus, the final image of the wanderer glimpsed at the end of The Caretaker is
a negative one, the tramp adrift and helpless , unable to affirm the absence of his
origins as freedom, but simply resenting his aboriginality as 'lack', as something
from which he must recover. Bruce Chatwin writes in The Songlines (itself a treatise
on aboriginality and an anthology of errancy):
Yet, in the East, they still preserve the once universal concept: that wandering
re-establishes the original harmony which once existed between man and the
40
universe.
There is no re-establishment of "original harmony" in Davies' wandering. Such a
general celebration of the thought of non-destination - the re-affirmation of
wandering as the 'natural' state of things - is echoed to a certain extent in Eckhart
and Derrida, but finds no place in The Caretaker. Whereas the Eckhartian soul
wanders as a means of joyfully achieving identity with the nothingness and non-
location of the Godhead, Davies' centrelessness only brings him anguish and
humiliation. Where Derrida's "joyous ...wandering without return" refuses to lament
the loss of one's origins and affirms an exhilarating "freedom",41 Davies is unable to
see his peregrinary condition as nothing but woeful exposure to the Other (be it
"them Blacks", a vindictive "Scotchman", "them bastard monks" or a malicious,
unpredictable landlord). In the end, the Buddha statue makes a mockery of Davies'
own rootless wanderings, a peregrination which ends in humiliation, not
enlightenment. In contrast to Eckhart and Derrida, the errancy of The Caretaker is
neither joyeuse nor liberating, but simply another synonym for miserable
vulnerability.
40 Bruce Chatwin, The Songlines (London: Picador, 1987) p200






4.1 The Welcoming of the Mystery : Eckhartian 'emptiness' and
Derridean 'openness'.
The Other resembles God.
- Levinas1
To absolutely welcome the Other is to preserve the Other as a state of
irreducible uncertainty, to suspend the desire to as-certain exactly who or what the
Other is, to suppress the wish to name, to avoid assimilating or incorporating the
other into a reassuringly familiar vocabulary. The object of this chapter will be to
compare the Eckhartian/Derridean response to the uncertainty of the 'infinitely
Other', to examine the terms of 'emptiness' and 'openness' which they subsequently
invoke, and to try and understand how Eckhart's idea of description/conception as
doing violence upon the Other is in part adopted, in part rejected by Derrida.
As some of the most interesting aspects of Derrida's understanding of
otherness can be discerned from his early work on Levinas, I will be examining an
initial scepticism on the part of Derrida towards the idea of a 'non-violent
phenomenology', in contrast to a much more recent re-assertion of his position vis-a-
vis Levinas and the 'welcome of the Other'.
In comparing Eckhartian 'emptiness' and Derridean 'openness' towards the
Other, three difficulties lie before us: firstly, the disparity between both Levinas and
Derrida's Other, which may be a 'mystery' but is not necessarily a synonym for God,
and Eckhart's divinely unnameable Other, with whom the intention is ultimately to
achieve union. Secondly, there is the problematic juncture of Greek and Old
Testament thought in Eckhart, reader of Proclus and Maimonides, the meeting
within Eckhart's writings of two traditions - the Neoplatonic God of emanating
oneness and simplicity ("...the pure being of divine unity which is being beyond
1 cit. by Derrida in Writing and Difference (trans. Alan Bass, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1978) 142
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being") and the concealed, unspeakable God of Exodus whose face no man may see
("the hidden darkness of the eternal Godhead [which] never shall be known"). Such
a synthesis of Greek and Hebrew thought in Eckhart, though obviously not exclusive
to the Dominican, is not without parallels to Levinas' own work, and makes
Derrida's critique of Levinas' "non-Greek" attempt to slay his "Greek father" (that is,
his attempt as a Jewish thinker to escape Greek metaphysics and thus "break with
Parmenides") all the more interesting.4 Finally, there is the genuine disparity between
Derrida's early 1964 critique of Levinas, admiring yet highly critical, and his
repeated affirmations in later years of a deeper affinity between Levinas' writings and
his own. A disparity which will make it all the more difficult to ascertain exactly
where Derrida stands in relation to Eckhartian geldzenheit.
4.1.1 Gelassenheit - Preserving the Uncertain.
Scholar:...even releasement can still be thought of as within the domain of the
will, as is the case with old masters of thought such as Meister Eckhart.
Teacher: From whom, all the same, much can be learned.
-Heidegger5
Both Derrida and Heidegger acknowledge the centrality of Eckhart to any
genealogy of Gelassenheit (in medieval German geldzenheit), a word invariably
translated as 'detachment', 'releasement' or 'letting-be'. Heidegger, although willing
elsewhere to testify to Eckhart's "sharpness and depth of thinking"6, is keen to have
his Scholar in the tripartite discussion within Gelassenheit distance himself from the
mystic's original geldzenheit, which is (says Heidegger's Scholar) nothing more than
-j
"casting off sinful selfishness and letting self-will go in favour of the divine will".
Whether this is the only way to appropriate Eckhart's concept, we shall see in a
moment.
201iver Davies(ed), Meister Eckhart: Selected VVnfr'ngs(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994) p235 - taken
from the sermon Renovamini spiritu
3
M.O'C.Walshe(ed),A/eisrer Eckhart: German Sermons and Treatises (London: Watkins, 1979) vol
II, p 249 from the sermon Haec dicit dominus
4
Writing and Difference, 89
5Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit (trans, by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund [London: Harper
& Row, 1966]) p62
6 Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978) p71
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Derrida, in a passage discussing the way negative theology "lets passage, lets
the other be", speaks of "the tradition of Gelassenheit which goes from Eckhart, at
least, to Heidegger".8 In part etymologically responsible for the word Gelassenheit, to
what extent is Eckhart's exhortation to "leave God to himself' and adopt a "complete
openness" (ledeger offenung) towards the divine Other9 analogous to Derrida's
"absolute openness"?10 It is a question which might best be answered by first
examining how 'violence upon the Other' is understood in Eckhart's sermons, and
how one can invite the Otherness of God into the soul whilst still respecting its
infinite and unspeakable alterity.
Doing Violence upon God.
In Chapter Two of this project, we examined how Eckhart, following
Avicenna in establishing God as a "being to whom nothing is, or can be, similar"11,
embarked upon a critique of presence which came to insist that no name could
adequately represent the ineffability of God. Having seen why we cannot name God,
we shall now take a moment to consider why Eckhart says we should not name God.
Eckhart's attitude towards the naming of God - whether such names are used to
invoke, perceive or conceive - is not without its ambiguities. In insisting upon the
oneness and the nameless simplicity of God, Eckhart takes up a familiar Neoplatonic
motif and therefore also adopts a characteristically Dionysian understanding of what
names are - that is, a consequence of the descent from oneness into multiplicity,
symptoms of the fragmentary fall from perfect, nameless unity into an imperfect
profusion of names. The farther a name is from the source, the greater its
dissimilarity.
7 Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit (trans, by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund [London: Harper
& Row, 1966] )p62
8
"Post-Scriptum" in Harold Coward and Toby Foshay(eds), Derrida and Negative Theology (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1992) p 316
9
Davies, Meister Eckhart, p245
10 taken from a transcript of the discussion "Perhaps or Maybe" in Midgley(ed), Responsibilities of
Deconstruction (Coventry: Parousia Press, 1997)
11 James M. Clark, Meister Eckhart (London: Nelson & Sons, 1957) pl79, taken from Avicenna's
Metaphysicae IX: 1
150
Although Dionysius acknowledges at the very beginning of The Divine Names
that it is "with a wise silence" that we best "do honour to the Inexpressible"12, names
are seen more as being 'obstructive' than 'violent', emanations which potentially
could return one to the source: "The Good returns all things to itself and gathers
together the scattered".13 The possibility that to name God might be to inflict an act
of injustice upon Him, whilst not completely absent from The Divine Names, does
not seem to be a central concern of Dionysius'.
In sermons such as Misit dominus manum suam, Eckhart initially seems to
adopt a similar line. Although God is "above names and nature", nevertheless "some
names are permitted to us, with which the saints have addressed him." (Doch sint uns
die namen erloubet, da mite in die heiligen genant hdnt...).14 This echoes the
Thomist compromise on names found in the Summa, where Aquinas resolves that
although names "do not signify what God is", each one nevertheless "signifies him in
an imperfect manner".15 Elsewhere, however, in sermons such as Quasi Stella
matutina and Quasi vas auri, Eckhart seems to go further than both Dionysius and
Aquinas in seeing names not only as inadequate but also unjust, reductive,
exploitative and ultimately violent.
This association of eponymy with violence, this linking of the name or image,
however praiseworthy, with the unethical imposition of force and gewalt, finds its
beginnings in an understanding of naming as a kind of deceitfulness. The prophets
who glimpsed God and were struck dumb by what they saw are praised by Eckhart
because "they preferred silence to lies"{...das si swigen vnd wolten nicht liegen)}6
Why is to name necessarily to lie? The word Eckhart uses for 'lies' is liegen - he
does not say 'error', 'inadequate' or 'foolish' but lies. Why is the attempt to convey
12
Pseudo-Dionysius : The Complete WorLs(trans. Colm Luibheid, London: SPCK , 1987) p50
13
ibid, p75. Grosseteste, the 13th century commentator on Dionysius, best sums up this idea of
multiplicity as a means of returning to the oneness: "Without material forms and figures...we shall
eventually contemplate the divine and intellectual beings, yet we shall not be able to attain to this
contemplation unless we first use both the uplifting forms and the material figures." A.J.Minnis &
A.B.Scott, Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism Circa 1100-1375 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988) pl69
14
Davies, Selected Writings, pl29 - Sermon 53 in Quint, Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und
lateinischen Werke (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1936ff) 2:534
15 Summa Theologiae, Question XIII, reply to Objection 1 - found in A. Hyman & J.Walsh,
Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co., 1973) p492
16
Davies, Meister Eckhart, pl37 - from the sermon Eratis etiim aliquando tenebrae, Sermon 50 in
Quint, 2:454
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the incommensurability of God, however admittedly futile, construed by Eckhart to
be an intentional, conscious "travesty of the truth"?
There is little in Eckhart's brief sermon which might help us on this question-
Eckhart talks a great deal about the reasons for the prophets' silence, but offers no
elaboration on why the attempt to break with such a silence might be considered
mendacious. In another sermon, Renovamini spiritu, the word 'lies' liegen occurs
again: "...do not chatter about God, for by chattering about him, you tell lies and
commit a sin"(...<?o von swig vnd klafe nit von gotte; wande mit dem, so dv von ime
claffest, so Ingest db, so tustu svnde).17 The same idea presents itself: silence
concerning God is authenticity, sincerity, whilst any attempt to name God or discuss
His nature is to knowingly mis-represent a truth. And yet, in the case of an ineffable
God, one may indeed pronounce errors, but how can anyone lie?
Eckhart's cynicism towards the act of naming becomes clearer if we read the
Rabbi Maimonides, whose twelfth century Guide of the Perplexed (a work Eckhart
cites and would have read in a Latin translation, Doctor Perplexorum), whilst
refraining from the word 'lie', vilifies those who would try to talk about God and
thereby affront His ineffability. Maimonides' negative description of such sophistry
is interesting, insofar as he discerns a subtle will-to-power in their speculations. He
speaks of so-called poets and preachers who "spent great efforts on sermons ...they
1 R
compiled and through which, in their opinion, they come nearer to God". Such
sophists are insincere interpreters, who "derive from [the scriptures] inferences and
secondary conclusions, and found upon them various kinds of discourses." For
Maimonides, the danger in attributing names and predicates to God is not just one of
intellectual pride ("...they think what they speak is poetry") but also the exploitation
of the "multitude who listen to these utterances". 9 Ultimately, he is indeed a liar who
"apprehends the deficiency of those speeches and yet uses those speeches". For God
is nameless: therefore, to know this and still to name Him is a lie.
Maimonides (or Rabbi Moyses, as Eckhart calls him) helps us to understand
Eckhart's unease with names and descriptions. He allows us an insight into why
17
ibid, p236- Sermon 83 in Quint 3:442
18 Guide of the Perplexed, ch. 59, in Hyman & Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages,p?>16
19 ibid, p377
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Eckhart's sermons give the impression of one who simply does not trust names, nor
the reasons why people use them. In fact, the Dominican's insistence on the
mendacity of the cataphatic reveals a deeper suspicion about all discourse on God in
general, and leads him along a more cynical route away from Dionysius' slightly
more positive (albeit temporary) acceptance of imperfect names and images. In many
of Eckhart's sermons, names and images of God are invariably linked with
metaphors of reification and violence:
If anyone said that God was good, he would do Him as great an injustice as if he
called the sun black.
Wer da spraeche daz got guot waere, der taete im als unrehte, als ob er die
sunnen swarz hieze.20
The incommunicability of God's Otherness is so complete that even the highest
compliments do nothing more than commit an act of injustice (unreht) upon the
totaliter alter of the Godhead. Any names or images we try to impose on God
through an act of will, instead of letting Him be, only serve to obstruct his flowing
into us - a situation Eckhart calls our 'unpreparedness':
But we do violence to him and wrong by obstructing him in his natural work
through our unpreparedness.
Aber wir tuon im gewalt und unreht mit dem, daz wir in sines natiurlichen
werkes hindern mit unser unbereitschaft.2'
We will, in a moment, examine this overcoming of 'unpreparedness' - that is,
through the soul's emptying of all images and names concerning God - in greater
detail. For now, the most important thing to note - in terms of our project - is how,
for Eckhart, description connotes violence, the equating together of unequal things.
Eckhart feels this so strongly that he is often driven to quite striking metaphors:
...if a man thinks he will get more of God by meditation, by devotion...than by
the fireside or in the stable - that is nothing but taking God, wrapping a cloak
round His head and shoving Him under a bench. {In hoc apparuit).
20 Clark , Meister Eckhart, p207, from the sermon Quasi Stella matutina - German taken from Josef
Quint, Textbuch zurMystik des deutschen Mittelalters (Halle: M.Niemeyer, 1952) pl2
21 Davies , Meister Eckhart, p41 - German taken from Josef Quint, Meister Eckhart: die deutschen und
lateinischen Werke (Stuttgart, 1936ff) vol 5., Traktat 2, p281
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You behave as if you made of God a candle in order to seek something with it,
and when one finds the thing one seeks, the candle is thrown away.(Omne datum
optimum).
But there are people who want to see God with the same eyes with which they
look at a cow...you love it for the milk and the cheese and for your own
profit.(<2j<asi vas auri).22
What Eckhart suggests - and what is so interesting to our own investigations - is not
only that God can be used, but that names and images facilitate this use. To name is
to reify, to turn something into an object, an object which (potentially) can suit our
purposes, fit our designs. This Eckhartian distrust of the desire to name and describe
reminds us, in OfGrammatology, of the moment where Derrida playfully juggles
with the image of writing as zoography - "the capture of the living", the notion of
representation as that which constitutes "the magical capture and murder" of the
"hunted beast".23 The fact that the act of naming carries with it an implied position of
power presents an obvious problem for the believer who wishes to speak about the
Ineffable with any degree of humility. Eckhart cannot ignore these implications of the
name, as his repeated warnings against the 'using' of God to obtain one's own ends
testifies. Does Adam, in Genesis 2:19, not name the animals he is to keep and raise?
The will to name, to conceptualise God, to understand Him (and why, as St
Augustine asked, would anyone want a God they could understand?24) really is for
Eckhart nothing more than "taking God, wrapping a cloak round His head and
shoving Him under a bench". Although it appears in a wide selection of his sermons
with varying degrees of intensity, Eckhart never really abandons this association of
eponymy with the imposition of power - like Maimonides, he sees the will to know,
and to speak about what one knows, as carrying with it all too often a more selfish
will to control, use and exploit. Unlike the genuine desire to know God - the desire
which "wants Him where he has no name"25 - Eckhart fears a desire which sees the
name as fitting its own purposes, as a means of obtaining its own ends, and certainly
22 the three quotations (in order) taken from : Walshe, Meister Eckhart, vol 1, pi 17; Clark , Meister
Eckhart, pl73; Schiirmann, Meister Eckhart, pl02
23
Jacques Derrida, OfGrammatology (trans. G.C.Spivak, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1976) 292.
24
Augustine, Sermon 117, ch. 3, n.5
25 Schiirmann ,Meister Eckhart, p57, from the sermon Mulier, venit hora et nunc est
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not as a temporary, Neoplatonic stage of return towards a primordial, nameless
Oneness.
Thus, the acts of naming and conceptualising finds a negative response in
Eckhart not simply because of their analogical inadequacy, but also for their
implications of force and gewalt. However, there is a third reason why names and
images have no place in the soul's ultimate union with God - a reason which, above
all else, is semiotic in nature, and has more to do with the sign indicating an absence,
than any notion of violence or insufficiency. In Eckhart's sermon on the conversion
of St Paul, Surrexit autem Saulus, he speaks of four reasons why the soul does not
name God.
The third reason is that [the soul] does not have enough time to name Him. It
cannot turn away long enough from love. It can pronounce no other word than
love.
Daz dritte: si enhate so vil zites tiiht, daz si in genante. Si enkan so lange von
minne niht gekeren; si enmac kein ander wort geleisten wan minne.26
To name is not to love; to love is not to name. Eckhart's point is simple: when one is
in the presence of something, no name for it is needed. Only when the thing is taken
away does one need a name to talk about it. Eckhart, unlike many of his scholastic
contemporaries, does not simply realise that the sign stands in for something, that it
indicates an absence, not a presence - a semiology of lack cynically summed up
elsewhere by Derrida: "The sign is always a sign of the Fall. Absence always relates
97
to distance from God". He is also keenly aware that discourse about God can only
take place when God is not present - and Eckhart is much more interested in
experiencing God than talking about Him. Names are opposed to love because they
necessitate the absence of the beloved - only by "turning away" from God can one
name Him. And it is precisely in this idea of 'experiencing' an unmediated encounter
with God, the possibility that one can mistakenly "turn away" from the presence of
God towards an inferior name or image, that Derrida's deconstructive scepticism - as
we shall see - inevitably distinguishes itself from the apophatic discourse. For




Derrida, it is never a question of renouncing the plenitude of the ineffable for a mere
name - one is simply turning from one sign to another.
Silence and Stillness: Emptying the Temple.
The finest thing that we can say of God is to be silent concerning him from the
wisdom of inner riches. - Meister Eckhart28
Having examined how all attempts to talk about God, for Eckhart, constitute an act of
injustice and even violence upon Him, principally because they all contain within
them something "alien and untrue", the question remains: how exactly are we meant
to contemplate, and ultimately welcome in, the radical Otherness of God? If all
names carry within them the potential to violently reduce God, then with what name
are we meant to invoke Him? If all representation involves the reductive yoking of
images to the essentially imageless, then what images can we use at all? If all images,
marks and noises only serve to 'push' the divine ipseity away from us, then it seems -
at least for Eckhart - God must remain infinitely Other to all our discourses.
Eckhart avoids this epistemological (not to say spiritual) blind alley through
his insistence on the soul remaining "empty" and "open" to God. It is a passive
'opening-up' of the soul towards the Godhead, one which does not attempt to graft
images and concepts onto the divine Other, but simply "lets God be" within the
ground of the soul. Hence Eckhart's radical interpretation of Matthew 21:12, where
Jesus drives the money-lenders out of the temple. For Eckhart, the temple is the soul,
which needs to be emptied of images and conceptions (in this case, the vendors and
the money-lenders) before God can dwell there:
When the temple becomes free of hindrances, that is from attachment to self and
ignorance, then it is so radiantly clear...that no-one can match its radiance but the
uncreated God alone.
Swenne dirre tempel alsus ledic wirt von alien hindemissen, daz ist eigenschaft
und unbekantheit, so blicket er also schone...daz im nieman widerschinen mac
dan der ungeschaffene got aleine. 29
Once again, like attracts like: if the soul is to achieve union with God, it can only do
so by becoming as imageless and nameless - "as free as nothingness is free" - as God
28
Davies, Meister Eckhart, p236
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Himself. Who are the money-lenders Jesus ejects? They are those people, both good
and bad, who have a concept of God, a concept they can commodify and use for their
own profit, a concept to which they can chain the motivations for their actions, the
goal for all their works. God cannot dwell in the temple as long as it is cluttered up
with such "merchants".
Such an emphasis on "clearing" the temple of all metaphysical preconceptions
and apparatus does bring us closer not only to Heidegger's description ofDasein as a
Lichtung or 'clearing', but also nearer indirectly to Derrida. Not surprisingly,
Heideggerian readings of Eckhart such as those of Caputo and Schiirmann
unambiguously associate Eckhart's ground of the soul with Heidegger's Lichtung,
"the openness in which beings appear...freed from the dominance of representation
and possession."30, whilst carefully retaining the difference in contexts. It is a caution
we must replicate on our own part: the fact that Eckhartian gelazenheit influenced
Heideggerian Gelassenheit, which in turn forms a central element in Derrida's
critique of metaphysics, does not automatically mean that Eckhart's opening-up of
the soul towards God is identical with Derrida's opening up of oneself to the play of
the world. As we shall see in his critique of Levinas, Derrida will have a number of
problems with Eckhart's attitude towards the violence of the image and the name,
and with the idea that one can somehow 'bypass' such violence to obtain an
unmediated 'experience' of the Other.
4.1.2 Derridean Reservations
In exploring the text of "Violence and Metaphysics" to illustrate Derrida's
differences with Eckhart's apophatic discourse, two points should be kept in mind:
firstly, that concerning the essentially violent nature of all representation (graphic and
phonetic), both Eckhart and Derrida are in perfect agreement. It is the 'innocent'
status of the subject of this violence, and the idea that we can ever avoid such
violence completely, that provides the basis of the disjunction between Eckhart and
Derrida's critique of representation. Secondly, insofar as Eckhart never privileges
29
ibid, 155- Sermon 1 in Quint 1:12
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firstly, that concerning the essentially violent nature of all representation (graphic and
phonetic), both Eckhart and Derrida are in perfect agreement. It is the 'innocent'
status of the subject of this violence, and the idea that we can ever avoid such
violence completely, that provides the basis of the disjunction between Eckhart and
Derrida's critique of representation. Secondly, insofar as Eckhart never privileges
speech over writing - for the Dominican, all attempts to represent God are
inadequate, be they written, painted, sung or murmured - he escapes the charges of
• ^ 1
phonocentricity which Derrida aims at Saussure, Rousseau and Levi-Strauss.
However, although Eckhart appears to have the deconstructionist's healthy suspicion
of representation, be it phoneme or grapheme, the question remains as to what kind
of reservations Derrida nurtures towards Eckhart's gelazenheit - in particular, the
possibility of experiencing the infinite Otherness of God in a space bereft of signs,
names and images. Reservations which, I will argue, are best examined in the light of
Derrida's early work on Levinas.
Early Derrida: The Unavoidability of 'Originary Violence'.
That Derrida sees all contemporary discourse concerning the Other - and our
relationship to that Other - as having ultimately theological origins, is no grand
revelation; Derrida, following Levinas, calls the relationship between God and the
individual "the original metaphor"32 for the question of the Other. It is therefore
equally unsurprising that Derrida should see Levinas' attempt to enter into a non¬
violent relationship with the irreducibly Other as placing Levinas "at arms with
problems which were equally the problems of negative theology" (Aux prises avec
30
Schurmann, Meister Eckhart, p200
31 One could take issue with this, given the fact that in a number of sermons {In his quae patris, for
example), Eckhart does quote that Derridean epitome of phonocentricity 2 Corinthians 3:6 "The letter
(that is, all outward practices) kills, but the Spirit gives life". However, Eckhart's interesting
amendment to the verse - "all outward practices" - suggests that what the Dominican understands by
"letter" includes all discourse, written and spoken, a possibility reinforced by the verse quoted
immediately afterward: "When you pray, do not use many words in your prayers like the Pharisees, for
they think to be heard with much speaking." (Matt 6:7, Walshe, Meister Eckhart, vol.1, p36). Meaning
may well be privileged and separated from discourse here, but it is difficult to see how speech is
privileged over writing.
32
Writing and Difference, pi42
158
desproblemes quifurent aussi bien ceux de la theologie negative...).33. Can the
experience of the Other ever take place non-violently? Can one ever truly talk to the
Other , talk about the Other, without ultimately incorporating it into the Same? Will a
certain violence not be unavoidable?
First of all one should stress, as with Eckhart, that both Derrida and Levinas
agree on the "ancient clandestine friendship between light and power" (Vielle amitie
occulte entre la lumiere et la puissance).34 Derrida's essay does not seek to challenge
Levinas' association of knowledge with violence - he is merely sceptical of the
various attempts Levinas makes to circumvent this. It is a position which, without
reading a word of "Violence and Metaphysics", could quickly be deduced from a
handful of remarks in OfGrammatology. In deconstructing the
Rousseauistic/Saussurean vilification of writing, Derrida maintains it is not his
intention to "make writing innocent", but simply to insist on the "originary violence"
of all discourse, written and spoken. The violence of writing "does not befall an
innocent language", if only because speech, far from being the peaceful alternative
35
envisaged by Saussure and Rousseau, is always already a kind of writing itself.
In the same way, Derrida's problem with Levinas is not so much his notion of
"violence", but his belief in the possibility of "non-violence". The question of
whether Levinas ever succeeds (in Derrida's eyes) in providing a non-violent
phenomenology for the Other, has been much discussed, which perhaps in itself is
testimony to the density and difficulty of Derrida's text. Suffice to say that most
critics feels "Violence and Metaphysics" to be not so much a critique of Totality and
Infinity but more of a deconstruction.36





36 An examination of the variety of critical responses to Derrida's early essay on Levinas would be
worth an essay in itself. A very definite sense of uncertainty, exacerbated by the often wildly
contrasting tones of admiration and refutation to be found in "Violence and Metaphysics", seems to
pervade most of the critics' reactions to it. Is Derrida, in his remarks on Levinas, "much more intent on
burying Caesar than praising him?" asks Critchley (Midgley, Responsibilities ofDeconstruction, p94).
"Is Derrida explicating Levinas or correcting him?" asks Bernasconi (John Sallis (ed), Deconstruction
and Philosophy [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987]p 128). Derrida's own apparently
unambiguous remarks concerning the failure of Levinas' project - the Levinas, that is, who is "resigned
to betraying his own intentions in his philosophical discourse" {se resout done a trahir son intention
dans son discours philosophique 151,224) - are often qualified by more positive assertions which
practically align Levinas' writing with Derrida's own - the declaration , for example, that "the thought
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Throughout the entire seventy pages of his essay, Derrida disagrees with the
reading of practically every philosopher Levinas cites. Levinas' portrayal of a
reductionist Husserl who merges "the infinite alterity of the other ...to the same" is
carefully rebuffed by Derrida, who sees Husserlian analogical appresentation as that
which (on the contrary) "confirms and respects separation"37; Levinas' Kierkegaard,
from whose solipsism Levinas wishes to disassociate himself for fear of lapsing into
a violent subjectivism, is also seen by Derrida to be a misunderstanding - an
underestimation of Kierkegaard's "sense of the relationship to the irreducibility of
of Emmanuel Levinas can make us tremble" (nous ferait trembler la pensee d'Emmanuel Levinas
82,122), or the reference to Levinas' "necessity of lodging oneself within traditional conceptuality in
order to destroy it" (une necessite ...de s'intaller dans la conceptualite traditionelle pour la detruire
111,165). Remarks which, one might be forgiven for thinking, seem to give Levinas' critique a
distinctly Derridean feel.
Professor Coward, near the end of an otherwise insightful and thought-provoking essay on
deconstruction and Hindu negative theology, offers a reading of "Violence and Metaphysics" which
completely omits the possibility of any negative critique of Levinas by Derrida. For Coward, Derrida
portrays a Levinas free from "a metaphysics of logos and light", and thereby "pushes Levinas thought
even further" (Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (eds), Derrida andNegative Theology,p2l8-9), an
optimistic appraisal which does move one to ask whether Professor Coward has read the essay in its
entirety, and not simply the passage he quotes. In contrast, Libertson talks of "Derrida's astonishing
incomprehension of Levinas", seeing the essay as "a virulent attempt to reduce the pertinence and
originality of all the Levinasian concepts..." (cit. in Robert Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism [Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1997] 131). John Llewellyn sees Derrida's essay as a questioning of
"Levinas' way of questioning" the limits of metaphysics (John Lewellyn, Emmanuel Levinas [London:
Routledge & Kegan, 1995] pl76) and a declaration of Levinas' failure to see, in Heidegger and
Husserl, the precedents for his own motifs. Eaglestone follows this line to a certain extent, carefully
listing Derrida's objections to Levinas and ultimately re-contextualising them as 'suggested revisions',
revisions which meant "in effect, that Levinas ha(d) to re-write his earlier work in new, strange and
different terms" (Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism, pi35). In this manner, Totality and Infinity became
Levinas' later work, Otherwise than Being, although the suggestion that "Violence and Metaphysics"
prompted Levinas to completely re-formulate the expression of his thought, Bernasconi considers to be
"a grand claim" (Sallis, Deconstruction and Philosophy, pi 29).
Bernasconi himself, in a number of studies, develops the idea of a Derrida who is not so
intent on "criticising Levinas" as much as isolating "one tendency in Levinas' writings which...is
compensated for elsewhere in them." (Richard Cohen (ed), Face to Face With Levinas [Albany:
SUNY Press, 1986]p 188). Bernasconi's obvious admiration for both thinkers does leave him
zigzagging between the two - defending Levinas against Derrida one moment, emphasising a common
resignation to "incoherent incoherence" the next (Writing and Difference 110, cit. in Sallis,
Deconstruction and Philosophy, pi30). If a deconstruction of Levinas has taken place (and
Bernasconi uses this word carefully, given that the term was only coined four years after the writing of
"Violence"), it is not an aggressive, disparaging deconstruction a la Rousseau, but rather a gentle
demonstration "of the difficulty of rupturing a tradition" (ibid, pi 29), a difficulty common to both
thinkers. Citing the Levinasian notion of how the receiver of a gift is ethically obliged to show no
gratitude - a gratitude which would undermine the generosity of the giver - Bernasconi even interprets
"Violence" as a "hermeneutical application" of this idea, Derrida's refusal to return the text to Levinas
by reading Levinas as he would have liked (ibid, pl26). In a sense, the radical ingratitude of "Violence
and Metaphysics" is Derrida's act of gratitude towards Levinas.
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the totally-other"38; even Levinas' nationalistic version of Heidegger, a thinker closer
to Levinas than anyone else, is considered by Derrida to be more of an "accusation"
than an interpretation, more of a gut-reaction to the "climate of Heidegger's
philosophy" than a sincere, impartial response.39
Derrida's disagreements, however, run deeper. In fact, the more one reads
Derrida's dialogue with Levinas, the more Derrida's critique come to resemble, on a
number of points, his critique of negative theology. The Levinas we encounter, a
figure who feels he can nurture a relationship with the Other without ever inflicting
violence upon it, becomes slightly naive. Derrida is quick to acknowledge the subtly
apophatic in Levinas' writing, a writing which moves "masterfully progressing by
negations, and by negation against negation".40 He even calls Levinas a negative
theologian, albeit one who "does not give himself the right to speak...in a language
resigned to its own failure".41 Nevertheless, in reading the early Derrida on Levinas,
one always has the feeling that Levinas is simply too theological for Derrida, too
keen on extolling the merits of an experience with the Ineffable, too quick to
associate 'finitude' with 'totality', too easily duped - unlike Husserl - by the "illusion
of the immediate presence of a plenitudinous infinity".42 Why does Derrida call into
question the confidence with which Levinas claims to establish "a non-violent
relationship to the infinite as infinitely Other"?43 What are the reasons for such
scepticism, and how do they relate to Eckhart?
Of Derrida's various objections to Levinas, three are of concern to us: firstly,
that the identity of the Other is forever out of reach - one cannot conceive it without
incorporating it into the Same. Secondly, as a result of this, the whole idea of "pure
non-violence" is a "dream" - there is always already violence, as soon as there is
meaning. Thirdly, such consequences of the Other's untranslatable
incommensurability means there is simply no way of simply escaping the violence of










knowledge whilst still respecting dissimilarity. All of which, as we shall see, have
profound implications on Eckhart's own attempts to approach God without
subjecting Him to a "violence".
The absolute unthinkability of the Other forms, in a sense, the crux of
Derrida's recurring problem with Levinas, an unthinkability which not even the
Levinasian notion of the face as a "relation of rectitude" can mediate.44 The moments
in "Violence and Metaphysics" where Derrida stresses this adopt an ultimately
sceptical tone, particularly in their insistence on the failure of language to represent
the Other:
The infinitely Other would not be what it is, other, if it was a positive infinity,
and if it did not maintain within itself the negativity of the indefinite, of the
apeiron . Does not "infinitely other" primarily signify that which does not come
to an end, despite my interminable labor and experience? Can one respect the
Other as Other, and expel negativity - labor - from transcendence, as Levinas
seeks to do? The positive Infinity (God) - if these words are meaningful - cannot
be infinitely Other. If one thinks, as Levinas does, that positive Infinity tolerates ,
or even requires, infinite alterity, then one must renounce all language, and first
of all the words infinite and other. Infinity cannot be understood as Other except
in the form of the in-finite. As soon as one attempts to think Infinity as a positive
plenitude (one pole of Levinas' nonnegative transcendence), the other becomes
unthinkable, impossible, unutterable. Perhaps Levinas calls us toward this
unthinkable-unutterable-impossible beyond (tradition's ) Being and Logos. But it
must not be possible either to think or state this call.
L'infiniment autre ne serait pas ce qu'il est autre, il s'etait infinite positive et
s'il ne gardait en lui la negativite de I'in-defini, de l'apeiron. "Infiniment autre"
ne signifie-t-il pas d'abord ce dont je ne peux venira bout malgre un travail et
une experience interminables? Peut-on respecter I'Autre comme Autre et
chasser la negativite, le travail, hors de la transcendance comme le voudrait
Levinas? L'lnfini positif (Dieu), si ces mots ont un sens, ne peut pas etre
infiniment Autre. Si I'on pense , comme Levinas, que I'Infini positif tolere ou
meme exige I'alterite infinie, ilfaut alors renoncer a tout langage et d'abord au
mot infini et au mot autre. L'infini ne s'entend comme Autre que sous la forme
de I'in-fini. Des que I'on veut penser I'Infini comme plenitude positive (pole de
la transcendance non-negative de Levinas), 1'Autre devient impensable,
impossible, indicible. C'est peut-etre vers cet impensable-impossible-indicible
que nous appelle Levinas au-dela de I'Etre et du Logos (de la tradition). Mais
cet appel ne doit pouvoir ni se penser ni se dire. (114,168)
Here, Derrida presents two versions of the Other: a 'false' version - the other as a
"positive infinity", much like what Derrida sees as the Super-God of negative
theology who is ultra-good, ultra-wise, ultra-powerful (but in an infinitely
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Levinas (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986) p23
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ungraspable way), and a different version of the Other, which will forever contain
something indefinite and uncertain (Anaximander's apeiron), something which is so
unspeakably other that it cannot even be thought. For Derrida, Levinas' delusion is
that he clearly feels his L'Autre to be the Other of the second category, but it actually
never gets beyond the first.
In other words, whereas Derrida's Other would be differance itself, an other
which would forever disappear in showing itself, which would forever be 'otherwise'
than being, Levinas' Other would be what Derrida understands as the God of
negative theology, an Other of deferred presence, a positive Infinity which "cannot
ever be infinitely Other" because it is 'beyond being', not 'otherwise than being' - a
crucial distinction. It is therefore no coincidence that the first serious attention given
to Eckhart in Derrida's oeuvre - that is, the first time he explicitly takes on the claims
of negative theology - occurs within the pages of "Violence and Metaphysics", and
involves Eckhart's oft-cited insistence on not having contested the Being of God, but
on the contrary of having affirmed it on a higher level. When Derrida criticises this,
he clearly has in mind Levinas, who contests the violence of metaphysics on one
level, only to re-affirm it on another.
Such violence for Derrida manifests itself in Levinas' discourse through his
notion of the face. Derrida is suspicious of this term for two reasons: first, because of
its religious connotations - Levinas' 'face' is not the "vis-a-vis of two equal and
upright men", but the face-to-face of the suppliant believer, "with bent neck and eyes
raised towards the God on high".45 Secondly, and more importantly, the notion of the
face of the Other re-introduces an element of metaphysics and self-identity into
Levinas' discourse, particularly since Levinas often uses the word as a synonym for
"substance". "The face" concludes Derrida, "is presence, ousia",46
Why is this necessarily a problem in a discourse of alleged non-violence?
Because presence is originally violent. "Presence as violence is the meaning of
finitude..." (La presence comme violence est le sens de Infinitude).41 As soon as the
Other acquires a face, a certain violence has already taken place. As soon as the
45






Other is here for us, as soon as the Other means something to us, we have already
inflicted a violence upon it - how could it ever be otherwise? As Derrida remarks
elsewhere, what manner of "unheard of graphics" could ever represent the truly
infinite Other?48 Or as Eckhart says, in a sermon Derrida has never cited and possibly
never read: "If you visualize anything or if anything enters your mind, that is not
God".49 Levinas' error is to have underestimated the inescapability ofmetaphysics -
and consequently the unavoidability of violence.
Hence Levinas' "dream" and his recourse to "experience".50 For Derrida, both
Rousseau and Levinas are dreamers - obsessed with the reve of recovering an
originary presence, in Rousseau's case a lost innocence, in Levinas' case the
irreducible 'identity' of the Other. Levinas' dream is that he can reach the Other non-
violently, via an 'experience' which would pole-vault one out of language and into
the immediate presence of the Other. A dream about which Derrida clearly has no
illusions:
The experience of the other (of the infinite) is irreducible, and is therefore "the
experience par excellence" (Totality and Infinity)...Bui can one speak of an
experience of the other or of difference? Has not the concept of experience
always been determined by the metaphysics of presence?
L'experience de I'autre (de I'infini) est irreductible, elle est done "I'experience
par excellence" (Totalite et Infinite) Mais peut-on parler d'une experience
de I'autre ou de la difference? Le concept de I'experience n'a-t-ilpas toujours
ete determine par la metaphysique de la presence? (152, 225)
To dream of an interpretation-free, signless 'experience' of the Other, an Other which
would retain the impossible simultaneity of the familiar and the unfamiliar, an Other
which could mean without being violated...such a dream of pure identity Derrida can
never accept, as we have learnt elsewhere. "From the moment there is meaning, there
is nothing but signs".51 Levinas' dream of non-violently welcoming the Other can
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metaphysics by going "beyond" it. A hope which, even in the most generous
moments of Derrida's essay, is only ever translated as naivete - an ultimate ignorance
of the fact that metaphysics has already "forever protected itself against every
absolutely surprising convocation" (s 'est protegee a jamais contre toute convocation
absolument surprenante).52 Words such as 'infinite' and 'other' can never "surprise"
metaphysics, for they already belong to it. Just as it is no coincidence to find Meister
Eckhart within the pages of "Violence", it is equally no coincidence to find, in the
closing pages, the words of Nicholas of Cusa, Eckhart's passionate admirer: "Every
question concerning God presupposeth his identity".53 Derrida's intention in quoting
the fifteenth-century master is subtle but unambiguous - Levinas' attempts to
question metaphysics presupposes metaphysics, just as Cusano's God is forever
affirmed, even when one questions His existence.
To recap, with respect to Eckhart: Derrida agrees with both Levinas and
Eckhart on the violence of the mimetic, on the synonymity of comprehension and
assimilation. It is with the response to such violence upon the Other that the
differences begin. For Derrida, Levinas and Eckhart share the same "dream", a non-
metaphysical encounter with the Other, and thereby fall victim to the same
deconstructive critique - that of chaining themselves to the desire for the elusive,
irreducible identity of the Other, which for Levinas is "the experience par
excellence", and for Eckhart the "secret of the eternal Godhead". "Violence and
Metaphysics" is, in a sense, an examination of the impossibility of such a project.
Derrida cannot share this dream of non-violent knowledge: "Like pure violence, pure
non-violence is a contradictory concept".54 It is the notion of 'purity', the purity of
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constitutes the essential difference between Derrida's idea of alterity and the versions
(and I stress the word 'versions') of Eckhart and Levinas he deconstructs. For
Levinasian violence and Eckhartian gewalt are a consequence of this dream of purity,
a purity whose ultimate deconstruction would remove the need for both words,
"violence" and "non-violence". A question which, although tangential to our project,
does make one wonder whether Derrida, in deconstructing 'purity', can still use the
word 'violence' at all. Nevertheless, however tempted one might be to conclude with
this Derridean scepticism of Levinas' position, recent remarks made by Derrida vis¬
a-vis Levinas' legacy do suggest a slight shift on Derrida's part towards a possible
language of non-violence, and merit some consideration on their own.
Recent Remarks: Openness Towards the Other.
Having gone to some lengths to emphasise a certain deconstructive scepticism
in Derrida, particularly towards the notion of the 'experience' of the Other and the
"dream" of non-violence, we have proposed a Derrida who sees an unavoidable
element of originary violence in all discourse (like Eckhart and Levinas), but can
neither envisage a reception of the Other 'outside' discourse, nor a non-violent
encounter with the Other 'inside' discourse (unlike Eckhart and Levinas). Such a
conclusion would certainly undermine the contention that a similar terminology of
'openness' and 'emptiness' towards the Other exists in both Eckhart and Derrida.
However, certain remarks of Derrida's in recent years concerning his relationship to
Levinas do throw a different light on Derridean alterity, and make us wonder whether
Derrida really is as sceptical about the welcome of the Other as the author "Violence
and Metaphysics" would have us believe. What I would now like to do is take the
remarks from two recent seminars of Derrida's, and show how Derrida's re-appraisal
of his position vis-a-vis Levinas indirectly brings him closer to Eckhartian
gelazenheit.
At a seminar in 1983, almost twenty years after the writing of "Violence",
Derrida says in a reply to Andre Jacob:
54
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Before a thought such as that of Levinas, I have never really had any objections.
I am ready to subscribe to everything he said. That doesn't mean that I think the
same thing in the same way; but the differences are very difficult to determine:
what does it mean, in this case, the difference of idiom, of language, of writing? I
have tried to pose a certain number of questions to Levinas in reading him...but
this is not in the order of a disagreement or a distance, (own translation)
Devant line pensee comme celle de Levinas, je n'ai jamais d'objection. Je suis
pret a souscrire a tout ce q 'il dit. (fa ne veut pas dire que je pense la meme
chose de la meme fagon; mais la les differences sont tres difficiles a determiner:
que signifie dans ce cas-la la difference d'idiome, de langue, d'ecriture? J'ai
essaye de poser un certain tiombre de questions a Levinas en le lisant...mais ce
qui se passe la n'est pas de I'ordre du disaccord ou de la distance.55
This gradual revelation of a deeper affinity between the two thinkers has puzzled
some critics (Critchley: "...if there indeed exists this happy homoiosis between
Levinas and Derrida...then what on earth is Derrida doing in his extended, and at
times highly critical, 1964 monograph on Levinas?"56), although there are a number
of possible reasons why this should not be so. Firstly, certain moments in the
evolution of Derrida's later thought (most notably Derrida's 1980 essay on Levinas
57
"En ce moment meme dans cet ouvrage me voici" ) do show indications of an
increasing sympathy towards Levinas. Secondly, the Levinas Derrida feels such a
deep affinity with in Alterites may not be so much the early Levinas of Totality and
Infinity, but more the later Levinas of Otherwise Than Being, if we are to believe the
suggestions that Levinas' 1974 work was, in many ways, a revision of Totality
prompted by Derrida's early deconstruction of him. Finally, there may well be
moments, as we shall see, in Derrida's "highly critical 1964 monograph" which
indicate a common core of thought between them.
It is with the mention of a 'common core of thought' in Levinas and Derrida
that our argument moves closer to Eckhart. What exactly is it in Levinas that Derrida
feels he can "subscribe" to? Ten years later, in a 1996 seminar, Derrida explains:
Everything I have tried to say here implies something I share with Levinas, that
is the absolute irreducibility of the otherness of the other. The other, even if he
or she is a finite being, is infinitely other, and this infinity is precisely what
55 Alterites (Paris: Editions Osiris, 1986) p74
36 Nick Midgley(ed), Responsibilities ofDeconstruction (Coventry: Parousia Press, 1997) p94
57 found in Psyche: Inventions de I'autre (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1987) ppl59-203
167
resists any reappropriation...And that's why the coming of the other is totally
unpredictable.58
The Other, like the text, resists all appropriation - its infinite alterity forever eludes
"the empire of the same", as Derrida says elsewhere. What is the proper response to
such unpredictable irreducibility? Here Derrida brings his appeal to "absolute
openness" into play, an idea we briefly examined at the end of the last chapter:
What I call messianicity without messianism refers to the promise of something
or someone to come in such a way that does not anticipate at all what or who will
come, when or where. An absolute openness to what is coming.59
Despite all of the reservations expressed in "Violence", this "absolute openness"
does seem to move nearer to the spirit of Gelassenheit. This is by no means
surprising - Derrida had already written how, through "permitting to let be others in
their truth...the thought of Being is thus as close as possible to non-violence".60 As
close as possible, but never completely non-violent, for "[T]he thought of Being, in
its unveiling, is never foreign to a certain violence" {La pensee de I'etre n 'est done
jamais, dans son devoilement, etrangere a une certaine violence).61 In a sense,
Derrida reproduces Heidegger's openness towards Being whilst simultaneously de-
theologising it, retaining the Offenheit but removing the Sein, and thereby removing
the horizon of expectation which must necessarily accompany it. It is a notion of
absolute 'emptiness' and messianic 'openness' which, we will recall, did have its
moments in "Violence and Metaphysics", although they remained undeveloped:
Philosophy...can only open itself to the question, within it and by it. It can only
let itself be questioned. (131)
Truthfully, messianic eschatology is never mentioned literally: it is but a
question of designating a space or hollow within naked experience where this
eschatology can be understood and where it must resonate. This hollow space is










Whether such an openness towards the Other can ever become, as in Eckhart, a
receptacle for the Other, is our question. The "hollow space" is certainly never
intended to be filled, as its 'hollowness' is the condition of its openness towards
others. Eckhart's sermons often feature such metaphors of 'emptiness' and
'openness', metaphors which produce some resemblance to Derrida's own terms,
despite their radically different contexts:
...[good people] are turned outwards to all in divine life and in complete
openness [ledeger offenung] in a way that is beyond their own control.
...but rather I remained free and empty in this present moment for the most
precious will ofGod...(Intravit Jesus)
...God [must] perform great works in you...in so far as he finds you empty and
bare...(Et cum factus esset)62
Such an insistence on remaining offen towards God - how far does it resemble, and
differ from, the Derridean openness towards the play of the Other? Is this the case of
an analogous metaphor, or have we simply strayed upon two fortuitous adjectives -
offen and ouvert, two deceptively similar images of receptivity which actually belong
to completely dissimilar vocabularies?
Derrida himself supplies at least one good reason why any similarities
between two such vocabularies of 'openness' are worth some investigation. In his
1992 essay on negative theology, "Post-Scriptum", he writes, in remarking upon the
thought of Gelassenheit in Eckhart and Silesius:
...the abandonment to this Gelassenheit does not exclude pleasure or enjoyment
; on the contrary, it gives rise to them. It opens the play ofGod (of God and with
God, of God with self and with creation)...
...I'abandon a cette Gelassenheit n'exclut pas le plaisir on la jouissance, il leur
donne lieu au contraire. II ouvre le jeu de Dieu (de Dieu et avec Dieu, de Dieu
avec soi et avec la creation)...63
II ouvre le jeu de Dieu: Derrida clearly sees Eckhartian gelazenheit not as a medieval
version of a homely pietism, but as a strategy which joyfully embarks upon a kind of
play with God, within an opening where both God and self can meet. Admittedly,
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this is a passage where Derrida is keen to identify the relative merits of God-centred
Gelassenheit within an essay whose ultimate aim is however to deconstruct such a
concept. Nevertheless, the fact that Derrida is willing to acknowledge Eckhart's
gelazenheit as the initiation of play, and not as an attempt to close it, should at least
encourage us to examine the two versions of 'openness' further.
If there are any deeper similarities to be found, the first certainly lies in both
Derrida and Eckhart's ironic proposal that not anticipating the arrival of the Other is
the only way to welcome it. As soon as we attempt to associate an image, or a name,
or an expectation to the Other, we no longer truly respect its alterity, but merely
extend our "empire of the same". In a sense, we have to be 'surprised':
Unless the event is so surprising that I am not even prepared for the surprise, it is
not an event. It is the same with the other: the otherness of the other, the
experience of the otherness of the other implies that the other may come when I
am totally unprepared: that is the condition of the other remaining other.64
The "otherness of the other" manifests itself so suddenly that there is no time for
preconceptions - in this unexpectedness, indeed only in this unexpectedness, can the
otherness of the other truly be. In such a moment of complete surprise, the Other
finds us in an 'empty' and 'open' state, momentarily free of any pre-planned response
to it. Derrida glimpses this moment of surprise as the only possible way of
welcoming the Other. He links the originary otherness of the Other, with impressive
originality, to the unknowable moment of the Other's arrival - the Other can only be
truly Other if it surprises us. This association of chronology and alterity does not take
place in Eckhart: the Lord may indeed come like a thief in the night, but His
ineffability is not in any way dependent upon the uncertain moment of His arrival.
Eckhart insists so often on 'preparing' the ground of the soul for God, that at
first glance, it would seem to be a complete contradiction of Derrida's advocating of
'unpreparedness'. A contradiction , that is, until we actually look at what Eckhart
means by "preparedness" or bereitschaft. In both Eckhartian 'emptiness' and
Derridean 'openness', an analogous idea is developed in different terms: just as
Derrida feels he can welcome the Other only by remaining completely open and
unprepared for it, Eckhart ironically insists we can only "prepare" ourselves for God
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by 'emptying' ourselves of all so-called preparations - names, concepts, ideas. The
failure to achieve this emptiness results in unbereitschaft or "unpreparedness", a
cluttering up of the soul with obstructive conceptions:
But we do violence to Him and wrong by obstructing Him in his natural work
through our unpreparedness.65
The number of Zen commentaries who have linked this Eckhartian emptiness with
eastern concepts such as sunyata (hollowness) or wu-nien (no-thought) is legion, and
needs no reiteration here. What is interesting, however, is how an analogous
understanding of the concept as violent and obstructive in Eckhart and Derrida leads
them to an analogous insistence on their abandonment, and the extolling of a
"complete openness" (ledeger offenung) which would let the Other be Other, would
let God be God.
Another similarity which both Eckhart and Derrida's emphasis on 'openness'
share is their emphasis on the uniqueness of the Other, which in Derrida is
understood as irreplaceability, and in Eckhart becomes ineffability. The fact that
there is nothing we know which is in any way similar to the Other is precisely that
irreducibility which gives the Other its otherness. Our acknowledgement of the
singularity of the Other is an essential part of our respect for it:
Hospitality is always offered to someone in the singular. The otherness of the
other who comes to me is singular, he is irreplaceable by any other one,
hospitality is offered to an irreplaceable other as a singularity. 66
Like Derrida's inimitably singular Other, Eckhart's God is "a being to whom nothing
is, or can be, similar". Eckhart's God is absolutely unique. Naturally, this does not
mean that 'irreplaceable' is synonymous with 'ineffable', but simply that both
writers' non-violent openness to the Other hinges upon a simple fact: that there is
nothing in our vocabulary which can ever reduce the identity of the Other to our
ftl
Same. The Other is, as Eckhart says, an "I do not know what" (neizwaz) , and must
remain so if its Otherness is not to be vanquished.
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The differences remain, however. How complete is Eckhart's "complete
openness, if it still contains the word 'God'? How "free and untrammelled" is
Eckhart's reception of the Other? The fact that, for Eckhart, certain concepts
concerning God have to be completely abandoned, including the idea that God is
good, wise, merciful, does suggest a ledeger offenung, a complete disarming of all
notions and images. It is a gesture Derrida would certainly see as 'open' and non¬
violent - "conceptual framework(s)" being "the first violence of all commentary".68
Derrida, as we have already seen, has commented on how negative theology "lets
passage, lets the other be", although there are reasons to suggest why Derrida would
not feel Eckhart's 'openness' to be "completely open". As we saw, Derrida's
"messianicity without messianism" involves remaining open for something or
someone, without anticipating them at all. In speaking of the tradition in Jewish
families whereby a place is kept free at the dinner table in anticipation of Elijah,
Derrida remarks:
But what I mean by messianicity is not only pre-messianic, it is also pre-Elijah, it
must remain totally open [italics mine]. But I am unhappy with this 'open', it
may have the connotation of the horizon, in the sense of being open to what may
come or not. But I am not even open to that...69
In contrast to Derrida, Eckhart's openness would, presumably, be 'messianicity with
messianism', not without. Eckhart's God (and here we return to Derrida's long-
abiding caveat concerning negative theology) would still be a presence, and
Eckhart's openness the expectation of a presence, the anticipation of ousia, an
emptiness waiting to be filled. Admittedly, this logocentric reading of Eckhart's
openness to God is facilitated by some of Eckhart's own terms, such as "potential
receptivity" - to receive the Other is to already have an idea of what the Other is. For
Derrida, the Eckhartian soul will never be "totally open", because it is still open
towards a God - and thereby still carries with it all the "connotation(s) of the
horizon". Which, in a way, re-emphasizes the most obvious difference between
Eckhartian emptiness and Derridean openness; where Derrida's ouverture would be
an openness to play (the play of the Other, the play of the world), Eckhart's
68
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emptiness is an openness towards God, and ultimately part of a move towards union
with the Other. In effect, gelazenheit is an initial step towards succumbing to the
violence of God.
In brief: the examination of an analogous openness towards the Other in
Eckhart and Derrida is initially forestalled in "Violence and Metaphysics", where
Derrida seems to be at his most sceptical concerning the non-violent accessibility to
the Other. The ineluctable violence of all discourse, the inescapability of metaphysics
and its imperialism of theoria, the illusion of an 'experience' somehow outside
discourse, the impossible "dream" of ever reaching the pure, irreducible identity of
the Other...all of Derrida's early objections to Levinas ultimately comment on the
failure of Eckhart's own discourse. It is only within the pages of a Derrida who has
grown more sympathetic to Levinas (or, as you will, a Derrida whom Levinas has
come to resemble) that the beginnings of a genuine comparison between Derridean
'openness' and Eckhartian gelazenheit can be undertaken. Two vocabularies which
not only agree on the synonymity of the violent and the metaphysical, but also
emphasize, in an analogous though not identical manner, the complete irreducibility
of the Other, an Other which is absolutely unique and whose utter alterity can only be
respected through the complete abandonment of all anticipatory apparatus and
conceptual machinery. In other words, an 'openness' would not attempt to 'think' the
Other and thereby close one to the unexpected and the non-anticipated.
What remains to be understood, however, within the terms of this thesis, is
exactly why both Derrida and Eckhart's understanding of Otherness is necessarily
'joyful' - and for this we must turn, finally and briefly, to the notion of the gift.
4.1.3 The Affirmation of the Mystery: Versions of the Gift.
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Die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen und die Offenheit fur das Geheimnis gehoren
zusammen.
Wenn die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen und die Offenheit fur das Geheimnis in
uns erwachen, dann durften wir auf einen Weg gelangen, der zu einem neuen
Grund und Boden fiihrt.
Letting-be before things and the openness to the mystery belong together.
If letting-be before things and the openness to the mystery awake in us, then we
should arrive at a path which will lead to a new ground and foundation.
-Heidegger70
The whole point of this chapter has been to try and show, with various reservations
and caveats, how the 'letting-be' of Eckhart and the 'openness' of Derrida can, to use
Heidegger's phrase, belong together. A sentiment I would finally like to underline
with the notion of the gift.
In not only Eckhart and Derrida but also Heidegger and Levinas, the word
"gift" recurs as a central motif in the manifestation of the Other: le don, die gabe, le
cadeau, das Geschenk. Of course, we are juggling versions of Gelassenheit here,
risking a juxtaposition of discourses which belong to radically different contexts: the
emptiness of the soul to the passage of the Godhead, the openness of Dasein to the
inscrutable play of Being, the openness of Levinas to the face of the Other, the
openness of the ouverture to the play of the world, to the play of the text.
In a similar fashion, the various versions of the gift implied by such thinkers
also accrue ultimately different meanings: the gift of the Word in the ground of the
soul, the gift of the thought of Being (es gibt Sein), the gift of the Other, the gift of
the text - this last gift a gift which cannot and should not ever be returned to the
giver. To compare all these versions of the gift, particularly Derrida's own extended
consideration of the act of giving in works such as Donner le Temps and "Dans cet
ouvrage", would require an entire chapter in itself and would prevent us from making
our single and most relevant point - that of the positive reception and response to
Otherness in Eckhart and Derrida.
A response which affirms the uncertainty of the Other as that which gives. The
"mystery" of the Other in both Eckhart and Derrida gives, and gives endlessly,
70 Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit (trans, by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund [London: Harper
& Row, 1966] )p55-6
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uncontrollably, unpredictably. It gives and does not take. In contrast (as we shall see)
to the mysterious entities of Kafka and Pinter, the nameless, enigmatic Other which
arrests and punishes unconditionally, inexplicably, Derrida and Eckhart affirm an
Other whose opening provides an endless possibility for play - regardless of whether
this is the play between God and the self, between the Other and the Same, between
the reader and the text.
Moreover, the gift of the Other can only come about when one respects the
mystery of the Other as an "I know not what" (neizwaz) - when one refuses, as
Derrida puts it, to "inscrib(e) the wholly other within the empire of the same".71 In
Eckhart's terms, the gift or gabe - which is the birth of the Word in the ground of the
soul - can only be given when one is empty of all conceptions of God and completely
open to Him, as "empty and free as God is empty and free in himself' (...ledic and
72vrt zemale, als got ledic and vri ist in irn selber). " The gift is not simply enabled by
openness - the gift is openness itself. Derrida summarises this idea succinctly in a
note on Heidegger's "Zeit und Sein": "...the thinking of the gift opens up the space in
which Being and time give themselves and give themselves to thought".73 The
thinking of the gift opens up the clearing ofDasein, just as the thinking of
Gelassenheit opens up the play of God. Opening up oneself to the Other - regardless
of whether the Other signifies Derridean play, Eckhart's Godhead or Heidegger's
Geheimnis - involves the acceptance of this gift of the Other, of this giving without
return.
The opposition we have just made and are ready to explore in the next chapter
- that of a positive, productive, giving version of the Mystery of the Other in negative
theology and deconstruction, as opposed to the malevolent Other of hidden menace
we find in Kafka and Pinter - could be undermined by a look at some of the
ambiguities attached to the advent of the Other in Derrida. Although Eckhart's Other
may well be a God of Love, the autre of Derrida is ominously referred to as the "as
71 from "At this very moment in this very work" in Peggy Kamuf (ed), A Derrida Reader: Between
the Blinds (Exeter: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) p412
72
Davies, Meister Eckhart, pl63, from the sermon Intravit Jesus in quoddam castellum - Sermon 2 in
Quint, 1:40
73 "How to Avoid Speaking : Denials" in Coward and Foshay (eds), Derrida and Negative Theology,
pl40 n.27
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yet unnameable"(/'encore innomable)74, an Other which "can only be anticipated in
the form of an absolute danger"75, an imminent birth which may yet result in a
If-
"terrifying form ofmonstrosity" {la forme terrifiante de la monstruosite). Such
uncertainty, one might feel, seems to lie rather more on the side of the woeful than
the joyful. What exactly does the 'gift of the Other' bode for Derrida? Is it good news
or bad? The fact that the word 'gift' means 'poison' in German (a coincidence
Derrida has more than once remarked upon) does remind us of the fundamental
uncertainty of that original gift of writing, the pharmakon - undecidably poison or
cure.
However, it would not be wrong to suggest that such fundamental ambiguity is
a necessary element of the Other, a point Derrida has underlined in a recent seminar.
Concerning the various risks in remaining "absolutely open to the Other", Duttman
suggested the possibility of the Other being radically "radically evil". Derrida's
response to this is interesting, as it affirms the sinister possibility of menace as the
very condition for absolute otherness:
For an event to happen, the possibility of the worst, of radical evil, must remain
a possibility, something that may indeed happen. Otherwise the good event, the
good Messiah, could not happen either.77
Derrida does not affirm the 'goodness' of the Other - he affirms the uncertainty of the
Other, and for this uncertainty to be genuine the possibility of "radical evil" must
remain inscribed. It is a mixture of chance and peril which we are familiar with in
Derrida - en jeu sometimes being translated by the expression 'at stake', more often
by the more neutral 'in play'. It is the reason why Derrida sometimes refers to the
"seminal adventure of the trace" as precisely that, an "adventure", and sometimes as
a "risk". The "joyous affirmation of the play of the world" would affirm this very
risk, the affirmation of the play of the Other.78
Such an ethical ambiguity does not seem to present itself in Eckhart's version
of the Other. Whether Eckhart, for all his "emptiness", could ever have envisaged a
74




Writing and Difference, p293
77
Midgley, Responsibilities, p9
78 both phrases taken from Writing and Difference, p292
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divine Other which retained the capacity for 'radical evil'an Other which might
genuinely wish us harm, remains a difficult question for Eckhartian scholarship.
Heideggerean scholars such as Caputo and Hiihnerfeld are insistent he could not
have. Caputo goes to some lengths to show how Heidegger's Being, in contrast to
Eckhart's God of Love, is "by no means 'fatherly' or 'loving' or 'benevolent'".79 He
quotes Eckhart's Book ofDivine Consolation'. "Love cannot distrust, it trustfully
awaits only good"80, and Hiihnerfeld agrees, remarking:
Meister Eckhart would never have taken the mystical step if he had believed that
he was leaping into Nothingness instead of into the arms of God.81
A remark slightly undermined by the fact that, in many sermons, Eckhart did call
God a "Nothingness", admittedly an incommensurable no-thingness which is hardly
synonymous with the Nothingness of "What is Metaphysics?". Ultimately, both
Hiihnerfeld and Caputo's insistence on Eckhart's God being a God of New
Testament love does seem to leave out the God of Job, the God of Abraham and
Isaac, the God of Exodus. Can one affirm a God of Love in negative theology, as
writers such as Caputo, Jean LucMarion and Kevin Hart have tried to, without re-
inscribing the onto-theo-logic? Can one remain "totally open" (to use Derrida's
phrase) to a God one has already precomprehended as 'loving'?
Such questions must be considered in the final chapter. For now, it merely
serves to underline how both Derrida and Eckhart present a positive, giving version
of the Other, even if - in the case of Derrida - the nature of the gift/Gift remains
ambiguous. Both thinkers see the advent of the Other as that which should encourage
openness, not closure, regardless of whether the Other is caring or malevolent, a God
of Love or a bearer of malice. An affirming thought of Otherness which leads us
appropriately into Pinter, and how the uncertainty of the Other offers very little
reason to be joyful.
79 John D.Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1978) p247
80 cit. in Caputo, The Mystical Element, p246
81 Huhnerfeld's The Heidegger Affair: An Essay Upon a German Genius, pl25, cit. in Caputo, The
Mystical Element, p245
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4.2 The Violence of the Mystery: A Neoplatonic Reading of The
Birthday Party.
The relation with the Other is the relation with a Mystery.
-Levinas, Le temps et I'autre
In Levinas, Derrida and Eckhart, as we see from the remark, the mystery of the
Other is a mystery to be welcomed. The aim of this section is to contrast this positive
reception of otherness with the dark, mysterious entities which lurk ineffably outside
Pinter's rooms; to show how the menace of the Other in Pinter makes use of the same
vocabularies of negative theology and Neoplatonism, but as a means towards
groundless malice, not groundless love.
Near the beginning of Kafka's famous letter to his father, Briefan den Vater,
he relates an incident from his childhood which, in many ways, serves as an
appropriate starting point for our investigation of the Other in Pinter. One night, as a
small child, the young Franz is whimpering and crying for a glass of water. After
shouting various threats at the child in an attempt to silence his cries, the father
charges suddenly into young Franz's room, pulls the child out of bed, carries him
downstairs and throws him out on to the street. Kafka writes:
Years later I still suffered from the tormenting possibility, that the giant, my
father, would come for me at the last moment without reason and drag me, in the
night, out ofmy bed and onto the street, and that I therefore meant nothing to
him.2
One can imagine the scene vividly, and it would not be difficult to extrapolate - with
psychoanalytical glee - the appropriate elements of the adult Kafka's
Weltanschauung from the young child's trauma: the unexpected provenance of the
assault, the absurdity of the father's anger, the helplessness of the small child before
the 'giant'8, the subject's conviction of self-worthlessness, not to mention the
unsettling possibility that the menace of the unfamiliar may actually spring out at you
from the familiar - the unheimliche emerging from the Heimlich, as it were.
1 cit in Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (trans. Alan Bass, London: Routledge & Kegan,
1978)pl42
2
Briefan den Vater, pi 1, own translation (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1962)
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It is an episode which, for all its biographical interest, does seem to give the
phrase 'the advent of the Other' a sinister twist. The Other who appears from
nowhere, for no reason, to pull us from our beds, march us out of our homes - the
Other who wishes to do us harm.
The aim of this section, therefore, is to continue exploring the theme of the
relationship with the Other, but in the light of Pinter, not Derrida or Eckhart. To
explore what really does happen when the Other becomes, to use Diittman's words,
"radically evil".3 We will also examine how a different kind of uncertainty pervades
The Birthday Party - not the undecidable oscillation between alternative sets of data
which will be found in The Caretaker and The Homecoming, but a much more
'classical' use of uncertainty as a mystery, the withdrawal of key information from
the fabric of the play.
After a provisional review of The Birthday Party's critical background, along
with its essential precedents in Kafka and Hemingway, we shall undertake a highly
individual reading of the play as a perverse version of Eckhart's Neoplatonism. Such
a reading will compare the gradual struggle, breakdown, subjugation and assimilation
of Stanley with the progress of the Eckhartian soul as it loses, in various stages, its
individuality, selfhood, reason and sight in order to return, in silence, to the Absolute
One.
4.2.1 Recent Re-readings of The Birthday Party.
Exactly whether Pinter criticism is, as Quigley has said, "proliferating but not
progressing"4, still remains a matter of debate - The Birthday Party certainly seems to
have moved in a number of unexpected directions, readings which - at least in one
case - shift the responsibility for Stanley's destruction onto the shoulders of Stanley
himself, and away from the agents of a nameless, lurking power. Rather than move
through the by-now familiar succession of interpretations (Cohn's savaging by the
System, Dukore's transformation of the individual, John Russell Brown's technical
3 Nick Midgley (ed), Responsibilities ofDeconstruction (Coventry: Parousia Press, 1997) p9
4
Anthony Quigley, The Pinter Problem (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975) p4
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study of the play's language), I would like to briefly consider two or three of the
play's most recent and more important critical re-evaluations, before going on to
examine how the play's more Neoplatonic echoes relate to this thesis.
Elizabeth Sakellaridou's 1988 study, Pinter's Female Portraits, is keen - as the
title suggests - to examine the female characters in The Birthday Party, both of which
"have subsidiary roles and are presented in an unflattering light".5 In a welcome
break from the male-dominated tradition of Pinter-crit, where barely half a dozen
female names stand out with any real significance (Cohn, Merris, Morrison,
Prentice), Sakellaridou develops a version of The Birthday Party as a play where "the
feminine principle is seen in continuos decline" (33). Although such a negative note
is only seen as an early stage in Pinter's gradual progress towards an "ideal" state of
androgyny in his characters, the male characters we are usually inclined to feel
sympathetic with in the play (Petey and Stanley) suffer badly in Sakellaridou's study.
Stanley is a "doomed, impotent creature of indefinite gender" (40), whilst Petey is
perceived as a "lower-class, frustrated man of average intelligence". Two such
mediocre and dependent individuals are obviously in need of a mother figure - which
is precisely where Sakellaridou invokes Jung's eternal, abiding mother archetype to
provide her description ofMeg. Drawing on sociological texts such as Families
Under Stress (1975) and The Reproduction ofMothering (1978), Meg's apparent
"silliness and sluttishness" (43) and unnatural attachment to Stanley is rendered more
justifiable by the "actual sterility" of her own marriage. Sakellaridou blames the
negative and derogatory image of Meg on Pinter's structuring of the play, which
encourages us to focus on Meg's deficiencies, without suggesting that Petey may be
in some way responsible for them.
Male characters in The Birthday Party come out badly once more in the work
of another female critic - Penelope Prentice's 1994 work, The Pinter Ethic.6 As the
single, consistent premise throughout the book is that Pinter's plays proffer "an ethic
[which] promotes life-enhancing values of love and justice" (41), namely through a
criticism of 'victim-mentality' and a re-emphasis on one's own individual
responsibility, it is not surprising to find both Stanley and Petey guilty of an "inertia"
5Elizabeth Sakellaridou, Pinter's Female Portraits (London: Macmillan, 1988) p50
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(25). This rather harsh equation of victim with villain does set Prentice, as she herself
acknowledges, against the overwhelming majority of critics - as does her unlikely
speculations that Goldberg and McCann have not been sent specially for Stanley but
have simply stumbled upon him by chance.
Although Prentice's argument, which essentially deconstructs the
victim/villain relationship in The Birthday Party and thereby acknowledges our
"kinship with Stanley" (41), is impressively argued, her insistence on the individual
responsibility of Stanley's actions as robbing Goldberg of any notion of villainy does
become slightly unsettling. It is an argument which seems to spring from the more
idealistic expressions of the French existentialists, and does lead Prentice to make
some odd points - her contention that Stanley "provokes" his own interrogation by
asking the visitors to leave, for example (33). Or his remark that, on witnessing
Goldberg stutter and stumble, "we sympathise when Goldberg momentarily stoops to
the precipice to confront the hollowness of his authority" (28). There is, no doubt,
obvious worth in this all-questioning approach to Stanley's 'victimhood' - Prentice
cites Francis Gillen's remark that Stanley could easily have become Meg's torturer
(41). Nevertheless, Pinter's own admission that the knock on Stanley's door came
from his "knowledge of the Gestapo", an admission Prentice cites at the end of her
chapter, does perhaps suggest that some victim/villain relationships are better left un-
deconstructed.
4.2,2 "The Killers", The Trial and The Birthday Party. Introducing Malice into
Uncertainty.
Criticism exploring the various links between Kafka's novel, Hemingway's story and
Pinter's play is by no means as abundant as the obvious similarities between the three
texts would lead one to expect. Practically every critic writing on The Birthday Party
makes some mention of Kafka, as if to fulfil the ritual obligations of some unspoken
tradition, although few critics dwell on the implications of "The Killers" and The
6
Penelope Prentice, The Pinter Ethic ( London: Garland, 1994)
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Trial for more than a paragraph.7 There is, no doubt, a fear of stating the obvious in
all this - three unusually similar accounts, all developing, if not concluding, in the
same way: the arrival of two mysterious henchmen, of unknown provenance, in
search of the protagonist for an unspecified reason. Like Kafka's childhood trauma,
all three involve the manifestation of the unfamiliar in what (for the protagonist)
would be the very heart of the familiar: Stanley's bedsit, Josef K.'s living room, the
lunch counter where Ole Andreson has his dinner every day. Even certain stock-
figures bear a resemblance to one another - the figure of the landlady, for example,
represented by Meg, Mrs Bell and Frau Grubach. All three exacerbate the cruel
menace inherent in the texts in an analogous manner: the maternal kindness and
understanding which they provide is rendered unbearably pathetic by their
incomprehension of the danger the protagonist lies in, creating a cheery pathos - what
Graham Greene would call the "baseless optimism that is so much more appalling
than our despair".8
In all three texts, conventional language and homely evocations of the familiar
are used to emphasize the horror of the alien. Thus, at the very beginning of The
Trial, after the two sinister henchmen have informed K. of the prosecution which has
been initiated against him, the protagonist calls on his landlady to find her knitting a
pair of stockings , a surreally incongruous image in view of what has gone before.
Near the end of "The Killers", as Nick Adams leaves Ole Andreson lying on his bed
to await his imminent and more-or-less inevitable execution by the two hired men,
the landlady informs the narrator: "He's been in his room all day...I guess he don't
feel well. I said to him: 'Mr Andreson, you ought to go out and take a walk on a nice
fall day like this,' but he didn't feel like it".9 The touching tone of innocent concern
in the landlady's voice emphasizes all the more the utter solitude of Andreson's lot. It
is a tone of naivete we also find in Meg - consider her speculations on Stanley's
relationship to the two villains: "Do you think they know each other? I think they're
7Randall Stevenson's interesting essay "Harold Pinter - Innovator?" (found in Alan Bold, Harold
Pinter - You Never Heard Such Silence [London: Vision Press, 1984] pp29) devotes some attention to
Kafka and Hemingway - another promising study should be Robert Armstrong's Kafka and Pinter:
Shadowboxing (London: Macmillan, 1998 [unpublished at time of writing]).
8 in Graham Greene's story "Across the Bridge" from Collected Stories (London: Bodley Head, 1972)
p432
9 Ernest Hemingway , Men Without Women (Cleveland: World Pub., 1946) p76
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old friends. Stanley had a lot of friends".10 Or the way in which, as they keep Stanley
in the upstairs bedroom, interrogating and probably torturing him, Meg brings them a
cup of tea.
Cordiality, kindness and generosity are not, however, simply confined to the
landladies in these texts. All three authors have their agents of execution display
moments of 'humanity' and understanding, moments which communicate either a
sadism, a sense of the macabre, a disconcerting irony or (worst of all) a puzzling
sincerity. Throughout the long course of his Prozefi, K. encounters one sympathetic
figure after another within the nameless web of state machinery which eventually
engineers his execution - the guardian (Wachter) who comes to arrest him and then
offers to bring him breakfast, the court-usher (Gerichtsdiener) who gives K. a guided
tour of the law chambers, the reassuring voice of the girl in the information bureau
who offers K. a chair ("Is this your first time here? Now, now, that's nothing to
worry about...").11 If the two killers in Hemingway's story employ a similar
vocabulary of casual, relaxed informality, it is with precisely the opposite intention -
that of instilling fear and trepidation into their audience with calculated malice:
"What do you do here nights?" A1 asked.
"They eat the big dinner," his friend said. "They call come here and eat the big
dinner."
"That's right," George said.
"So you think that's right?" A1 asked George.
"Sure".
"You're a bright boy, aren't you?"12
This is not quite the same strategy of language as Mick uses in The Caretaker, where
friendly and hostile registers of language remain separate, surreally juxtaposed to
stun the victim - here, Hemingway's killers adopt the form but not the content of
joking bar-room banter, a veneer of informality which thinly veils a genuine, deep-
seated malevolence. The manner of Goldberg and McCann is equally informal, an
unsettling blend of homespun truths, fireside wisdom and gentlemanly charm which
quite wins Meg over. The disparity between the warm-hearted affections of
Goldberg's nostalgic homilies ("How often, in this day and age, do you come across
10 The Birthday Party (London: Methuen, 1960) p68 - all following citations will be from this edition.
11 Franz Kafka, Der Prozefi ( Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1960) - own translation, p85
12 Men Without Women, 67
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true, real warmth?" 56) and McCann's simplistic brutality ("Wake him up. Stick a
needle in his eye." 52) provides the menace implicit in the visitor's presence.
The possibility that the stranger who throws a party for your birthday may
actually wish to stick a needle in your eye instigates a hermeneutics of suspicion, a
distrust of conventional signs. Like the hospitality of Kafka's clerks or the joking
banter of A1 and Max, the good-natured generosity of Goldberg and McCann no
longer means what it actually signifies. Texts such as "The Killers" and The Birthday
Party translate the sort of purely philosophical scepticism of language we find in
Wittgenstein's notebooks (i.e. how do we know the words "Good morning" always
mean "Good morning"?) into a much more conspiratorial cynicism (i.e. what does
the person who wishes me "Good morning" really want from me?). Such texts
encourage a distrust of the world of signs not through any form of philosophical
argument, but by showing how apparently 'good' signs (gestures of kindness,
helpfulness, affection) are actually 'bad' ones (intentions to kill, maim, humiliate). In
the worlds of such texts, the link between sign and meaning is no longer a priori - a
smile on a face, a warm handshake, an offer of coffee may actually be expressing the
most malicious of intentions. In this way Kafka, Hemingway and Pinter, after their
own individual fashion, re-introduce malice into uncertainty.
In a sense, by reading such texts (or seeing them performed), the reader
undergoes a kind of 'conversion'. A naive belief in the trustworthiness of the sign is
lost when one sees acts of unambiguous cruelty accompanied by words of kindness.
When Goldberg hears from Meg that Stanley has been "down in the dumps lately",
he remarks: "We'll bring him out of himself' (33). To 'bring someone out of his/her
self' would mean, to the unconverted, to cheer somebody up, to raise their spirits.
Conventionally, this is what the phrase signifies. Pinter's audience, however, will by
now hear the second, more sinister echo: to bring Stanley 'out of himself' will mean
to rob Stanley of any sense of self, to un-selve him, as it were. The impulse to
consider everything one reads or hears twice, not to accept anything in its
conventional sense but to constantly suspect it of some meaning outside its habitual
usage - such impulses only spring from 'converted' readers, readers who have seen
enough to know better than to trust at face value.
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So the possibility of malice endows even the most innocent and
straightforward aspects of a text with an ambiguity - however, in the case of The
Birthday Party, it is not an 'undecidable' ambiguity, in contrast to the other two
Pinter plays we have studied. Where one might well ask "Is Ruth really serious or is
she only playing?" or "Is Aston's altruism really genuine or is it just a trick?", one
certainly never feels like asking: "Is Goldberg really a warm person?". The
uncertainty of The Birthday Party - like that of The Trial and "The Killers" - is a
purely theocentric one: it is an uncertainty which relies on the primum mobile of the
story's development remaining ineffable. All we ever see are the effects of this
'ineffability' - strangers appearing in lunchrooms, apartments, seaside bedsits. We
never find out what Old Andreson has done in Chicago, why K. is being prosecuted,
or indeed precisely what Goldberg and McCann's "organisation" actually is. This
withdrawal of key information - as opposed to providing a choice between two
conflicting sets of alternative data - supplies the uncertainty of The Birthday Party
and thereby imitates a theological structure: a nameless, off-stage "organisation"
which punishes and rewards for no reason. With this in mind, we shall now examine
The Birthday Party in exclusively Neoplatonic terms, to see how closely (and
perversely) the 'unselving' and reduction of Stanley parallels the re-incorporation of
the soul into the Ineffable One of Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius ...and Meister Eckhart.
4.2.3 Absorbed into the One.
Before re-interpreting the text of The Birthday Party in terms of Eckhart's
Neoplatonism, three caveats have to be made. Firstly, the ground for such a reading is
one of simple hermeneutical curiosity - no-one is suggesting for a moment that Pinter
wrote his play with anything even remotely concerning the word 'Neoplatonism' in
mind. Insofar as the play concerns the destruction of a self, the text offers some
parallels with the gradual dissolution of the self in Neoplatonic thought, and it is
these parallels which we aim to investigate. Secondly, the fact that Eckhart's
vocabulary has Neoplatonic roots does not necessarily make Eckhart a Neoplatonist,
but rather someone who works within a certain tradition to develop it in a highly
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original and distinctive way. The Neoplatonic citations of Eckhart we use are not
intended to be representative of the Eckhart presented in this study.
The possibility that, particularly concerning topics such as the genealogy of the
word Volksgeist back to Herder and beyond, or the various and manifold connections
between Nazism and mysticism, some of the Ur-metaphors of National Socialism
might have found their beginnings in the flourishing of late medieval Rhineland
mysticism would seem to be a bizarre speculation. Admittedly, there are a number of
common motifs: the union of the self with an ineffable, omnipotent and above all
pure Oneness, the sacrifice of individuality in order to be assimilated into a
mysterious entity, bigger and Other than oneself ... whether National Socialism does
provide an example of how a totalitarian state can exploit a number of long-abiding
religious metaphors for their own political ends remains a question for another time.
The fact that some Nazi intellectuals were greatly interested in Eckhart (most notably
Alfred Rosenberg, whose 1934 work Die Religion des Meister Eckharts extolled the
new, Nordic faith of the Dominican above the "tormented, bound, bastardized 'half-
African' Augustine") may or may not provide some substance to these speculations -
however, such conjectures upon the political implications of Eckhart's Gottesmystik
will need to be developed elsewhere. The totalitarian possibilities of Eckhart's
dissolving of the soul into the darkness of the Godhead , although interesting and
indirectly related, have no real place in a study of Pinter, and therefore I have chosen
1 "3
to pass over them for now.
The various motifs of Neoplatonism occur frequently in the writings of
Dionysius and Eckhart: the progressive return of the fallen soul to the One, a return
from multiplicity to unicity, from the impure to the pure, from sense to non-sense,
and from discourse and vision to silence and darkness. In order for the soul to be re¬
united with the original oneness or epekeina tes ousia, it first has to undergo a series
of progressive stages - what Eckhart calls "process of becoming nothingness" {in
13 cited p275 - for Rosenberg's understanding of Eckhart in his DerMythus des 20.Jahrhunderts
(Munich, 1938) see section 1.1. A number of Rosenberg studies do deal with his obsession with
Eckhart at some length, most notably Robert Cecil's The Myth of the Master Race (London: Batsford,
1972). Cecil points out how Rosenberg understood the inimitably Eckhartian ground of the soul in
purely racial terms, "a secret core that there develops what we call racial characteristic (Volkstum) and
race-culture..." p85 - Cecil is citing Rosenberg from an address made to a conference of teachers.
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einem niht-werdenne)}4 This section will now examine how Stanley himself
becomes a "nothingness" - the five stages he has to undergo before being assimilated
back into the "organisation": the recognition of one's sinful individuality, the
breaking-down of reason, blindness, silence and, finally, the ecstasy.
Individuality Is Wrong
It is clear from the beginning that Stanley is, in the ironic sense of the word, an
individual. His lethargic and seemingly aimless lifestyle, his aversion to fresh air, his
propensity to fictionalise his past, his unkempt state and erratic mood-swings (joking
with Meg one moment, deep fits of depression the next) all mark him immediately as
someone distinct from Petey and Lulu - someone who neither participates in society
nor contributes to it. Lulu's reproof in Act I essentially sums up his ex-centricity
regarding the outside world:
Do you want to have a look at your face?...You could do with a shave, do you
know that?... Don't you ever get out?...I mean, what do you do, just sit around
the house like this all day long?...Hasn't Mrs Boles got enough to do without
have you under her feet all day long? (25)
Lulu's good-natured criticism of Stanley, painting his existence as a superfluous and
unnecessary addition to society, forms a milder version of Goldberg and McCann's
own diatribe against him, later in the play. Stanley's individuality is unclean ("When
did you last have a bath?" demands Goldberg), unproductive ("When did you last
wash a cup?" 49), anti-social ("Why do you treat that young lady like a leper?" 47)
and ultimately an obstruction to the progress of the community ("Why are you getting
in everybody's way?" 47). Just as the dissimilarity of the imperfect soul prevents its
union with the One, Stanley's distinctive particularity prevents him from
participating in any kind of group or communal set of values. Unlike Goldberg, who
is full of talk of his "old mum", his girlfriend, his wife, his "Uncle Barney", Stanley
never talks about his family context, apart from mentioning the father who failed to
attend his concert performance.
14
Davies, Meister Eckhart, p46 - from the Talks of Instruction, XXIII, Traktat 2, Largier p422
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Clearly, if Stanley is to be ushered back into whatever concept of society
Goldberg has in mind, the annihilation of Stanley resistant selfhood is the first task to
be undertaken. Eckhart calls this "the destruction of the person", an "eradication and
reduction of self\ein verninten und verkleinern sin selbes).15 Stanley's
reintroduction into the "organisation" (italics mine) involves precisely this removal
of all things alien to it, a process which begins not only with the recognition of
difference as obstruction, but also with the abandonment of reason.
The Breaking-Down ofReason.
The disintegration of Stanley's rational faculties forms the second stage of his
progress towards the One and mirrors Eckhart's own insistence on how the soul
"should become non-mental and stripped of its mental nature"(Dc dinsel sol nich
geistig sin und entplozet aller geistekeite).16 Stanley's obstinate reluctance to sit
down in the middle ofAct II eventually instigates the famous interrogation scene -
where Goldberg and McCann ply a seated Stanley with a flood of bizarre,
disconnected questions ("What about the Albigensinist heresy? Who watered the
wicket in Melbourne?...Why did the chicken cross the road?" 51). How does such an
interrogation effect the disintegration of Stanley's reason?
In two ways: by showing - through a succession of contradictory and stunningly
surreal questions - how all answers are constructs and, consequently, by
demonstrating how no answer Stanley provides, rational or irrational, can ever be the
'right' one. Goldberg and McCann construct their own truth-conditions in their use of
questions - a set of criteria which are utterly their own and which they constantly
change. When they ask "Is the number 846 possible or necessary?" (50), there is no
correct answer - first it is "necessary but not possible", then "necessarily possible",
and finally "only necessarily necessary". The interrogators' own use of rationality
underlines the arbitrary absurdity of their questions; such an abandonment of reason
on behalf of the interrogators makes Stanley's situation quite hopeless. Regardless of
whether he gives reasonable answers ("When did you come to this place?" "Last
15 ibid, p46, Largier 420
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year." 48) or nonsensical ones ("Why did you change your name?" "I forgot the other
one." 50), Stanley is wrong, wrong, wrong, "all along the line" (51).
The interrogation scene in Act II shows that Stanley is never going to find the
'right' answer through reason, particularly when the interrogators themselves have
excluded the rational from their consideration of possible answers. Goldberg and
McCann have the monopoly on truth - principally because they make it up as they go
along. "Where was your wife?"-"What wife?"-"He's killed his wife!" (49).
Rationality cannot help Stanley but only hinder him in his attempt to satisfy his
interrogators' demands. Like his individuality, Stanley's reason becomes yet another
obstacle to be overcome in his progress towards the One, a One which is beyond
identity and difference, true and false, right and wrong.
Blindness
Not only does Stanley lose his reason, he also loses his sight. In the middle of
Act II, halfway through the interrogation scene, McCann plucks Stanley's spectacles
away on Goldberg's orders. "What can you see without your glasses?" asks
Goldberg. "Anything" lies the myopic Stanley (49). In Eckhart, such a loss of vision
is extolled as a prerequisite for divine knowledge: "When the mind is blind and sees
nothing else, it sees God".17 In so far as vision is still one of the senses - and thereby
maintains the attachment of the soul to the here and now, to this and that - it must be
abandoned if one is to embrace the all-encompassing oneness of God, who is neither
here nor there, neither this nor that. To lose one's vision, for both Stanley and the
Eckhartian sele, is to lose the final point of contact with the individual, the particular.
Such blindness is a prelude towards union with the One.
Of course, the more immediately practical reason why McCann snatches away
Stanley's glasses is to render him defenceless. The stage-directions have Stanley
"stumbling" after McCann to recover his spectacles, and then clutching at a chair to
steady himself in his short-sightedness(49). Not long after McCann gives Stanley's
glasses back to him, Stanley finds his sight removed again as he plays his turn in
16
ibid, p238 - from the sermon Renovamini spiritu, Sermon 83, Largier 194
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'blind man's buff. It is not difficult to see why the loss of vision forms such a central
metaphor in Stanley's subjugation, sight being the most irrepressible expression of
selfhood. To gaze is to reify, to re-describe, to colour the subject with one's own
inimitable viewpoint. The implicit threat in the gaze of the Other - the Other which
sees me and, in a sense, gives me being - is reciprocal. Were it not for my gaze, the
Other would not be. Where Levinas uses this mutual need of the Other positively as
the basis for his own post-metaphysical ethic, the foundation ofmy identity in the
gaze of the Other only ever finds malevolent expression in Pinter, regardless of
whether it is the reifying gaze of Goldberg, Ruth or Mick. When Stanley loses his
sight, his is not merely a physical disadvantage, a handicap which will make Stanley
easier to capture and subdue. Stanley's blindness turns him into the subject of those
who would perceive him without being perceived. No longer able to individuate and
re-appropriate the blur of phenomena which surrounds him, his last weapon of
defense - that of the gaze which could glare back triumphantly at his persecutors and
consume them from the angle of its own, unreachable perspective - is "stripped
away". The loss of Stanley's individual (and individuating) field of vision prepares
him to be absorbed back into the One.
Silence
Silence, in Neoplatonism, performs two functions; in one sense, it is a
preparatory precondition for being re-appropriated into the One ("Where this word is
to be heard, there must be stillness and silence").18 In another, it is the only adequate
response to the ineffability of the One ("The finest thing we can say about God is to
be silent...").19 Stanley's gurgled inarticulation and subsequent silence at the end of
the play parodies, in many ways, the unspeakability of the One and the mystical
silence which it demands:
GOLDBERG: What do you think? Eh, boy?
STANLEY begins to clench and unclench his eyes.
McCANN: What's your opinion, sir? Of this prospect, sir?
17
Schurmann, Meister Eckhart, pi26 - from the sermon Surrexit autem Saulus de terra
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GOLDBERG: Prospect. Sure. Sure it's a prospect.
STANLEY'S hands clutching his glasses begin to tremble.
What's your opinion of such a prospect? Eh, Stanley?
STANLEY concentrates, his mouth opens, he attempts to speak, fails and emits
sounds from his throat.
STANLEY: Uh-gug...uh-gug...eeeh-gag...(o/z the breath) Caahh...caahh...(84)
Rather than re-iterate the obvious political significance of Stanley's loss of speech,
an area of The Birthday Party already well-explored and documented by other Pinter
critics, I would just like to underline how silence acts as a closing stage of Stanley's
journey towards the One - the One being, in this sense, his re-incorporation into
society. The importance of remaining alert - of retaining the use of all of one's senses
- has been an important motif throughout the play. When Stanley suggests that his
interrogators are deaf to his requests for them to leave, Goldberg becomes wistfully
ironic: "What makes you think that? As a matter of fact, every single one ofmy
senses is at its peak."(44) - an assertion we will not be able to make about Stanley at
the end of the play. Stanley's protective feelings towards Meg and Petey ("They've
been down here too long. They've lost their sense of smell. I haven't." 45) underline
the link between resistance and the individual's use of the senses. Whether Stanley
actually loses his own sense of smell in the end, as he is led out to the van, is
impossible to say. What he certainly does lose is his sight and his speech. As Stanley
moves towards the One, his reason, vision and speech are gradually stripped away
from him.
The noises Stanley makes as he attempts to speak ("Caahh...caahh...") are
reminiscent of the moment in Godot, when the much-oppressed Pozzo tries to speak
without his hat. Typically interpreted as the impossibility/futility of intellectual
expression, Stanley's stammering and then ultimate silence also signify the 'wiping
clean' of Stanley's slate, a tabula rasa with which Goldberg proposes to make "a
new man" (81). The Eckhartian soul, we will recall, is "empty of self and freed from
90
the knowledge of objects" , emptied to prepare a space (a clearing) for the birth of
the Word in the ground of the soul. The Birthday Party is the story of one such birth -
the story of the "emptying" of a human being (or as Ruby Cohn would say, the
"annihilation of an individual") and the birth of a new citizen. If speech really is the
20
Davies, Meister Eckhart, p225, from the sermon Cumfactus esset
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ex-pression of interiority, then Stanley's complete emptiness of self explains his
silence - Stanley has, quite literally, 'nothing' to say.
Ecstasy
Ecstasy, in Neoplatonic terms, is the joy of the final union with the One, the bliss of
abandoning one's own corrupting selfhood. The fact that, etymologically, it literally
means a 'standing outside one's self (ex-stasis) brings us closer to the version of
ecstasy we find in The Birthday Party - as encapsulated , we will recall, by
Goldberg's sinister promise about Stanley to Meg: "We'll bring him out of himself'
(33). Goldberg, for all his irony, is ruthlessly accurate: in three acts, we witness the
gradual dissolution of Stanley's individuality, the dismantling of his reason, the theft
of his vision and speech, and the 'hollowing-out' of his person - presumably to be
filled by the likes of Monty, Goldberg's sinister-sounding doctor who is going to give
Stanley "special treatment". The final moments of the play do intimate, in a sense,
how Stanley really has gone out of himself:
MEG: Where's Stan?
Pause.
Is Stan down yet, Petey?
PETEY: No...he's...
MEG: Is he still in bed?
PETEY: Yes, he's...still asleep. (86)
When the mute, well-dressed, clean-cut version of Stanley is finally marched out of
his house towards the van (a march, one may add, not at all like Josef K.'s final walk
with his interrogators, where K. struggles and pulls and locks his legs the entire way),
Stanley's old self remains behind in the bedsit, still "asleep". As the silent,
characterless, "new" Stanley is escorted out to the van and driven away to an
uncertain future, Stanley's ghost almost seems to haunt the house in the closing
minutes of the play, thanks to Petey's deceit and Meg's ignorance.
Of course, Stanley's ecstasy in The Birthday Party is by no means joyful or
even desired. Whereas the Neoplatonic soul longs to return to the source, is willing to
give everything up in order to be re-joined with the originary Oneness, Stanley is
trapped, bullied and coerced into his abandonment of self. It would be difficult
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indeed to imagine a reading of The Birthday Party where Stanley runs - like Kafka's
mouse - willingly into the trap he sees before him. Although a Christian Neoplatonist
would see Stanley's clinging to his own individuality as 'impure' and 'sinful', it
remains a forgivably secular gesture. Stanley does not trust the One which seeks to
re-claim him, despite all its promises that he'll be a "mensch" and will have
"success" (83). In the face of an all-encompassing homogeneity, Stanley adopts a
faintly Kierkegaardian pose, preferring the Individual to the General, the particular
over the universal, and seeking refuge from the various Goldbergs and McCanns of
this world in his own irreducible inwardness - an inwardness which, alas, proves all
too reducible.
4,2.4 The Menace of the Mystery: Welcomins as Violence
In the middle of his sermon Dum medium silentium, Eckhart quotes the biblical
verse which supplies the title of the address:
In the middle of the night, when all things were in a quiet silence, there was
spoken to me a hidden word. It came like a thief by stealth.21
In contrast to Kafka's childhood trauma and Pinter's henchmen, the advent of the
Other in the middle of the night finds no menacing overtones in Eckhart - it is an
opportunity for spiritual renewal. For the Dominican, the divine Other arrives in the
night to give, not to take; to bestow, not to abduct. Despite such ominous-sounding
phrases such as "the darkness of the mystery of the eternal Godhead", Eckhart's
apophatic discourse of ineffable alterity remains an alterity of love - hence the
ultimately positive version of a giving Other in his theology, an Other whose Gift
will never be poisonous, malicious or ambiguous.
All of which, in turn, does provoke a cluster of complex questions: when did
we begin to see the henological model of the One as that which might seek to do us
harm, not good? Precisely when, and how, did the giving, caring Mystery acquire an
unconditional, unmotivated malice? What manner of genealogy could chart the
21 M. O'C. Walshe(ed), Meister Eckhart: German Sermons and Treatises (London: Watkins, 1979)
vol 1, p9 - Sapientia 18:4
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transformation of the ineffable from agape to groundless malevolence? And, finally:
to what extent can we see the darker strains of the tradition of the absurd - Josef K.'s
never-cited crime, Goldberg and McCann's unexplained "organisation" - as
constituting a sinister version of the language of negative theology, with its emphasis
on the utter ineffability of God, the unsearchability of his judgements and the
absolutely unconditional and unmotivated nature of his love?
These are questions which cannot be answered within the bounds of this
study; and yet which nevertheless pervade our entire approach to the question of the
Other in Eckhart, Derrida and Pinter. For now, we simply have to conclude that our
Neoplatonic reading of The Birthday Party offers us an insight into why uncertainty
is so sinister in Pinter. Insofar as Stanley's story in The Birthday Party is the story of
a man who is crushed by the Ineffable, by people we do not know, for reasons we are
not told about, and is taken away to a place which is never revealed. Such uncertainty
in the form ofmystery, as we have already said, is of a radically different kind from
the undecidability to be found in The Caretaker and The Homecoming, nevertheless
the effects are the same, even if the sources are different: exploitation, suffering, fear
and anguish. Whereas, in Eckhart and Derrida, the uncertain is affirmed in order to
bring about an 'openness' or 'emptiness' towards the Other, no such positive
employment of uncertainty occurs in Pinter. Regardless of whether it is Ruth playing
games with a puzzled Lenny, two brothers playing 'good cop/bad cop' with a
homeless tramp, or an interrogation in which the only questions asked are always






5.1 Negative Theology vs Deconstruction: Eckhart as De-limiter or
Deferrer ?
God is not perhaps so much a region beyond knowledge, as something prior to
the sentences we speak.
- Foucault, The Order of Things1
Our examination of uncertainty in Eckhart, Derrida and Pinter, along with its
subsequent affirmation /defamation, has almost come to an end. In preceding
chapters we have seen how the critique of presence renders God/the text resistant to
all totalization - an inescapable ineffability/textual instability which, although
affirmed as dynamic and life-giving in both negative theology and deconstruction,
only ever finds its expression in The Homecoming through aggressive mind-games
and strategic exploitation. We have seen how the motif of wandering, with all its
implications of goal-lessness and whylessness, is not only depicted but also extolled
in Eckhart and Derrida, and portrayed as a state of vulnerability and anguish in The
Caretaker. Finally, we have examined the uncertainty of the Mystery /Other in
Eckhart and Derrida, an Other which gives and to whom we should remain
empty/open, alongside the sinister version of the Other in The Birthday Party, an
Other which uses its ineffability to crush and assimilate any difference it finds in its
path.
What remains, however, is the question of the secret - of that which is
withheld, concealed, kept away. The aim of this final, brief chapter is to ask: to what
extent do the texts of Derrida, Eckhart and Pinter conceal a secret? Is Eckhart's
Godhead beyond God really just another all-too-familiar deferral of the mystery? Can
difference ever really be "neither a word or a concept"?2 Is there already a secret to
Pinter's plays, locked away somewhere inside them - or do we bring the mystery to
his texts? Do we imbue the noises we hear, the words we read, with an enigma which
is simply not there?
1 cit. by Jean-Luc Marion in "A Relief for Theology", Critical Inquiry 3 (1994) p570
2
Margins ofPhilosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982) p3
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As we have seen consistently throughout this thesis, Derrida sees Meister
Eckhart and the discourse of negative theology, even in its most apophatic of
moments, as the keeper of a secret. In fairness to Derrida, his insistence upon the
subtle yet inherent logocentrism in Eckhart and Dionysius has not been dogmatic, a
blind sticking-to-one's-guns.3 In essays devoted exclusively to the apophatic project
such as "Denials" (1987) and "Post-Scriptum" (1993), Derrida takes great pains to
point out his admiration for the corpus of negative theology - a "corpus at once open
and closed", and written in a language "that does not cease testing the very limits of
language" (qui ne cesse de mettre a I'epreuve les limites meme du langage).4 Aware
of claims that he is subscribing (as Kevin Hart has said) to an orthodox, "classic"
version of negative theology - a version which would simply be the negative half of a
Hegelian dialectic - Derrida has been keen to distance himself from a naive reading
of Eckhart and Dionysius, and acknowledge the complexity and difficulty of their
thought.
An acknowledgement, however, which has not led Derrida to withdraw his
basic - and long-abiding - objection to negative theology: that, after all its negations,
de-negations and auto-deconstructions, the apophatic is still concerned with (to use
Foucault's phrase) a region beyond knowledge. It still keeps "in reserve ...some
hyperessentiality" (elle semble reserver ...quelque suressentialite) and thereby
ultimately re-affirms the onto-theo-logic.5 What I propose to do in this section is, first
of all, to examine the various ways in which Derrida has strengthened and elaborated
his position on negative theology - in particular on Meister Eckhart; and, secondly, to
show how the version of Eckhart Derrida rejects as logocentric, although by no
means a simplistic, 'classical' model of the negative theologian, remains
nevertheless a selective reading of his work, based on a certain number of the more
3 For a different and somewhat hostile version of Derrida's reluctance to acknowledge the openness
and non-logocentricity of negative theology, see Morny Joy's "Divine Reservations" (Derrida and
Negative Theology [Albany: SUNY Press, 1992] pp255-283), which paints an amusingly original but
slightly bizarre picture of a solitary, prodigal sceptic, unwilling to return once more to the home of his
Jewish heritage: "Derrida remains on the threshold. He cannot come home - though it seems he is
enticed, fascinated. Derrida is the exile, the outsider...Lashed to the masthead of reason, he will not
succumb to the siren song of experience."p263
"Post-Scriptum" found in Coward, Derrida and Negative Theology, p295,299, Saufle nom 53
5 "Denials" found in Coward, Derrida and Negative Theology, p77, Psyche 540
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orthodox, 'safer' moments in his sermons, as opposed to other passages which would
be less easily appropriated into a metaphysics of presence.
In the original discussion following Derrida's 1971 lecture "La Differance",
Brice Parain was one of the first to stand up and declare: "[Differancejis the source
of everything and one cannot know it. It is the God of negative theology".6 Derrida's
passionate response, both interrupting and interrupted, does tell us something about
the depth of his conviction: "It is and is not - it is above all not - ...". Why does
Derrida refuse to except figures such as Eckhart and Dionysius from his critique of
the logocentric tradition? Why, for Derrida, will deconstruction always remain
analogous to negative theology, but always maintain an "infinite distance" from it?7
Derrida's objections to the apophatic discourse, fleshed out in his two later
essays, are four in number: firstly (and most importantly), the discourse of negative
theology manifests itself in the form of a promise - the promise to impart a secret, to
unveil a mystery, a promise which defers as much as it refers. Secondly, the frequent
insistence in negative theology on the necessity of purity - one must be pure in order
to receive the secret, in order to be worthy of the promise - also arouses Derrida's
suspicions of a self-present identity. Thirdly, such discourses are always directed -
Derrida notes how both Dionysius and Eckhart begin and end their writings with
prayers, as though to 'orient' the address towards its correct destination, and not just
'anywhere'. Such an insistence on purity and preparation, says Derrida (fourthly)
ultimately provokes a prohibition of all discourse, a theology which exhorts silence
and commands not to speak. For Derrida, all four of these motifs in negative theology
- the promise of the secret, the guiding prayer, the purity of the reception and the
silencing ineffable - are characteristic of logocentric discourses.
6Taken from "The original discussion of 'La Differance'" in David Wood, Derrida and Difference
(Coventry: Parousia Press, 1988) p84. Stephen Moore, citing Parain's remark in his Poststructuralism
and the New Testament (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), adds somewhat flippantly: "Perhaps he
had wandered in late or, more likely, fallen asleep. Several pages into his paper, Derrida had already
said of differance..." (p23). If an author's disclaimer is enough to dissuade Moore from thinking one
thing about the author's text instead of another, then perhaps his own rational faculties have fallen
asleep.
7 in Wood, Derrida and Differance, p84
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l.The Promise of the Secret
To begin with the secret. In Eckhart's writings, writes Derrida, "one may say
that no mystery is made of the necessity of the secret", a fact which implies finding
"the place proper to the experience of the secret"(/c lieu propre a 1'experience du
secret).8 There can be no denying that, in certain passages, Eckhart does indeed speak
of the Godhead in terms of a secret - or as Derrida would say, a hyperessentiality kept
forever in reserve. "God is a word: an unspoken word" (Got ist ein wort, ein
ungesprochenen wort) says Eckhart in Misit dominus manum suam? The word
'secret/mystery' (Geheimnis/heimlicheit) occurs again in sermons such as Homo
quidam nobilis - "the hidden secrets of His hidden deity", "the mystery of the eternal
Godhead"10, which would seem to confirm Eckhart as the keeper of a secret. All of
the excerpts from Eckhart which Derrida cites - and Derrida makes use of two
sermons in particular in "Denials", Quasi Stella matutina and Renovamini spiritu -
are selected with this notion of a reserve hyperessentiality in mind:
But when I said that God is not a being and is above Being [iiber wesen], I have
not denied Him being [ich im niht wesen abgesprochen] but, rather, I have
exalted Being in Him [ich hati es in im gehoehet], p78
Goodness is a garment under which God is hidden, and the will apprehends God
under the garment of goodness, pi 15
When we apprehend God in Being, we apprehend Him in his parvis [the outer
sanctuary of the temple], for Being is the parvis in which He resides, p 121
"Is it arbitrary to still call truth or hyper-truth this unveiling which is perhaps no
longer an unveiling of Being?" asks Derrida. "I do not believe so".11 The selections
from Eckhart that Derrida quotes all reflect this notion of a hidden "hyper-truth"(5Mr-
verite). Whether the metaphor is the nakedness of God which lies under the garment,
or the penetralium which lies in the inner sanctuary of the temple, Derrida is keen to
stress the moments in Eckhart where a hidden, greater truth is concealed beneath the
8
"Denials", p89, Psyche 552
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visible. Hence the faintly Freudian irony of the essay title in English: "Denials".
Negative theology vigorously denies what is secretly true.12 No surprise, therefore,
that Derrida sees Eckhart's denial of onto-theology as an ultimate affirmation.
Thus, Derrida presents a version of Eckhart, who on the one hand "radically
contests the tradition from which [he] seems to come"(conteste radicalement la
tradition dont il semble provenir), but on the other, whose "hyperbole" still remains
"faithful to the originary onto-theological injunction"(fidele...a I'injonction onto-
theologique originaire).13 Although the word 'dialectic' does not appear, it is a
remark which reinforces Kevin Hart's assertion that, to a certain extent, Derrida's
understanding of Eckhart is still coloured by Hegel. This does not mean that
Derrida's version of Eckhart is invalid - but simply that there is still another Eckhart,
one who can be constructed by citing different passages from the ones Derrida
presents to us in "Denials".
For example, Derrida has never cited or alluded to Eckhart's celebrated
prayer: "I ask God to free me of 'God'" (Her umbe so bite ich got, daz ermich ledic
mache gotes).14 A prayer in which Eckhart's attempt to de-limit 'God' - that is, to
free God from 'God' - is most clearly expressed. Eckhart attempts to free God from
'God' in the same way Derrida wishes to free the text from the book. And yet it is a
de-limitation which Derrida can only ever see as a deferral, a negation "in the name
of a way of truth".15 Wherever Eckhart de-limits, Derrida will always suspect him of
deferring. Whenever Eckhart claims to abandon onto-theology, Derrida will always
suspect him of really 'saving it for later'. It is precisely this conviction of Derrida's -
that Dominicans can defer but they can't de-limit, a conviction based on a selective
reading of Eckhart's works - which we are calling into question.
Consider again, for another example, a key passage from the sermon Nolite
timere eos, a passage Derrida has never cited. Nolite timere is a sermon Derrida is
fond of quoting - he cites a line from it in his essay on Jabes (the first line of the
12 I say "faintly", for Derrida stresses his wish to understand the notion of denial "prior even to its
elaboration in the Freudian context" ("Denials",p95).
13
"Post-Scriptum" found in Coward, Derrida and Negative Theology, p309,78-9




passage below16 ), and again in his essay on Levinas.17 Derrida has never mentioned,
however, the final and most important passage in this short, three-side sermon:
God 'becomes' God when all creatures speak God forth: there 'God' is born.
When I was still in the ground, in the depths, in the flow and source of the
Godhead, no one asked me where I wished to go or what I was doing. But as I
flowed forth, all creatures uttered 'God'...This is how all creatures speak of God.
And why do they not speak of the Godhead? All that is in the Godhead is One,
and of this no-one can speak. God acts, while the Godhead does not act. There is
nothing for it to do, there is no action in it...The difference between God and the
Godhead is that one acts, the other does not. If I return to 'God' but do not
remain there, then my break through is far better than my flowing out...But when
I enter the ground, the bottom, the flow and the source of the Godhead, no-one
asks me where I come from and where I have been. There no-one has missed me,
and there God 'unbecomes'.18
God 'becomes' and 'unbecomes'-. by insisting on the nameless, silent non-place
beyond and before 'God', Eckhart de-ontologises God by robbing Him of what
Aquinas would have called 'His highest name' - Being {esse). Aquinas' via
eminentiae, we will recall, insisted that names could be used of God, but in an
imperfect manner.19 God is denied the names 'Being', 'Love', 'Goodness', only to
re-possess them on a higher level, in an infinitely ungraspable way - it is precisely
this idea of a Thomist hyperessentiality that Derrida wishes to attribute to Eckhart.
Whilst there are many passages in both the German and Latin works where Eckhart
would seem to agree with his Dominican brother, the above-cited passage is not one
of them. The Godhead beyond God is the non-place where names and attributes are
not re-affirmed but dissolved. Concepts of God are not re-formulated but dismantled.
It is difficult to see how any kind of Hegelian releve could breakthrough to the
truthless, nameless abyss of the Godhead - or indeed, what manner of
'hyperessentiality' it could ever expect to find there.
For another example of a sermon which Derrida never mentions, and yet which
would undermine the re-assuring, re-affirming version of Eckhart proposed in
"Denials", one could look at Surrexit autem Saulus de terra. It is a sermon, in many
ways, about nothingness, about the divine nothingness that God is and the creaturely
16
Writing and Difference, p71
17
Writing and Difference, pi46
18 Davies (ed), Meister Eckhart, p234
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nothingness that created things are. The subject is the moment after the blinding
conversion of Saul on the road to Damascus, taken from Acts 9:8 "Paul rose from the
ground and with open eyes saw nothing". Eckhart's sermon deals with this word
"nothing" {nihil) in a variety of ways, revealing at once an extraordinary multiplicity
of meanings:
It seems to me that this little phrase has a fourfold meaning. First, when he rose
up from the ground, with open eyes he saw nothing, and this nothingness was
God. Indeed he saw God, and that is what he calls a nothingness. Second, when
he rose up, he saw nothing but God. Third, in all things, he saw nothing but God.
Fourth, when he saw God, he saw all things as a nothingness.
Mich diinket, daz diz wortelin vier sinne habe. Ein sin ist: do er ufstuont von der
erden, mit offenen ougen sach er niht, und daz niht was got; wan do er got sach,
daz heizet er ein niht. Der ander sin: do er ufstuont, do ensach er niht wan
got.Der dritte: in alien dingen ensach er niht wan got. Der vierde: do er got
sach, do sach er alliu dine als ein niht.20
Here, Eckhart makes use of the two kinds of nothingness in his thought - the
inimitable, unspeakable no-thingness of God, and the creaturely nothingness of
created beings whose entire existence depends on God. In the second chapter
(Section 2.1.2), we suggested briefly that Eckhart's understanding of God as a
"nothingness" {ein niht) concerned a God which is like no-thing. God's radical
incommensurability, the fact that there is literally (following Avicenna's dictum) no¬
thing which can be similar to God, prompts Eckhart to call Him a niht. Might not this
niht still be a Derridean "hyperessentiality" - or, more accurately, a 'hypernullity'?
Whatever we think or say or write about God, the secret of what He 'is' will always
be different, will always be other. Is this not a classic example of the deferred "hyper-
truth"? A second passage from the same sermon shows us why this might not be so:
To see [God] one must be blind and one must divest God of everything that there
is. A master says: to speak of God in any simile is to speak of him in an impure
mode. But whoever speaks of God through nothingness speaks of him to the
point.
When the mind penetrates into the One, entering in pure dereliction
[verworfenheit] of itself, it finds God as in a nothingness. A man had a dream, a
daydream: it seemed to him that he was big with nothingness as a woman is with
child. In this nothingness, God was born. He was the fruit of nothingness. God
19 for a summary of this, see Bernard McGinn's excellent introduction "Meister Eckhart on Speaking
About God" in his Meister Eckhart.Teacher and Preacher (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1986) vol 2,
pp 15-30
20
Schiirmann, Meister Eckhart, pl22 - Sermon 71, Quint 3:211-2
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was born in nothingness. This is why it says: "Paul rose from the ground and
with open eyes saw nothing".
...swer daz sehen sol, der muoz blint sin undmuoz got al abnemen von ihte. Ein
meister sprichet: swer von gote redet bi deheiner glichnisse, der redet
unluterliche von im. Der aber bi nihte von gote redet, der redet eigenliche von
im.
Swenne diu sele kumet in ein und si da inne tritet in ein luter verworfenheit
ir selber, da vindet si got als in einem nihte. Ez duhte einen menschen als in eine
troume - ez was ein wachender troum -, wie ez swanger wiirde von nihte als ein
vrouwe mit einem kinde, und in dem nihte wart got geborn; der was diu vruht
des nihtes. Got wart geborn in dem nihte. Da von sprichet er: "er stuont ufvon
der erden, und mit ojfenen ougen sach er niht."
We shall return to what Eckhart means by "impure mode" in a moment. When
Derrida insisted that differance was unnameable, but "nor because our language has
not yet found or received this name"22, he was distinguishing differance not just from
Heidegger's Being but also from the God of negative theology. Differance, Derrida
has famously said, is older than both Being and God. Despite Eckhart's frequent
declaration that God is nameless (namloz), Derrida still suspects Eckhart's God of
ultimately possessing a secret, originary name, a secret identity: "To respond to the
true name of God...It is to this end that the negative procedure refuses, denies, rejects
all the inadequate attributions"!...repondre au vrai nom de Dieu...C'est a cettefin que
' ' / / 23la procedure negative refuse, nie, rejette toutes les attributions inadequates).
Despite passages such as the one cited, where Eckhart presents a God divested "of
everything that there is", a silent, nameless, primordial nothingness which is the
source of all names - Derrida still sees in Eckhart the return (releve) to a "hyper-
truth", one which would re-inscribe the very attributes that had been temporarily
'denied'.
There are eighty-three sermons in Quint's edition of the Deutsche Werke - it is
obviously not the intent of this section to castigate Derrida for not having quoted
from every one of them. Nor is the intention to simply label Derrida's Eckhart
'wrong' or 'incomplete' - on the contrary, many Eckhart scholars would agree with
the dialectical reading of Eckhart's denegations.24 The aim of this section is simply
21
ibid, pi26 - Sermon 71, Largier 71
22
Margins ofPhilosophy (trans. Alan Bass - Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982) p26, 28
23
"Post-Scriptum", p310, Saufle nom 82
24
McGinn, admittedly somewhat guardedly, agrees that "the term dialectic, at least understood in its
Neoplatonic form, is, I believe, a more appropriate word to characterize the dynamics of Eckhart's
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to point out how the body of Eckhart's texts, to use Derrida's own words,
"definitively escape any exhaustive treatment" (se derobent definitivement a toute
exhaustion).25 There is no single Eckhart one can incontestably deduce from the
sermons, no more than there is a single negative theology, a fact Derrida himself
96
acknowledges on more than one occasion."
As soon as Derrida has established his logocentric reading of Eckhart, where
the abyss of the Godhead would become the secret location of the hyperessentiality
of God, then the rest of his objections - that negative theology is obsessed with
purity, that it always calls on prayer to guide its discourses , and that its primary
function is not to encourage discourse but to silence it - follow on fairly logically. If
one insists on interpreting negative theology not as a de-limitation of God but rather
as a deferral of God's secret ousia, then such words as 'purity', 'prayer' and 'silence'
are going to be understood in their conventional meanings, as opposed to the highly
original and unorthodox use which a different reading of Eckhart would make of
them.
2.Purity
For example, the notion of 'purity' becomes an ever-recurring motif in
"Denials", as Derrida uses it to show how negative theology still conforms to
logocentric assumptions of presence. Taking the example of Moses proffered by
Dionysius in his Mystical Theology, who "was ordered first to purify himself, and
then to separate himself from those who were not pure"27 before going up onto the
mountain to talk with God, Derrida sees this emphasis on purification as the most
important logocentric symptom in negative theology. He cites, to further support his
argument, Dionysius' recommendation that the soul should be soft and virginal, like
way of speaking about God." From the introduction to McGinn, Meister Eckhart.Teacher and
Preacher, vol 2, p26
23
Peggy Kamuf, A Derrida Reader (Exeter: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) pl73, La Dissemination 183
26
see in particular "Denials"(p82) where Derrida considers the "voluminous and nebulous multiplicity
of potentials to which the single expression 'negative theology' yet remains inadequate".
27 "Denials" p92, taken from Dionysius' Mystical Theology 1:1000 (The Complete Works, trans. Colm
Luibheid [London: SPCK, 1987])
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wax (keros), in order to perfectly receive the imprint of God.28 Derrida's point is
clear: for the purity of the divine presence to be experienced, uncontaminated by
worldly things, the soul itselfmust be pure and virginal - what Eckhart would call
'God-coloured' (gotvar). An aversion towards the 'impure' which would seem to be
the epitomy of the very onto-theology it seeks to deconstruct.
However, Derrida actually misreads the word 'purity' here - or, at least, fails
to take into account another interpretation of the word, one which would no longer
understand purity as conformity with a pure self-presence, but rather as the prelude
towards union with a divine nothingness. Without a doubt, Eckhart often insists in
his sermons (particularly Intravit Jesus in quoddam castellum) on the necessity of
remaining "virginal and free" (ledic und vri) towards God. Only likeness can bring
about union, as the Scholastics say, therefore "he who wishes to receive the virginal
9Q
Jesus must himself be virginal and free"." However, the notion of purity/virginity
here does not mean the reception of a presence, or the conformity of the soul to a
certain identity, a certain colour, a certain essence. On the contrary, to be 'pure' in
Eckhart means to become a kind of abyss - to be unattached to images, "free and
disengaged" from all logoi, to be "empty and free as God is empty and free in
himself'.30 If God is a divine nothingness, then the soul too must become a kind of
nothingness if it is to achieve union with Him - such is this notion of purity in
Eckhart which Derrida fails to allow for.
One might even say it is a desire for purity which Derrida himself displays in
his attempt to disassociate deconstruction from the "locutions, detours and syntax" of
-3 1
negative theology. In a passage from "Post-Scriptum" which relates how negative
theology fulfils "the philosophical or ontotheological promise it seems to break" (la
promessephilosophique ou onto-theologique qu'elleparait renier)32, Derrida writes:
Conversely, I trust, no text that is not [negative theology] is someway
contaminated with negative theology, and even among those texts that
28 ibid pi20, taken from the Divine Names 2:644 (The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid
[London: SPCK, 1987])
29
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apparently do not have, want or believe they have any relation with theology in
general, (italics mine)
Inversement, je n'en crois aucun qui tie soit en rien contamine de theologie
negative, et meme parmi ceux qui apparemment n'ont, ne veulent ou ne croient
avoir aucun rapport avec la theologie en general.
Derrida's point is this: if negative theology insists that one can only know what God
is through what He is not, then all discourse - even that which claims not to have
"any relation with theology in general" - potentially becomes a statement about God.
What is of interest to us here, however, is how the word "contaminated" becomes
involved in this potential onto-theological re-appropriation of all discourse. Derrida's
reference to "those texts that apparently do not ...want...any relation with theology in
general" presumably includes his own writings - writings which attempt to enact a
critique of onto-theology, yet nevertheless remain "someway contaminated with
negative theology". Why "contaminated"? one feels forced to ask. Is this because the
'purity' of the deconstructive project must be maintained? And not be infiltrated (and
possibly hijacked) by negative theology?
Such questions, no doubt, lead us onto the familiar and somewhat exhausted
issue of the status of deconstruction. The point, however, is not to resurrect once
more the contours and conclusions of an already well-documented debate
(Gasche/Rorty/Norris et al), but simply to highlight how even Derrida cannot escape
a notion of 'purity' and 'contamination'. In his desire to keep an "infinite distance"
between his own writings and those of negative theology, he has to preserve the
'purity' of his own discourse, of differance, and keep it free from any form of
metaphysical 'contamination'. Whenever Derrida is forced to differentiate his own
work from the various motifs (and motives) of the apophatic, this notion of 'purity'
must inevitably be invoked - even if it concerns a 'purity' bereft of any notion of
identity or logos, the very kind of 'purity' Derrida failed to recognise in Eckhart: an
unattachment to images, a nameless emptiness, a logos-free abyss.
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3.Prayers
In addition to the motif of the secret and the insistence on purity in Eckhart
and Dionysius' writings, another proof of a 'hyperessentiality' in negative theology
cited by Derrida is the use of prayers. For Derrida, no matter how 'subversive' and
'deconstructive' the writings of negative theology appear to be, they are always
directed. For all their radical use of language and questioning of the onto-theo-logic,
they are still addressed towards a destination, towards a hyperessentiality. To
illustrate this, Derrida shows how dependent Dionysius is on the guiding prayer. "It is
IT
necessary to start with prayers" he writes in the Divine Names. The fact that
Dionysius begins his writings with both an opening prayer and an encomium (a kind
of hymnal celebration - "O holiest of holies") implies a desired reading of the text -
in much the same way the preface attempts to announce the pathway and trajectory of
the text it precedes.
An experience which must yet guide the apophasis towards excellence, not allow
it to say just anything...This experience is that of prayer.
Une experience doit encore guider I'apophase vers I'excellence, ne pas la
laisser dire n'importe quoi...Cette experience est celle de la priere.34
The encomium ("Thou hyperessential and more than divine Trinity"), says Derrida,
"qualifies God and determines prayer, determines the other".35 It directs the prayer,
and the text which follows it, towards a certain presence, towards a certain place. In
doing so, it not only determines God, but also gives its message a single,
incontestable meaning. The opening prayer, together with the encomium, ensures that
the message of the text does not simply wander off anywhere (like one of Derrida's
lost postcards) by addressing it to a predetermined destination. Negative theology,
Derrida is keen to remind us, cannot simply "say just anything".36
On behalf of negative theology, there are two ways of responding to this third
objection of Derrida's. One is to point out that, in certain moments of The Mystical
33 3:680, cit in "Denials" pi 12
34 ibid, pi 10, Psyche, 571
35 ibid, pi 11, 572
207
Theology and The Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysius declares that we can "say just
anything" about God. He makes the remarkable assertion that to call God "drunk"
and "hungover" is more "suitable" than calling Him 'good' or 'wise'37, for
"incongruous dissimilarities" make us more aware of God's ineffability than equally
finite adjectives such as 'almighty' and 'all-knowing'. "Everything ...can be a help to
contemplation" insists the Areopagite - although here, admittedly, the sense is not so
much 'Say anything you wish' but rather 'Call God anything you want to - it is all
equally false'.
The second response would be to make Jean Luc Marion's point that praying
to God is not the same as talking about God, or saying what God 'is'. Derrida is well
aware of this: "Neither the prayer nor the encomium is, of course, an act of constative
predication. Both have a performative dimension..." (M la priere ni la louange ne
sont certes des actes de predication constative. Toutes deux ont une dimension
performative...pi 11,572).38 Nevertheless, although Derrida is willing to acknowledge
the performative status of the prayer, he remains insistent that the Dionysian
encomium "preserves an irreducible relationship to the attribution". In other words,
Dionysius' various texts emphasising the unspeakability, namelessness and radical
otherness of God are ironically undermined from the start by an opening predication
of God. Dionysius' works on the indescribability of God begins paradoxically with a
description of God - an encomium which addresses God as "trinity" and
"hyperessential".
Do such prayers exist in Eckhart? And do they have the same 'constative'
function? Eckhart, like most preachers, ends his sermons with prayers rather than
beginning with them. He seems to have displayed, on more than one occasion, a
strikingly honest expectation of incomprehension (At the end of one sermon: "There
are many people who do not understand this. That is not surprising to me." Or, at the
end of another: "If anyone has understood this sermon, I wish them well").39
Therefore, he seldom prays for understanding on behalf of his congregation.
36 ibid, pi 10
37
Mystical Theology 3:1033B, Celestial Hierarchy 2:14IB
38 "Denials" pill, Psyche 572
39 taken from Praedica verbum in Schiirmann, Meister Eckhart, pi84, and from Nolite timere eos in
Clark, Meister Eckhart, pi 80
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Eckhart's brief prayers mostly involve asking God for divine help in becoming more
like Him, or in understanding better what God 'is'.
Once again, the argument forks: with Derrida's Thomist reading of Eckhart,
one could simply see the prayers at the end of the Dominican's sermons as examples
of what Derrida calls "counter-signatures" - ways of confirming that the text just
preached, however radically apophatic, is ultimately returned to the re-affirmed onto-
theological God. This is, indeed, a relatively valid interpretation of Eckhart's prayers
- however, it is not the only one. Prayers such as "May God...help us that we may be
prepared to receive the best of gifts"40, read in light of a different Eckhart, would act
as a prelude towards the "emptying of the soul" discussed in the previous chapter .
Such is Eckhart's prayer of preparation - de-essentializing, as opposed to re¬
affirming. Eckhart's prayer does not simply return his sermon to the all-too-familiar
God of onto-theology, but rather asks that the sele might become the kind of
nothingness that the Godhead is. If Eckhart's prayers do indeed guide the soul, they
guide it to a point where it no longer needs a guide. Which is precisely why Eckhart
makes his famous prayer "I beg God to rid me of 'God' ". Eckhart's prayers do not
"direct", they de-limit; they do not "determine", they empty. Far from invoking the
very concept of God Eckhart deemed idolatrous, Eckhart's prayers initiate the
breakthrough to the nameless, silent darkness of the Godhead.
4.The prohibition ofdiscourse
Of all Derrida's objections to negative theology's kinship with deconstruction,
his fourth and final one is perhaps the strongest. Partly because silence is so often
extolled as the end of negative theology, and partly because of Eckhart's own
frequent admonishments against 'chattering' (klafen) about God. Admonishments
which, for Derrida, only serve to reinforce negative theology's essential raison
d'etre: "...to speak in order to command not to speak" (Parlerpour commander de ne
pas parler).41 Once we realise that nothing we can say in our finite and imperfect
language can adequately represent God, that nothing in our inadequate vocabulary
40
Clark, Meister Eckhart, p!75, from the sermon Omne datem optimum
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can convey the incommensurable hyperessentiality of God, then "we learn to
read...and finally to be silent".42
Thus, Derrida sees negative theology as ultimately prohibiting discourse, as
ultimately discouraging talk about God. Derrida sees this as the most convincing
proof of both Eckhart and Dionysius' ultimate commitment to metaphysics. A
conviction that whatever we say will never be enough to convey the illusory "full
presence" of God - and therefore, we should not speak at all.
That Eckhart extols silence as "the finest thing we can say about God" (Das
schoneste, dc der mensche gesprechen mag von gotte)43 cannot be denied. Neither
can the frequency with which Eckhart commends the superiority of silence over
discourse in sermons such as Renovamini spiritu and Eratis enim aliquando. What
can be said, however, is that there are two different reasons in Eckhart why the
individual should remain silent about God - and Derrida only really considers the
first.
Eckhart's first silence is, as Derrida rightfully claims, the silence of
inadequacy. It is the silence of the finite in the presence of the infinite, the silence of
the speechless in the face of the incommensurable. It is a silence born partly out of a
sense of the fallibility of one's discourse, and (more importantly) out of a sense of
respect. Not surprisingly, Derrida sees in such respect an all-too-familiar homage
towards an ineffable plenitude. It is a silence which belongs to many other similar
calls for reticence in a variety of authors: Wittgenstein's "whereof one cannot speak,
thereof one must remain silent"; Augustine's divine contradictions, "to be passed
over in silence" rather than "resolved verbally"44; the silence of Kierkegaard's
Abraham, who "walks the narrow path of faith no-one can advise or understand"45. In
all such instances, it is our respect for the inexpressible 'hyper-truth' which forbids
us to speak.
41
"Denials", pl21, Psyche, 583
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ibid, pi 19
43 Davies (ed), Meister Eckhart, p236 - from the sermon Renovamini spiritu, Sermon 83 in Quint
3:442
44 Christian Doctrine, 1:6
45 Fear and Trembling, trans. Alistair Hannay (London: Penguin, 1995) p95
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Eckhart's second silence, however, is not really taken up by Derrida. Having
established Eckhart's God beyond God as just another infinitely deferred secret,
Derrida can only ever see the Dominican's silence as self-censure. In doing so,
Derrida misses the much more profound motivation behind the silence in Eckhart's
thought: silence is not merely understood as a resignation to ineffability, but also as a
prelude towards union with the silent, nameless nothingness of the Godhead.
We have already examined elsewhere how a central feature of the Godhead is
silence: the Godhead is a discourse-free zone, a place where language cannot happen.
Caputo writes that "while Eckhart spoke of a primal Word, he wanted to say that the
truest language of all was absolutely silent".46 Only through silence can one remain
in the Godhead - indeed, silence is a precondition of one's entry into it, and one's
remaining there:
When I was still in the ...source of the Godhead, no-one asked me where I was
going...But as I flowed forth, all creatures uttered 'God'. 47
"When I flowed out, all creatures said 'God'": as soon as one leaves the Godhead,
language can name, signification can occur, God can be called 'God' again. Once we
are willing to understand Eckhart's Godhead not as a secret hidden away in a box,
but rather as a silent darkness anterior to all our conceptions of God, then Eckhart's
call for reticence is no longer prohibitive, but rather imitative. In typically Scholastic
fashion, union can only come about through likeness. We have already seen how, if
the soul wishes to be one with God, it must become "empty and free as God is empty
and free in himself'. In the same way, if the soul wishes to breakthrough into the
silence of the Godhead, then it must become a kind of silence itself.
Within such a reading of Eckhart, the exhortation to silence in negative
theology is no longer the faintly totalitarian muzzle Derrida paints it to be, but rather
a means towards union with the divine. No longer the frowning prohibition of
'chatter' about God, but rather the possibility of finally dwelling in the silence of the
Godhead. No longer the veto on all discourse about God, but rather an attempt to
reach the same state of silence as God's ground, and thereby gain access to it.
46 John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1986) p224
47 Davies (ed), Meister Eckhart, p234
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The aim of this section, therefore, has been straightforward: to show how
Derrida, in his dealings with negative theology, has been more interested in an
Eckhart who defers than one who de-limits. Denys Turner criticises the various
"contemporary readings" which have painted an Eckhart "satisfyingly redolent of
Buddhism".48 Our attempt to present an alternative Eckhart to the Thomist version
Derrida offers us - the 'safe' version Derrida clearly sees as representative of negative
theology in general - has perhaps forced us to dwell on the more 'unorthodox'
moments in Eckhart's sermons. Hermeneutically speaking, Eckhart's texts are no
different to any of the other texts Derrida has examined: they are resistant to all
totalization. Derrida's intelligent and coherent critique of Eckhart remains, for all its
worth, undermined by the passages Derrida does not cite, by the sermons he has not
read.
Of course, whether such a reading of Eckhart can escape the description of
metaphysical 'hyperessentiality' whilst at the same time remaining within a
recognizably Christian framework - such a question lies outside the scope of this
study. Certainly, Leibniz recognized very early on the potential dangers of negative
theology, with its metaphors "almost inclining to Godlessness". The word 'almost' is
interesting, and does suggest why a number of recent Christian responses to
postmodemity have expressed an interest in negative theology, even to the point of
adopting a similar tone.49 However, as we have said, the aim of this section has not
been to consider how 'Christian' Eckhart's sermons actually are, but rather to
reinforce a thesis we have only alluded to up to now: that the version of Eckhart
Derrida presents in "Denials", an Eckhart who ultimately returns God to theology,
will always be undercut by an 'other' Eckhart who de-limits the certainty of God, as
opposed to deferring it. An Eckhart who refuses to understand God simply as 'God'.
48
Denys Turner, The Darkness ofGod (London: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p266
49 Leibniz is writing in a letter to Paccius, 28th January, 1695 - from L.Dutens' Leibnitii opera ,
Geneva, 1768 6:56 and cited in "Post-Scriptum", Derrida and Negative Theology, p284. With regards
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5.2 The Secret of The Pinter Effect: Some Closing Thoughts
Having examined the question of the secret in Eckhart's texts - of whether
negative theology really is, in Derrida's words, a "secret society", we move on to
Pinter and the question of whether Pinter's texts actually contain a secret at all. We
have already suggested that there are two categories of Pinter plays: the first a
category of undecidability, where plays such as The Homecoming and The Caretaker
offer themselves up to a finite number of incomplete, contradictory readings - puzzles
with conflicting solutions, as it were. The second a category of secrecy, where plays
such as The Birthday Party and The Dumb Waiter rely on an absence of information
to produce their uncertainty, and not the impossible choice between plausible yet
mutually contradictory scenarios.
This final section concerns the second category of Pinter plays, and what kind
of 'secrets' lie beneath the texts of The Birthday Party and The Dumb Waiter. In
doing so, we will examine the association of secrecy with death, and suggest that in
Pinter, the significance of the secret lies invariably in the retention of malice.
In Borges' famous detective story of Talmudic hermeneutics "Death and the
Compass", the protagonist tries to solve a series of murders which have been planned
according to the letters of the tetragrammaton, the holy name of Jahweh. In trying to
discover the identity of the murderer, the detective finds himself analogously drawn
into solving the secret of the name of God. The hero, not surprisingly, finds death as
soon as he locates the assassin. The idea that secrecy involves death (and that death
involves secrecy) should come as no surprise, especially not to readers of detective
fiction. One could examine the implications of this pairing ad infinitum: that Death is
a secret denied to the living. Or the Elizabethan associations of 'secret' with
'virginity' and 'death' with 'consummation', opening up endless perspectives on
secrecy, thanatology and sexuality. Or that the secret contains a forbidden - and fatal -
knowledge, one which brings death to the overtly inquisitive. Looking upon the face
of the Almighty, touching the Ark of the covenant, glimpsing the gods besport
themselves naked - all of these have brought death at some time or another. What kind
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of secrets are at work in The DumbWaiter and The Birthday Party'l Are they genuine
secrets? And what does their disclosure ultimately bring?
Insiders and Outsiders.
The central secret of The Dumb Waiter is, ultimately, the planned death of one
of its two protagonists. The sharing of the secret brings death to Gus. However, it is
only one of a number of different kinds of secrets in both plays...pseudo-secrets, non-
secrets, shared secrets, secrets which only the audience or the protagonist or the author
knows, secrets which nobody really knows. Pinter's plays are full of secrets, some of
them imaginary, some of them arbitrary (thrown in to 'spice' things up
hermeneutically and prevent the story-line from lapsing into clarity), some of them
real, fatally real.
The magic of the secret lies in its effect upon the mundane. As soon as we
encounter an obvious secret - the advent of two strangers, the persistent reference to
an unnamed organisation - then all discourse becomes potentially enigmatic. Even the
dullest, most unpromising conversation about breakfast or weather immediately
becomes cryptically-coded; even the most ordinary-sounding cadences suddenly
acquire a mysterious ring. Everyday chatter, in the presence of the secret, becomes (in
the words of Frank Kermode) "inexhaustibly occult".1
In fact, Kermode's classic series of lectures on the secret - The Genesis of
Secrecy (1978) - lends us two terms which shall prove useful in our study of the secret
in Pinter: 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Although Kermode is actually concerned with the
Gospel of Mark, and the question of Jesus' much-debated (in)consistency in sharing
the secret of His divinity with some people and not with others, he is not reluctant to
draw on other, more literary enigmas - Henry Green's pigeons, Kafka's parables,
Joyce's Man in the Macintosh. Enigmas which, like Jesus, invoke 'insiders' - those on
the inside who know the meaning of the parable or the purpose of the gesture, those
who possess the much-desired gnosis, and 'outsiders' - those whose lot must
inevitably be scepticism and speculation.
In plays such as The Dumb Waiter and The Birthday Party, there are three
kinds of secret: open secrets, closed secrets and (for want of a better term) anti-
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secrets. All three categories of secret can be found in the plays; all three categories
involve someone or some group not knowing a certain reason, motive or meaning; all
three categories, although straightforward and easily explainable, nevertheless play a
central role in generating that blend ofmystery and menace one might easily term 'the
Pinter Effect'.
Open secrets are secrets which have been disclosed to the audience but not to
certain members of the cast. In this sense, the audience and the knowing protagonists
become 'insiders', as a third-party on- or off-stage are kept 'outside'. The most
obvious open secret in The Birthday Party are the malevolent intentions of Goldberg
and McCann, which Stanley is well aware of but about which Petey, Meg and Lulu are
naively ignorant:
STANLEY[to Goldberg and McCann]: Let me - just make this clear. You don't
bother me. To me, you're nothing but a dirty joke. But I have a responsibility
towards the people in this house. They've been down here too long. They've lost
their sense of smell. I haven't. And nobody's going to take advantage of them
while I'm here. (45)
The secret of the visitor's malevolence creates in us a heightened sense of
helplessness, especially when we witness Meg and Lulu's unsuspecting deference
towards their homely deceit ("I've always like older men" says Lulu to
Goldberg."They can soothe you" 60). For Lulu and Petey, at least, the secret behind
Goldberg's altruistic facade becomes known all too late - too late to prevent Stanley's
abduction, or Lulu's unpleasant seduction/rape.
We are 'in' on the secret again in The Dumb Waiter, literally inside the same
room as the two contract killers, who are waiting a la Godot in a bedsit-basement to
spring their surprise on the 'outsider' who is about to arrive. The rehearsed
instructions, chilling in their precision, underline our collusion with the assassins:
"Stand behind the door...When the bloke comes in...Shut the door behind
him...Without divulging your presence...He'll see me and come towards me...He
won't see you...I take out my gun...He stops in his tracks...If he turns round...You're
there". As the audience listens, thoughts turn to the imminent arrival of the
unsuspecting victim. Our observation of the assassins' discussions involves us in some
1 Frank Kermode, The Genesis ofSecrecy (London: Harvard University Press, 1979) p3
2
p!58-9 - all references to The Dumb Waiter are taken from Plays: One, Methuen 1976
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way, renders us complicit as fellow initiates in the killers' dark kerygma: unwillingly,
we participate in the secret, to the exclusion of the very person who will suffer from it.
If open secrets invite the audience into a certain circle of knowledge, closed
secrets keep them firmly outside. Closed secrets occur in Pinter plays when characters
allude to states of events which have been concealed from both fellow-characters and
the audience. In other words, both the audience and the stage-characters become
'outsiders', outsiders to a knowledge held by an individual or a select few. The
clearest example of such a closed secret occurs in The Birthday Party, where
Goldberg and McCann make persistent references to an "organization", "mission" and
"assignment", none of which the audience who listens have any idea about. The secret
of the visitors' organization, their purpose in tracking Stanley down, the question of
whether either party already knew one another before their meeting in the boarding
house, even the reason why Goldberg takes such exception to being called
"Simey"...all such information remains empirically out of bounds for the duration of
the play.
The Dumb Waiter also has moments of privileged knowledge which exclude
the audience. Much like The Birthday Party, there are constant references to a
mysterious society, named individuals and previous "jobs", none of which the
audience is familiar with. In Gus' comments about the "girl" they had once abducted
and (presumably) tortured, Pinter draws on the familiar technique of supplying
incomplete information about an incident in order to leave the greater horror to the
audience/reader's imagination:
She wasn't much to look at, I know, but still. It was a mess though, wasn't it?
What a mess. Honest, I can't remember a mess like that one. (146)
Unlike open secrets, where the audience shares the power status of the protagonist's
knowledge and experiences an almost voyeuristic sensation of guilt and helplessness,
closed secrets relegate the audience to a collection of paying eavesdroppers. Of course
Esslin, in his regard for the 'realistic' status of Pinter's plays, refuses to see such third-
party references as being enigmatic in any way. Given that "people don't explain each
other's past lives and motivations, which are already well-known to them"3, Esslin
sees the incomplete and elusive nature of Pinter dialogue as simply unmediated real-
3 Scott, Pinter (London: Macmillan Casebook Series, 1986) pi72
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life. There is nothing secretive or enigmatic, he argues, about the fragmentary and
abbreviating character of overheard conversation, bereft of explanatory notes to assist
the listener. This is how we talk in 'real life'.
Esslin's naturalist assumption that the function of good drama is essentially
mimetic (i.e. the playwright's ability to reproduce a conversation in a pub as
accurately as possible) completely fails to take into account the presentation of such
conversations to an 'outside' third party. Esslin's perfectly valid point - that people
who know one another do not re-iterate biographical asides whenever they talk about
a friend or colleague - is wholly irrelevant to the dramatic experience of such
conversations. Of course two people who work for the same "organization" are
unlikely to explain its function or purpose to one another - a fact which does not
reduce an audience's curiosity and bewilderment when they hear it constantly referred
to on stage. The mystification of an audience cannot simply be dissolved by
suggesting the dialogues they are eavesdropping on are 'how people really talk'. In his
desire to de-mystify and re-emphasize the naturalism of Pinter, Esslin underestimates
the hermeneutical complexity of the secret.
Of course, the irony of The Dumb Waiter is that what Gus believes to be an
open secret (the two killers' arrangement to kill a third party) is actually a closed
secret, closed to Gus (one partner has secretly been ordered to kill the other). Hence
the moments in the play where Ben appears to be hiding an ulterior motive from his
partner, a motive which the audience can only confirm retrospectively:
GUS: I've been meaning to ask you...why did you stop the car this morning, in
the middle of the road?
BEN: (lowering the paper) I thought you were asleep.
GUS: I was, but I woke up when you stopped. You did stop, didn't you?
Pause.
In the middle of the road...I thought perhaps you wanted to kip, but you were
sitting up dead straight, like you were waiting for something. (135)
Why did Ben stop the car? Ben does not appear eager to say - his evasive tone, weak
excuse ("We were too early") and abrupt desire to terminate the topic ("Who took the
call, me or you?") all arouse suspicion. Suddenly, Ben becomes the keeper of a secret
which neither Gus nor the audience are 'in' on: the secret of Gus' imminent death. A
secret kept from Gus till the very end of the play. Precisely why Ben stopped the car in
the middle of the road actually matters very little - Gus' querying of an irregularity is
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enough to call Ben's signs into question. To stop a car suddenly for no reason is
inexplicable - and in Pinter, as we have learnt, the inexplicable is seldom innocent.
Pinter's plays work towards ignorance, not knowledge. Whereas open secrets
encourage a sense of control in the audience by letting them know everything that is
happening on stage, closed secrets diminish this sense of security as they begin to
sever, one by one, the audience's channels of epistemological access to the play. In the
everyday thriller or detective story, audience knowledge is gradually augmented as
one secret after another is divulged. In Pinter, the reverse occurs: the number of things
the audience does not know actually increases as the play progresses. At the start of
The Birthday Party, the audience is asking: who are the two visitors who are going to
come? and why is Stanley so frightened of them? By the end of the play, the questions
have proliferated: did the visitors know Stanley beforehand? Who were they working
for? What did they do to Stanley upstairs? Where have they taken him? Why are they
abducting him? Who is Monty?
It is important to stress how Pinter plays such as The Birthday Party and The
Dumb Waiter diminish audience knowledge, whereas plays such as The Homecoming
and The Caretaker de-stabilize it. The uncertainty of the first category of plays is
produced by withdrawing central elements of information - whereas the uncertainty of
The Homecoming and The Caretaker is produced by rendering the audience familiar
with one set of certainties (Ruth the homely wife, Max the vicious father, Mick the
brotherly thug) and then de-stabilizing them with another (Ruth the prostitute, Max
the loving grandpa, Mick the best mate and guardian). This distinction between the
infinitely speculative unknown and the infinitely undecidable known constitutes the
difference between the two kinds of uncertainty in Pinter's plays.
Although closed secrets diminish audience knowledge and instil a moderate
sense of uncertainty in the observer, they never radically challenge the hermeneutical
structure of the play. That is, we realise we do not know the significance of this action
or that name, but we are 'comforted' by the fact that somebody does know, even if
they are unwilling to disclose such knowledge to the rest of us. The existence of the
information which would de-mystify the gesture or remark and render it
comprehensible is never called into question.
The third category of secrets in Pinter, however, does precisely this. Anti-
secrets are secrets where everyone is an outsider, perhaps even the author. They
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appear gratuitously, distinguish themselves from surrounding events by their very
incongruity, proffer an inscrutable, undeniable significance and simultaneously refuse
to yield that significance to anyone - neither the protagonist, the audience nor even a
third party. Halfway through The DumbWaiter, as Ben and Gus discuss football
results, a small brown envelope is pushed underneath the door. Gus opens it, to find
inside twelve matches. "That's funny, isn't it?" says Gus. Who sent the matches - and
why? Simply to "light the kettle"? Could it be a bizarre pun on the word "matches" by
the author, given that Gus and Ben were discussing football at that precise moment?
And why twelve matches - the twelfth month? The twelfth hour? The number of
players in a football team? One number short of a treacherous disciple?
Unlike the secret of Aston's smile (either treacherous malice or brotherly love),
anti-secrets retain an infinite number of hermeneutical possibilities, inexhaustible by
the very fact of their incongruity. Who works the dumb waiter? What is its purpose in
the play? Is it a symbol, a joke, a dig at future critics? What exactly is whispered to
Ben through the tube? Do they really tell him to kill Gus?4
Pinter has long berated critics for the futility of such cabbalistically-inspired
questions - particularly when they have been directed at him. The possibility that such
enigmas mean nothing and therefore - by default - anything, invests Pinter's texts with
an uncertainty which goes radically beyond even the theocentric echoes of Goldberg's
mysterious "organization". Anti-secrets disconcert precisely because we realise that
no-one is in control - as the cliche says, the secret is that there is no secret -and yet the
effect remains. The illusion of secrecy is still strong enough to chill us.
The conviction that a hidden, deeper, radically other significance must
necessarily lie behind the Buddha statue in The Caretaker, the workings of the dumb
waiter, the envelope of matches under the door or even that now-famous, hastily
scribbled remark in Nietzsche's final notebook ("I have forgotten my umbrella") is
perhaps fading with us. Which is not to say that the meaning is no longer recoverable,
but rather that there never was an Ur-meaning to recover. "Meaning begins in the
4 On the 'precise meaning' of the dumb waiter itself, critical commentaries offer little help. Trussler
sees a pun on Gus, the dumb-waiter (The Plays ofHarold Pinter, 52); Morrison prefers "a hilarious
image of unquestioning obedience to authority" (Canters and Chronicles, 146); Dukore registers the
image of "a man emptying all he has to appease an unseen master" (Harold Pinter, 39) and Esslin,
much in the same vein, sees behind the dumb waiter "a supernatural power bombarding [Ben and Gus]
with impossible demands" (The Peopled Wound, 71). Hinchliffe, perhaps wisest of all, simply notes "an
opening into the unknown" (Harold Pinter, 64) and moves quickly on.
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words, in action, continues in your head and ends nowhere. There is no end to
meaning." (Pinter, in a letter to Peter Wood).5 Noises, gestures, actions happens on a
stage and immediately our attentions are busy swarming over them, attributing
meanings and designs, turning the slightest discrepancies into secrets. Pinter's plays,
with their conundrums and contradictions, their puzzles and strange silences, assist
this deception: they make us feel a silence is when something remains unsaid. They
maintain the illusion of secrecy.
"God is a word", says Eckhart, "an unspoken word".6 If God really is a secret in
Eckhart (a reading we have called into question in the previous section), then He is a
secret of Love, not of malice. To participate in such a secret means, in Eckhart, to
engender the unspoken Word in the ground of the soul and breakthrough into the
loving abyss of the Godhead. In this sense, sharing a secret in Eckhart does bring
•7
death to the knower - a "destruction of the person", a death to all selfhood - just as
Ben's disclosure of the secret brings death to Gus.
Of course, the secrets of terror in The Birthday Party and The Dumb Waiter are
far from illusory. The concealment of a desire to kill and do harm is the central secret
and driving force of both plays. The possibility of unconditional, unmotivated malice,
as we insisted in Section 4.2.2., is what generates the 'Pinter Effect' - a possibility
which imbues even the most innocuous remarks with darker implications. However,
out of the three categories of secret we have examined, Pinter's anti-secrets seem to
generate an effect all of their own - a sense ofmystery and bewilderment not
necessarily dependent upon a potentially menacing presence, but which rather seems
to spring from a gratuitous incongruity. We see the Buddha statue on the mantelpiece
or the envelope pushed under the door, we perceive the operation of the dumb waiter
and its centrality in the play, we/ee/ there is an importance attached to them and await
a justifiable explanation - which never comes. Perhaps there lies the remnants of
something ultimately theological in such expectations - perhaps, to hear a silence and
feel there is 'something' not being said, is the unconscious reflex of a much older
yearning. Will there come a time when we are no longer be surprised by the
5
Scott, Macmillan Casebook, p80
6 Davies (ed), Meister Eckhart, pi28
7 Davies (ed), Meister Eckhart, p46
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incongruous, nor expect every remark to have an ascribable meaning? For now, at




Throughout this thesis, we have been concerned with three writers and their
various attempts to radically re-locate uncertainty in the heart of the familiar. What
follows constitutes a few words on the conclusions to be drawn from this work, and
more importantly the wider implications such conclusions suggest for our
understanding of negative theology, deconstruction and the drama of the Absurd.
1) Eckhart's emphasis on the radically unspeakable nature of God and language's
utter inadequacy to convey this deconstructs a certain Scholastic confidence, just as
Derrida's emphasis on the unmasterability of the text undermines the Structuralist /
phenomenological dream of scientific rigour. In both cases, the writers refuse to see
the ineffability/instability of their subjects as a 'problem', but rather celebrate the
freedom of such uncertainty as something to be desired.
In Pinter, however, the uncertainty of language never manifests neutrally, but
always seems to find itself in a militaristic context - employed as a strategy to puzzle,
disarm and deceive one's opponents. Thus the very uncertainty of meaning extolled
by Eckhart and Derrida actually encourages, in Pinter, a never-ending power struggle
whose battleground is language and whose stakes are the appropriation of one's
identity and freedom by another.
2) Both Eckhart and Derrida proffer analogous versions of a 'thought of non-
destination', where the topography of 'destination' complies with the etymology of
'motivation'. Both writers' pathless ways see the idea of a destination as obstructive /
illusory; both writers exhort a mode of behaviour which is spontaneous and
'whyless', one which refuses to chain one's actions to a reifying centre, a spiritually-
deadening vocabulary of motivations and goal-orientated thinking. Both writers
prefer to wander rather than to march, and encounter thereby analogous difficulties in




In Pinter, however, wandering and whylessness acquire a more negative
meaning. To stray without origins or destination, far from constituting any sense of
freedom or spiritual renewal, merely results in vulnerability and terror. The
thoughtless spontaneity of the good man's actions, in Mick, form part of a darker
strategy to inflict unpredictable violence upon one's victim. Errancy and aimlessness
facilitate anguish and humiliation in The Caretaker, and not a "seminal adventure" or
a "breakthrough to the Godhead".
3) With regards to the Other, both Eckhart and Derrida see the language of certainty -
that is, the mimetic language of predication and representation - as essentially violent.
Although in his earlier works Derrida calls into question the possibility of ever non-
violently welcoming the Other, both writers do ultimately extol the uncertainty of
God/the Other as something which should be preserved, not dispelled. Both Eckhart
and Derrida write of an analogous "openness" towards God/the Other, an openness
which would acknowledge the radical incommensurability of God /the Other, whilst
still allowing some degree of non-violent reception.
In The Birthday Party, this positive version of the uncertainty of the Other
quickly becomes negative. The ineffability and unfathomable motivations of
Goldberg's "organisation" exerts its inscrutable will to crush and assimilate the
individual into its nameless whole. The spiritually-directed vocabularies of negative
theology and Neoplatonism, intended to move the soul nearer to God through the
abandonment of language, finds a darker evolution in Pinter: they conceal and make
enigmatic a very real desire to murder, humiliate and control.
4) The consistent objection that Derrida has raised against both Eckhart and
Dionysius' negative theologies - that, for all their earnest deconstructing, their
ultimate purpose is to defer the 'secret' of the onto-theological God - is
acknowledged to be valid, but not exclusively so. There is another Eckhart (and, no
doubt, another Dionysius1) to be drawn from sermons which Derrida has not
1 The debate concerning the extent of God's ineffability in Dionysius still goes on - see the exchange
between Aimee Light and John N.Jones in Harvard Theological Review 91:2 (1998) pp205-9. Jones is
insistent that Dionysian thought is "not self-negating" - there are "positive" things to be said about
God (209). Aimee Light, however, contends Jones' claim that Dionysius "does not deny
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considered, from passages Derrida has chosen not to quote. An Eckhart whose God is
a radically divine nothingness, and not simply a secret tucked away outside language,
hidden beneath a veil or kept behind a screen. A God beyond 'truth' and 'being',
because He is always already prior to such concepts. In trying to paint this radical
'God'-less Eckhart as the Thomist corrector of affirmative theologies, the purveyor
of a Truth and the keeper of a secret, Derrida unwittingly replicates the same kind of
accusations which have been levelled at his own work.
The question of the secret in the early Pinter, once again, acquires a darker
hue. The key secrets in plays such as The Dumb Waiter and The Birthday Party are
not secrets of love, but rather designs of malice - the privileged knowledge of
another's death or impending torture. As we have seen, the malice of such
uncertainty is infectious: it renders everything, even the most peripheral and
mundane occurrences, sinister and potentially threatening. However, there are also
secrets in Pinter's plays which can have no possible meaning - or, by default, all
possible meanings. The unexpectedness and incongruity of their arrival makes them
impenetrably enigmatic - even if, in the end, there is no enigma to penetrate.
"To make enigmatic what one thinks one understands by the words
'proximity', 'immediacy', 'presence'" wrote Derrida in OfGrammatology, "is my
final intention in this book.".2 To 'make enigmatic' means, literally, to darken (from
the Greek ainigma). To re-introduce a darkness into what was previously illuminated;
to obscure something which was felt to be clear. At least one implication of the
above points is that, in their own unique way, all three writers re-introduce the
darkness of the enigmatic into safely-held assumptions about meaning, language and
God. All three writers react against the certain and familiar, resisting the desire to
clarify and explain. At a time when scholars were more confident than ever in their
capacity to speak about God and His attributes, or language and its sign-systems,
when the Chekhovian dream of reproducing people on the stage 'exactly as they are'
was beginning to change British drama, all three writers chose to restore a certain
indiscriminately the use of language for its transcendent God, but only that language implies
existence." On the contrary, argues Light, Dionysius "uses certain language to say what God is not,
then abandons even this language as saying too much." (206).
223
224
darkness into the midst of things, trying to "make enigmatic" certainties which were
being taken for granted.
In his work Greek Myths and Christian Mystery, Hugo Rahner describes how
the flourishing enlightenment of Greek thought and the arts in the first four centuries
after Christ provoked, in turn, the desire for a "mystery atmosphere" once more:
...the Apollonian brilliance of Greek sculpture...the acids of Attic comedy, and
later the rationalism of the Stoa, dissolved the traditional belief in gods and
goddesses... [and] led the Greek increasingly to seek refuge in the eerie realm of
the cults.3
The enlightenment certainties in Greek thought aroused in many a nostalgia for the
ancient mystery cults, a yearning for what Rahner calls the "pre-Hellenic darkness"
of earlier times: "What man now seeks is the bizarre...as against the Olympian calm
of classical times".4 The desires in all three writers to re-affirm the mystery of God,
the enigma of presence and the strangeness of the everyday are, I suggest, distant
cousins of this desire for a "pre-Hellenic darkness". Which is not to completely sever
Eckhart from his Scholastic origins, nor to re-write Derrida and Pinter as mystical
keepers of a secret gnosis, but simply to underline how all three writers see clarity
and the language of certainty as banal and illusory - if not with quite the same
consequences.
It is no coincidence that both Eckhart and Derrida use the word "abyss"
(iabgrunt / abime) to describe their respective notions of the Godhead and differance.
Derrida writes in OfGrammatology of "the abyss through which the yet unnameable
glimmer beyond the closure can be glimpsed"5, whilst Eckhart refers often to the
"eternal abyss of divine being".6 As we saw in Section 2.1.2, both versions of the
abyss - the Derridean and the divine - are unnameable, constitute a 'nothingness' and
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Oates, 1963) p 17
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nameless source of all names, the silence from which all language springs, whilst the
abyss of differance is "the play which makes possible nominal effects"7, an abime of
"irreducible and generative multiplicity".8 Both Eckhart and Derrida encourage us,
for very different reasons, to embrace the abyss, to remain open to its utter
uncertainty, to desist from trying to name it or predict what it will give us.
If our inclusion of Pinter in this thesis has had any function at all, it has been as
a sobering corrective to this joyful affirmation of the uncertain. Pinter shows us
uncertainty's darker edge. He shows us how, at times, the ambiguity of language can
be distinctly wndesirable. The fact that the meaning of any grammatical sentence may
oscillate indeterminately between a finite number of alternative possibilities is a
purely semantic observation - in Pinter it becomes of strategic value. Pinter's plays
remind us that being ignorant of one's destination is not always a good thing - that
'joyful wandering' can mean ending up in a place where we do not want to be. Pinter
prevents us from getting too 'joyful' about the uncertainty of the Other by showing
how the Other might use that uncertainty to do us harm. Although there are enough
'certainty-seekers' in Pinter's plays (Ted, Max, Davies) to show the
wrongheadedness of chaining ourselves to the unstable signs around us, there are also
enough 'uncertainty-exploiters' in his plays (Lenny, Mick, Goldberg) to show what
might happen to us if we abandon the certainties we already have. To "absolutely
welcome" the uncertainty of the Other may not always be the best course of action,




Positions, trans. Alan Bass (London: Athlone, 1987) p45
225
Bibliography
Meister Eckhart - German Editions.
Jostes, F., Meister Eckhart und seine Jiinger (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1972)
Largier, Niklaus(ed), Meister Eckhart: Werke (Frankfurt am Main: Kohlhammer, 1993)
Quint, Josef, Meister Eckhart: die deutschen und lateinischen Werke (Stuttgart and
Frankfurt: Kohlhammer, 1936ff) 5 vols
Quint, Josef, Textbuch zurMystik des deutschen Mittelalters (Halle: M.Niemeyer, 1952)
Meister Eckhart - Translations.
Clark, James M., Meister Eckhart (London: Nelson & Sons, 1957)
Davies, Oliver, Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings (London: Penguin, 1994)
McGinn, Bernard, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher (New Jersey: Paulist Press,
1986) vol 2
Walshe, M.O'C., Meister Eckhart:German Sermons and Treatises (London: Watkins,
1979) 2 vols
Derrida - Primary Texts
De la Grammatologie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967) - translated by G.C.Spivak as
OfGrammatology (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976)
L'Ecriture et la Difference (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967) - translated by Alan Bass as
Writing and Difference (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1978)
Les Marges de la Philosophie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972) - translated by Alan
Bass as Margins ofPhilosophy (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982)
Positions (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972) - translated by Alan Bass as Positions
(London: Athlon, 1987)
Peggy Kamuf (ed), A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds (Exeter: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1991)
La Dissemination ( Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1972) - translated by Barbara Jonson
(London: Athlon, 1981)
Alterites (Paris: Editions Osiris, 1986)
"Of An Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted In Philosophy" translated by John P.Leavey,
Jr., found in Coward and Foshay (see below), Derrida and Negative Theology, ppl-25
"Comment Ne Pas Parler: Denegations" in Psyche: Inventions de 1'autre (Paris: Editions
Galilee, 1987) - translated by Ken Frieden as "How To Avoid Speaking :Denials" (1989)
- found in Coward and Foshay (see below), Derrida and Negative Theology, pp73-142
"Passions: An Oblique Offering" (1992) translated by David Wood in Wood, Derrida: A
Critical Reader, pp5-35
Saufle nom (Paris: Editions galilee, 1993) - translated by John P. Leavey,Jr., "Post-
Scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices" in Coward and Foshay, Derrida and Negative
Theology, pp283-324
Pinter: Primary Texts.
The Dumb Waiter in Plays: One (London: Methuen, 1976)
The Birthday Party (London: Methuen, 1960)
The Caretaker in Plays: Two (London: Methuen, 1977)
The Homecoming in Plays: Three (London: Methuen, 1978)
Secondary Literature
Almansi, Guido/Henderson, Simon, Harold Pinter (London: Methuen, 1983)
Thomas J. Altizer (ed), "History as Apocalypse" in Deconstruction and Theology (New
York: Crossroad, 1982
Bell, David, Husserl (London: Routledge and Kegan,1990)
Bloch, Ernst, Atheismus im Christentum - found in his Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1968) vol 14
Bold, Alan (ed), Harold Pinter: You Never Heard Such Silence (London: Vision Press,
1984)
Borges, Jorge Luis, Labyrinths - trans. Donald A.Yates and Jane A. Isby (London:
Penguin, 1995)
Brown, John Russell, Theatre Language: A Study ofArden, Osborne, Pinter and Wesker
( London : Allen Lane, 1972)
Burrell, David , Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1973)
Carlson, Thomas A., "The Poverty and Poetry of Indiscretion" in Christianity and
Literature 47:2 (1998)
Caputo, John.D, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1978)
Caputo, John.D, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic
Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987)
Caputo, John.D, "Mysticism and Transgression: Meister Eckhart and Derrida" in Hugh J.
Silverman (ed), Derrida and Deconstruction (London: Routledge and Kegan,1989)
Chatwin, Bruce, The Songlines (London: Picador, 1987)
Cohen, Richard (ed), Face to Face With Levinas (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986)
Cohn, Ruby, "The World of Harold Pinter" in Arthur Ganz (ed), Pinter: A collection of
critical essays, pp78-92
Coward, Harold, Derrida and Indian Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990)
Coward, Harold and Foshay, Toby (eds), Derrida and Negative Theology (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1992)
Davies, J.G., "Pilgrimage and Crusade Literature" in Sargent-Baur, Journeys Toward
God, ppl-30
Davies, Paul, The MatterMyth (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992)
Degenhardt, Ingeborg, Studien zum Wandel des Eckhartbildes (Leiden: Brill, 1967)
Dukore, Bernard, Harold Pinter (London: Macmillan 1988)
Eaglestone, Robert, Ethical Criticism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997)
Eagleton, Terry , "Marxism and Deconstruction" in Contemporary Literature (1981)
pp477-488
Eco, Umberto, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas trans. Hugh Bredin (London: Radius,
1988)
Ellis, John , Against Deconstruction (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989)
Collected Works ofErasmus (trans. Craig R. Thompson - London: University of Toronto
Press, 1997) vol.40
Esslin, Martin, The Theatre of the Absurd (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1968)
Esslin, Martin, The Peopled Wound (London: Methuen 1970)
Frank, Jr., Robert Worth, "Pilgrimage and Sacred Power" in Sargent-Baur, Journeys
Toward God,pp 31-44
French, Dorothea R., "Journeys to the Center of the Earth" - found in Barbara N.
Sargent-Baur (ed), Journeys Toward God (Michigan: Medieval Institute Publications,
1992)pp45-82
Gale, Steve (ed), Harold Pinter: Critical Approaches (London: Associated University
Press, 1986)
Ganz, Arthur (ed), Pinter: A Collection ofCritical Essays (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1972)
Gasche, Rodolphe, The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986)
Gasche, Rodolphe, "Infrastructures and Systematicity" found in John Sallis (ed),
Deconstruction and Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) pp3-20
Habermas, Jiirgen, Philosophical Discourse ofModernity (Boston: MIT Press 1987)
Harris, Wendell (ed), Beyond Poststructuralism: The Speculations of Theory and The
Experience ofReading (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Press, 1996)
Hart, Kevin, The Trespass of the Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
Hart, Kevin , "Jacques Derrida : The God Effect" from Philip Blond (ed) Post-Secular
Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1998)
Harvey, Irene, Derrida and the Economy ofDifferance (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1986)
Heidegger, Martin, Zur Seinsfrage (London: Vision Press, 1956)
Heidegger, Martin, Gelassenheit, trans, by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund
(London: Harper & Row, 1966)
Hemingway, Ernest, Men Without Women (Cleveland: World Pub., 1946)
Herring, Philip, Joyce's Uncertainty Principle (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1987)
Hinchliffe, Arnold, Harold Pinter ( Boston : Twayne Publishers, 1967)
Hong Chu Fu, "Deconstruction and Taoism: Comparisons Reconsidered" in Comparative
Literature Studies 29:3 (1992)
Hyman,A. and Walsh, J.(eds), Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett
Pub Co., 1973)
Innes, Christopher , Modern British Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992)
Jones, John N, "A Reply to Aimee Light" in Harvard Theological Review 91:2 (1998)
pp205-9
Joy, Morny, "Divine Reservations" in Coward and Foshay, Derrida and Negative
Theology, pp255-283
Joyce, James,Ulysses (London: Bodley Head, 1960)
Kafka, Franz , Der Prozefi (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1960)
Kafka, Franz, Saemtlich Erzaehlungen (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1970)
Kafka, Franz, Briefan den Vater (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1962)
Kaufmann, Walter, Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre ( New York: Meridian
Books, 1956)
Kelley, C.F., Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge (New Haven :Yale University Press,
1977)
The Book ofMargery Kempe , trans, into modern English by A.B.Windeatt (London:
Penguin, 1994)
Kennedy, Andrew, Six Dramatists in Search ofa Language (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1975)
Kermode, Frank, The Genesis ofSecrecy (London: Harvard University Press, 1979)
Kierkegaard, Soren, Fear and Trembling , translated by Alistair Hannay
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985)
Knowles, Ronald, Text and Performance (London: Macmillan, 1988)
Krell, David (ed), Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger (London: Routledge & Kegan,
1978)
Lahr, John, "Pinter and Chekhov: The Bond of Naturalism" in Arthur Ganz (ed), Pinter:
A Collection ofCritical Essays (New Jersey, 1972) pp60-71
Lecca,Doina, Human Communication - Models for Analysis , (Bucharest: Universitatea
din Bucuresti, 1990)
Lewellyn, John, Emmanuel Levinas (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1995)
Light, Aimee, "Sculpting God: An Exchange" in Harvard Theological Review 91:2
(1998)
Lossky, Vladmir, Theologie Negative chezMaitre Eckhart (Paris, 1973)
Loy, David, "The Deconstruction of Buddhism" in Coward and Foshay (eds), Derrida
and Negative Theology, pp227-255
McGinn, Bernard(ed), Christian Spirituality (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1987)
Marion, Jean Luc, God Without Being, translated by Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991)
Marion, Jean Luc, "A Relief for Theology" in Critical Inquiry 3 (1994)
Midgley, Nick(ed), Responsibilities ofDeconstruction (Coventry: Parousia Press, 1997)
Minnis, A.J. and Scott, A.B., Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism Circa 1100-1375
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1988)
Moore, Stephen, Poststructuralism and the New Testament (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1994)
Morrison, Kristin, Canters and Chronicles (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983)
Mortley, Raoul, From Word to Silence:The Way ofNegation, Christian and Greek
(Bonn: Hannstein, 1986) vol 2
Nealon, Jeffrey, "The Discipline of Deconstruction" in PMLA 107 (1992)
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Twilight of the Idols, trans. A. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth:
Penguin ,1995)
Norris, Christopher, Derrida (London: Fontana, 1987)
Norris, Christopher, "Deconstruction, Postmodernism and Philosophy: Habermas on
Derrida" in David Wood(ed), Derrida: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
Otto, Rudolf, Mysticism: East and West, trans. Bertha L. Bracey and Richenda C. Payne
(London: Collier Books, 1932)
Penzo, Giorgio, Invito al Pensiero di Eckhart ( Milan: Bompiani, 1997)
Prentice, Penelope, The Pinter Ethic: The Erotic Aesthetic (London: Garland,1994 )
Prescott, Jerusalem Journey (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1954)
Pseudo-Dionysius : The Complete Works translated by Colm Luibheid ( London: SPCK ,
1987)
Quigley, Austin, The Pinter Problem (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975)
Rahner, Hugo, Greek Myths and Christian Mystery, trans. Brian Battershaw (London:
Burns and Oates, 1963)
Rorty, Richard, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989)
Rorty, Richard, "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?" in Wood, Derrida: A
Critical Reader, pp235-247
Rosenberg, Alfred, Der Mythus des XX. Jahrhunderts ( Munich, 1930)
Ruh, Kurt (ed), Altdeutsche und Altniederlandische Mystik (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964)
Sakellaridou, Elizabeth, Pinter's Female Portraits (London: Macmillan 1988)
Sallis, John (ed), Deconstruction and Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1987)
Sargent-Baur, Barbara N. (ed), Journeys Toward God (Michigan: Medieval Institute
Publications, 1992)
Schiirmann, Reiner, Meister Eckhart ( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978)
Scott, Michael (ed), Pinter: The Birthday Party, The Caretaker and The Homecoming
(London: Macmillan Casebook Series, 1986)
Simard, Rodney, Postmodern Drama (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984)
Sheehan, Thomas , "Reading a Life: Heidegger and Hard Times" in the Cambridge
Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993)
Sterne, Laurence, A Sentimental Journey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986)
Sumption, Johnathan, Pilgrimage: an Image ofMedieval Devotion (London: Faber &
Faber, 1975)
Taylor, Mark C., ErRing: A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1986)
Taylor, John Russell, Anger andAfter (London: Methuen, 1962)
Tracey, David , "Literary Theory and the Return of Forms for Naming and Thinking God
in Theology" Journal ofReligion 74 :3 (1994)
Trussler, Simon, The Plays ofHarold Pinter (London : Gollancz, 1973)
Turner, Denys, The Darkness ofGod (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
Wandor, Michelene, Look Back in Gender (London: Methuen 1987)
Watson, Gerard, Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion ofGod (Dublin: Columba
Press, 1994)
Wolfson, Harry A., Studies in the History and Philosophy ofReligion (Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1977)
Wood, David , Derrida and Dijferance (Coventry: Parousia Press, 1988)
Wood, David (ed), Derrida : A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
Zornado, Joseph, "Freeplay: Christian Hierarchies" in Christianity and Literature 47:2
(1998)
